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Introduction
Technological progress is a much studied topic nowadays. This is because there is a widespread
acceptance of the argument that technological progress is one of the main engines of economic
growth and therefore the development of nations and the well being of their people depend on it.
Despite the amount of research done on technological progress, there remain areas which still
justify further investigation. The aim of this book is to shed light on some of these remaining
areas by investigating how some peculiar features that characterize developing countries may
affect the mode and the rate of occurrence of technological progress in these countries. Consider
the mode of occurrence of technological progress across countries. The latter depends upon
whether the country concerned is at the technological frontier or not. Countries which are located
at the technological frontier experience technological progress when they can innovate. To this
end they perform research and development (RnD) activities. In this respect, a peculiarity of
developing countries is that almost all of them are not at the technological frontier but some way
behind, hence they perform very little RnD activities, and cannot for this reason be the source of
new technology. 
Table I.1 - Measures of Technology Creation
1,0962.512.948World
0000Low income
countries
7510.70.55Middle income
countries
3,4492.682.9350High income
countries
Researchers in
RnD (per
million people)
1990-2001 
Research and
development
(RnD)
expenditures
(% of GDP)
1996-2002 
Receipts of  
royalties and
licence fees
(US$ per
person) 2002
Patents granted
to residents (per
million people)
2000
Note: The classification of countries by income into high income, middle income and low
income, is the same as that adopted by the World Bank in its "World Development Indicators"
Series. Source: U. N. Human Development Report, 2004, Table 12 on pages 182-183.
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Such a stylized fact is clearly visible from Table I.1, which shows data on four different
measures of technological activity for three groups of countries classified by income, and for the
whole world. The groups of high income and middle income countries roughly correspond to our
definition of developed and developing countries respectively, which will be used throughout
this book. The low income countries, also sometimes known as least developed countries (LDC),
will not play a part in the remainder of this book. The data point to the fact that only a tiny
portion of technology creation occurs in developing countries. Instead, technological
advancement in these countries takes the form of transfers of already existing technology from
the countries that do perform RnD. 
Figure I.1 - Average GDP per capita calculated across 15 developed economies (the North) and
11 developing economies (the South) for the period 1988 - 1998, in PPP current dollars 
Given the strategic importance of these technology transfers, it is little surprise that a lot
of effort has been put into understanding which are the main channels of transmission. The most
commonly accepted are trade (both imports and exports) and foreign direct investment (in short
FDI, see Keller, 2004). With respect to FDI there is a heated debate on whether the latter is an
effective carrier of technology and even whether it is beneficial or harmful for the receiving
country in the first place. So the role played by FDI in the process of transferring technology to
Introduction
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Line above is prc GDP North, line below is prc GDP South
Year
 gdpprcN  gdpprcS
1988 1998
2086
24914
developing countries, and more generally as a determinant (positive or negative) for the
development of these countries, certainly qualifies as an area which requires further
investigation.
Figure I.2 - Average Gini coefficient, calculated across 15 developed economies (the North) and
11 developing economies (the South), for the period 1988 - 1998
A second feature which characterizes developing countries and makes them different
from developed ones is, by the very criterion used to classify them as developing or developed,
their income, both the average income and the income distribution around that average. Figures
1.1 and 1.2 illustrate the point. Figure 1.1 shows time series of the average GDP per capita
(expressed in PPP current international dollars) calculated across two blocs of 15 developed and
11 developimg countries for the time period 1988 - 19982. As can be seen, the income per capita
is approximately 10 times larger for the developed bloc consistently throughout the period.
Figure 1.2 shows how the income inequality featured by the developing bloc is also considerably
larger than that of the developed bloc over the entire period. An intriguing issue, and one which
is not well understood yet, is whether these differences in income distributions, which result in
differences in the composition and size of demand for goods and services, might have any effect
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2 The 15 OECD countries sampled are: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, U.K. and U.S.A. The 11 developing countries sampled are: Brazil,
China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Rep. Korea, Singapore, Thailand and Turkey. A summary
of the data used to draw Figures I.1 and I.2 can be found in Tables 5.1 and  5.2 of Chapter 5.
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on the mode and the rate of occurrence of technological progress across countries. Even less
understood are the channels of transmission for such an effect to take place. So this is a second
area of research concerning the relationship between the peculiar features of developing
countries and technological progress which deserves further investigation. 
The remainder of this introduction is structured as follows: in Section 1.1 we describe the
issues concerning FDI and development which will be dealt with in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 of
this book. Section 1.2 returns to the topic of income distribution and technological progress to
briefly explain how Chapters 3, 4, and 5 may provide insight into this topic. 
I.1 FDI and Development
Chapters 1 and 2 of the book are concerned with an investigation of the relationship between
FDI and development, which can account for at least some of the characteristics which are
specific to developing countries. There are two issues which are studied at some length. Firstly,
the view that FDI makes a positive contribution to the development prospects of host countries is
not undisputed. Indeed there is a broad spectrum of standpoints, encompassing the neighboring
disciplines of sociology and economics, which vary from the view that FDI impedes or at least
slows down development, generally held by sociologists, to the opposite view that FDI actually
fosters development, mostly held by economists. Therefore the first objective is to critically
espouse the positive view after a careful description of a selection of studies (which will not be
comprehensive for obvious reasons of space and scope) that cover the entire spectrum. 
The negative view rests on the argument that the arrival of FDI into a developing country
triggers two opposite effects. A positive short term effect is caused by the inflow of FDI into the
host country. But this effect is alleged to be more than offset by a long term, negative effect,
which takes place because of the self interested incentives that push transnational corporations to
withdraw the investments they had made into the country. An account of this theory, also known
as capital dependency theory, and mention of the references thereof, can be found in Chapter 1.
The positive view rests on two assumptions. The first assumption, that technological
progress is at the core of the process of economic growth, is the basis of the so called new
growth theory. Chapter 1 reviews some of the most seminal studies that belong to this theory.
Introduction
12
The second assumption is that FDI is an important carrier of technology. Some contributions to
the new growth theory embrace this assumption and include FDI in their theoretical models.
Chapter 1 also reviews some of these studies. 
Equipped with a better understanding of the reasons whereby FDI should be considered
beneficial for development, the reader can find in Chapter 2 an empirical investigation which
brings into sharper focus the effect of specific characteristics of developing countries into the
role played by FDI in fostering development. While Chapter 1 simply takes stock of some of the
most influential existing theories on the matter of FDI and development, Chapter 2 is an
empirical study that should be included in the strand of literature which has attempted to study
such a matter at a macroeconomic level, across countries (see both Chapter 2, Section 2.2, and
Barba-Navarretti and Venables, 2004, for references concerning this literature3). When compared
to this literature, the main novelty introduced in Chapter 2 is that the latter does not simply ask
the question whether FDI matters for economic development, but it also tests whether it matters
because of its function as a vehicle for technology transfers. Its main findings are that the more
technology is embodied into the foreign investment flowing into a developing country, the more
advanced is the stage of economic development of that country. Whether the existence of such a
positive relationship implies a causal link between how much technology is embodied into FDI
and economic development, is a matter that is not solved in Chapter 2, but whose investigation,
for reasons that are discussed in the same chapter, requires the use of a broader data set than
presently available. Also Chapter 2 provides evidence to show that such a result is rather strong
in the case of developing countries, but vanishes when the same analysis is applied to developed
countries. We argue in that chapter that the reason for this result may be the fact that in
developed countries FDI is not a main source of technological progress, which in that region
occurs mostly through innovations that are a consequence of RnD activities. 
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3 Barba-Navarretti and Venables (2004) are also a good starting point for the large strand of literature which studies
the relationship between FDI and economic development at a microeconomic level.
I.2 Income Inequality and Technological Progress
Having studied the role played by FDI in transferring technology to developing countries, the
focus of the book turns to the idea that there may be a relationship between the way income is
distributed across countries and the mode and rate of occurrence of technological progress.
A feature shared by many a developing country, and one which hits the eye of the
western traveller too, is that the economy of these countries may consist of two different and
parallel sectors. A modern sector, which boasts all the gadgetry and comforts which are
characteristic of the developed world, is often accompanied by a more traditional sector where
the arrival of modernity in a broad sense is at best patchy. Such a diversity in the current state of
technology across the two sectors is present in all walks of life, from the type of dwellings
people inhabit, to the kind of transportation used, to working methods and to the goods and
services demanded by people in the two sectors. This dual structure of the economy stemmes
from the fact that not only are average incomes lower in developing countries, but also the
distribution of such incomes is far more spread around the mean than in the developed world, as
shown in Figure 1.2. 
One of the first scholars to capture the peculiar nature of the economy of developing
countries was Lewis (1954) with his dual sector model of development. In his work, he
envisaged an urban industrial sector and a rural traditional sector. Since those early times, in
many developing countries a robust migration from the countryside to the cities has caused urban
poverty to swell, so that today many of the people who form the traditional sector are the urban
poor. In order to understand why the dual structure of the economy which characterizes
developing countries may be relevant to the study of technological progress and development, it
is important to grasp the centrality of technological progress in the process of economic growth.
Another famous early scholar, Josep Schumpeter, was probably the first person to posit the role
of technological progress in the process of economic growth. In his view4, the engine of growth
was the constant replacement of existing products and production processes by newer ones, in a
cycle to which he gave the name of creative destruction. The idea advanced in this book is that
the phenomenon of creative destruction is only partial in the case of developing countries,
because of the presence of a traditional sector which continues to demand goods and services
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that would otherwise have become obsolete. In other words, the idea developed here is that the
higher degree of income inequality which characterizes developing countries has consequences
on the product life-cycle which are different from the life-cycle that a product would experience
in a developed country.
In order to convey the main idea, Chapter 3 presents the basic model, whose core
elements are that durable goods feature several levels of quality (called quality ladders) and
consumers' heterogeneity (i.e. income inequality). Chapter 4 develops an open economy version,  
with the objective of explaining and predicting feedback mechanisms and relationships that are
set in motion when the rich, developed region and the poorer developing region of the world
trade with each other. Finally, Chapter 5 provides an empirical verification of the role played by
income inequality across countries as a determinant of technological progress. 
In the literature, the closest relatives to the model of Chapter 3 are the works of Li (1998
and 2003) and Zweimuller and Brunner (1998). Broadly speaking, all these studies can be placed
in the so called quality ladders literature that was initiated by the seminal contributions of
Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992). While the basic structure is the
same both in Chapter 3 and in these studies, there are some non trivial differences that are
discussed at some length in Section 3.1 of Chapter 3. In Li (1998, 2003), income inequality is
introduced through assuming that labor income has a uniform distribution with mean preserving
spread. This assumption simplifies somewhat the analysis, but it does not allow for a comparison
of countries that feature very different mean incomes. Hence, it does not allow for a comparison
of the developed world vs. the developing world. 
In Zweimuller and Brunner (1998), labor income is assumed to be the same across
individuals, while income inequality is introduced through heterogeneity in “other wealth”,
which is endogenous, and whose source is the stake that each individual owns in the firms that
produce the quality goods. Here too a simplifying assumption is made, so that the other wealth is
not uniformly distributed, as in Li (1998) and in previous vertical quality differentiation
literature, but consumers are divided into two categories, the rich and the poor, according to a
discrete distribution.
While we accept that a uniform distribution may fail to give an accurate distribution of
income in the real world, we nevertheless feel that it is worthwhile to maintain this assumption,
in order not to lose the rich framework provided by the vertical quality differentiation literature.
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Therefore, in this study, income inequality is introduced through other wealth which originates
from having a stake in the firms that produce the quality goods, like in Zweimuller and Brunner.
This other wealth is assumed to be uniformly distributed, but without the restrictive mean
preserving spread assumption. 
As for the model of Chapter 4, it has obvious similarities with Glass and Saggi (1998)
and the open economy version of Grossman and Helpman (1991) because, like them, it features
an open economy version of the model with quality ladders. It differs considerably from them in
that its focus is on the role of income inequality, while in Grossman and Helpman (1991) the
focus is on the role of trade, and in Glass and Saggi (1998) the focus is on the role of FDI5. 
Notice finally that the most novel element of this book in our view is probably the
empirical test of Chapter 5, since there has been no attempt yet, to the best of our knowledge, to
establish a link at macroeconomic level and for a cross section of countries, between income
inequality and technological progress. 
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5 Indeed, Glass and Saggi (1998) is the main theoretical yardstick for our empirical study on FDI of Chapter 2.
Chapter 1 The Relationship Between Foreign Direct
Investment and Development: A Selected Survey of the
Relevant Literature
1.1 Introduction
Research in sociology has found that foreign direct investment has a negative effect on the
development of peripheral countries (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn, 1985). Put briefly, if a steady
flow of foreign direct investment towards a developing country takes place, over time that
country becomes characterized by a high degree of foreign capital penetration. As a result, there
is a dependency of the developing country on this foreign capital. Any repatriation of profits or
capital is then likely to have a harmful effect for the economy that hosts the foreign capital. This
argument goes under the name of capital dependency hypothesis.
In economics, by contrast, growth has always been linked to the accumulation of three
traditional factors of production: capital, land and labour. Foreign direct investment has been
seen by economists, merely as a component in the process of capital accumulation that stimulates
growth. This argument however, was not considered satisfactory by sociologists, who continue
to debate to this day whether foreign direct investment benefits or harms poor nations. 
More recently economists have brought forward the importance of a fourth factor to
production: endogenous technological change. They have done so by producing a whole new
class of models that have been known under the name of new growth, or endogenous growth,
theory. In these models, foreign direct investment is seen as a vehicle for technological progress.
As such, it assumes a new and even more positive growth-fostering role.
In order to understand how these theories from sister disciplines approach the study of
the same phenomenon to produce such contrasting and opposite predictions, we review them in
this literature survey. It should be stressed that the survey is not comprehensive, but covers only
the works that are relevant for the scope pursued here, which is to become acquainted both with
the view that FDI may be harmful and the view that it can be beneficial for development, and
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critically espouse one of these views. The knowledge thereby acquired will give us reason to
proceed with an empirical verification of causes and effects of foreign direct investment. It will
also intrigue us on the importance of technological change in explaining the process of economic
development. We shall therefore broaden the horizon with a more comprehensive theory of
technological change, both in developed economies (core, in the parlance of sociologists), and in
developing economies (peripheral, in that parlance), encompassing  features such as the
distribution of income and the structure of product markets, which we believe play a very
important role as determinants of the processes of technological change and development.
The flowchart in Figure 1 describes the structure of this survey. Therefore the first box in
this flowchart reads "Capital Dependency", to show that we start by presenting the position of
capital dependency theorists, and the subsequent debate that this position sparked. The work of
Bornschier and Chase-Dunn (1985) is used as representative of this theory. To give a flavour of
the debate that followed among social scientists, the contributions by Firebaugh (1992, 1996)
and Dixon and Boswell (1996) are presented. All this is done in Section 1.2. Section 1.3 is
divided into two parts. Section 1.3.1 (and the second box in the flowchart, following the arrows)
focuses on the Harrod Domar theory of growth, because this theory constitutes the basis for
foreign capital dependency theorists. Understanding this theory is therefore necessary to see why
an effort should be made to go beyond it. In Section 1.3.2 (box 3 of the flowchart) we take a look
at the neoclassical growth models, whose conception came later than the Harrod Domar theory6,
and upon whom economists relied for a long time. We pay special attention to the Solow model,
and we conclude that this class of models too is not suitable for our purposes because of its
failure to explain technological change within the model. In Section 1.4 we survey the new
growth theory models, which are centered around the role played by technological change in
promoting economic growth, so that by the end of this section, the reader should be convinced
that technological change cannot be ignored when studying the determinants of economic
development.
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6 Harrod and Domar developed their theory in the 40s, while Solow conceived his model in the late 50s. See Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1995) for references to their work.
Figure 1.1 - The Survey in a Flowchart
The models discussed in Section 1.4 deal with closed economies, and as such they may
seem not to be relevant when studying FDI. However we review them rather extensively for two
main reasons. The first reason has been put forward very well by Markusen in his recent book on
multinational firms (see Markusen, 2002, page 21):
"I have always believed that an effective approach to a topic is to start simple and build
up to more complicated and realistic models".
The second reason relates to the aim of this part of the survey which is to lay the
foundations, based on new growth theory, for understanding why technological change affects
economic development and growth. Our interest stems from the fact that technological change is
the channel through which FDI is thought to have a positive impact on development. The models
surveyed in Section 1.4 are also important for pointing at factors that can spur technological
change. Each model will focus on a different factor, so that the model of Section 1.4.1 (Romer
1990) will point mainly at the importance of the stock of human capital, the model of Section
1.4.2 (Grossman and Helpman 1991) will stress the importance of an appetite for variety in
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consumption, and the model of Section 1.4.3 (Aghion and Howitt 1992), will bring to the fore
the degree of competition in product markets. This is described in the fourth rectangle of Figure
1.
Section 1.5 looks at the literature on foreign direct investment and growth with the
declared purpose of better defining the direction of research to be taken in the empirical
investigation that will follow this survey. As a prelude to that, in Section 1.5.1 we review the
product diversity model with imitation (Grossman and Helpman 1991). This is shown in the fifth
box of our flowchart. The survey of this model serves the purpose of acquainting us with the
different shapes technological change can take in countries at different stages of development
(innovation versus imitation) and with the differing effects that it may have also depending on
which trade regime is implemented (trade with the foreign country versus autarky). In
Subsections 1.5.2 to 1.5.4 (the final box in the flowchart) we shall study the new growth models
with FDI. The aim of this part of the survey is to bring forward a research agenda as to why and
how foreign investment by multinational corporations in developing countries might be
advantageous for them. Investigation and empirical verification of those reasons will be the
scope of the next chapter of this research. 
Before turning to Section 1.2, a final remark is in order. Throughout this survey, when
defining the variables, we kept the same notation as that used by the original authors. This
methodogy may have occasionally produced situations in which the same variable was given
more than one name, or conversely the same definition may have applied to different variables in
different sections. The advantage of sticking with the original notation is considerable ease of
comparison when referring back to the original sources. A list of symbols for each section is in
Appendix A.1.3 at the end of the chapter.
1.2 A Survey of Capital Dependency Theory 
The most authoritative and original exposition of the capital dependency theory is the book
written by Bornschier and Chase Dunn (1985). To put it very briefly, the theory states that the
countries of the world are part of a “world system” with a “core” and a “periphery”. Countries in
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the core can exercise control over those in the periphery. This control is in the political, military,
cultural and economic spheres. 
The study by Bornschier and Chase Dunn is specifically concerned with economic
control. In particular, the authors claim that transnational corporations, with their base in
developed countries belonging to the core, make investments in developing countries of the
periphery, but because they take home the profits that they make, those investments are in fact
harmful for the development of the host country. In other words, the net effect of investment and
profit repatriation, they claim, is negative. In addition, they point out a sharp difference between
the short term consequences of penetration by transnational corporations – the flow of foreign
direct investment – and the long term consequences of such penetration – the stock of foreign
investment in the periphery. The former is maintained to have a positive effect on economic
growth, whereas the latter shall have a negative and, crucially, more than offsetting effect on
growth, so that the overall effect turns out to be negative. The piece of economic theory used to
support these claims is the Harrod Domar model of growth. Since we want to compare the
Harrod Domar theory with other more recent models that consider technological change as the
root of economic growth, it is necessary that we gain a thorough understanding of the Harrod
Domar theory, in order to be able to contrast it more effectively with those more recent models.
That is the aim of the next section. Here, rather, we continue our journey through the capital
dependency literature. We introduce some of the empirical aspects of the work of Bornschier and
Chase Dunn, and then proceed with presenting the ensuing debate. To repeat, the question put
forward by Bornschier and Chase Dunn is: “what are the effects of transnational corporate
penetration on economic growth?”. The variable used to describe penetration by the
transnational corporations is:
(2.1)PEN = KFDIK
KFDI
POP
where  represents the stock of capital owned by foreign direct investment, K represents theKFDI
total capital stock of the country, the second  proxies for , a measure of organizationalKFDI LFDI
strength, and POP represents total population of the country concerned, a proxy for the total
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labor force7. The PEN variable, so constructed, is computed for 103 countries in the year 1967
(see Bornschier and Chase Dunn for the source of the data). The objective is to use this measure
of penetration at one particular point in time (1967) in order to study its relationship with change
in economic development over a later time period. The dependent variable measuring such a
change in economic development is “economic growth”, which is measured for the twelve year
period between 1965 and 1977, as follows8: 
(2.2)Compound growth rate = YN1977YN1965 − 1
1
12 & 100
where YN is gross national product (GNP) per capita, expressed in constant U.S. dollars of the
base period 1975-1977. The main regression equation also includes a number of control
variables, the most important of which are foreign direct investment (FDI)9, introduced to
separate the effects of recent flows from the effects of accumulated stock, a size variable (SIZE),
measured as logs of total energy consumption in1967, the level of exports (EXPORT), the level
of gross domestic investment (GDI) and both the (log) level of economic development and its
square. The main result, obtained by using the full sample of 103 countries, confirms that
penetration has a negative and statistically significant impact on economic growth, while the
coefficient attached to the flow of foreign investment (FDI) is positive (and statistically
significant). These results, and others that try to fine tune the main findings in order to account
for discrepancies of earlier research, can be found in chapter 6 of Bronschier and Chase Dunn.
The study by Bronschier and Chase Dunn (hereafter BCD) sparked a lively debate in the
sociological literature, on the impact of foreign capital in the growth process of developing
countries, and on differences between the role played by foreign and domestic capital in this
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9 The flow variable FDI is measured by the difference between the stock of FDI in 1973 and in 1967 divided by the
average Gross Domestic Product for the years 1965 to 1970.
8 This is a cross sectional study because it involves comparison of countries at one point in time. However, by
measuring the dependent variable over time, Bornschier and Chase-Dunn show an early awareness of the
advantages in terms of firmer inferences about the direction of causation brought about by a design combining both
variation across units with variation in time (see the main text for details). Such advantages along with a far greater
availability of data would later motivate researchers to produce many longitudinal (or panel data) studies which use
both cross sectional and time dimensions for all variables concerned. 
7 Penetration here does not describe investment, but a (weighted) measure of how much capital in a given country is
in foreign hands. When surveying the debate on capital dependency theory, we shall come back on the difference
between foreign investment and penetration.
process. The findings of the BCD study, that foreign capital is bad for growth, represent the
negative extreme in a varied spectrum of positions. Also located at the negative end of this
spectrum is the position recently taken by another sociologist, Francisia Seda (see Seda, 2001).
She considers the case study of Indonesia to argue that the situation is particularly bad when the
developing country is endowed with natural resources (especially oil and gas). Her argument is
that foreign direct investment, along with the presence of natural resources increases the share of
government finances that stem from these two sources. As a result, the government does not feel
compelled  to be responsive to the best interests of the country as a whole, but only to those
interests that are the source of its finances. 
The "middle of the road" view in the spectrum is that foreign capital is good for growth,
though not as good as domestic capital, and the position, attributed to classical economics, that
capital is capital and it is a positive factor for growth irrespective of its origin, be it foreign or
domestic. At the other end of the spectrum is the position that rests on the more recent economic
theories (new growth theories) that see technological change as a major engine of economic
growth, and point at the fact that in many a developing country, where research and development
(RnD) activities are almost non existent, foreign capital is the sole vehicle to import
technological change into the country. This position is of course in sharp and direct contrast with
capital dependency theory. 
Firebaugh (1992), is an exponent of the "middle of the road" position. Firebaugh argues
that foreign investment, whether in the short or the long run, cannot have a negative effect on
growth, although he admits that the effect of foreign investment on growth may not be as good
as that of domestic investment. He also exposes an important problem that lies in the
interpretation that Bornschier and Chase Dunn give to their results. In order to understand his
argument, we have to recall that in the BCD regression the main independent variable was a
weighted measure of the stock of foreign capital in the initial year (see equation 2.1 above) but
that the flow of foreign capital in the relevant interval was also entered in the regression as a
separate control variable. In short, the BCD regression looked like the following:
(2.3)g = 0 + 1stock + 2flow + 3 other controls
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A negative coefficient for the stock variable and a positive coefficient for the flow variable were
interpreted by BCD as two contrasting effects: a positive short term effect due to the flow of
foreign investment and a negative long term effect due to the penetration of foreign capital (the
accumulated capital stock) in the host country. Firebaugh (1992) points out that the negative
coefficient attached to the stock of accumulated foreign capital must not be read as foreign
capital hindering growth, but is a consequence of the fact that the foreign capital stock is merely
the denominator of the ratio that has the foreign investment flow as its numerator. This ratio is
precisely the foreign investment rate (flow/stock). Firebaugh (1992) runs his own regression,
where the foreign investment rate (I) appears as the main independent variable, as follows:
(2.4)g = 0 + 1I + 2 other controls
and finds a significant and positive effect of the latter on economic growth ( ). In his own1 > 0
regression, where the foreign investment rate is the main independent variable, Firebaugh (1992)
finds a significant and positive effect of the latter on economic growth. He therefore argues that
when flow and stock are entered separately in the regression equation, a  negative coefficient for
the denominator (the stock) and a positive coefficient for the numerator (the flow), both express
a positive effect of foreign investment on economic growth. In particular, a diminishing foreign
capital  stock, when the flow is held constant, implies an increasing foreign investment rate,
which in turn is found to contribute positively to economic growth. To support these claims,
Firebaugh runs several regressions using the same data set as BCD, where flow and stock, both
foreign and domestic, enter in his regressions separately and the regressions confirm his
arguments. Thus, after controlling for the same set of variables as the BCD study does, he finds
positive coefficients for the flows and negative coefficients for the stocks. This latter regression
is particularly important because, his argument goes, if the negative coefficient attached to
foreign stock implied a genuine long run negative effect of foreign capital stock on growth, then
one should find a positive coefficient attached to the stock of domestic capital, as nobody argues
that the latter is detrimental to growth. But the finding that both foreign and domestic stock
coefficients are negative, is proof that we are simply dealing with denominator effects.
While this paper by Firebaugh seemed to have put to rest the capital dependency thesis
that foreign capital can have, at least in the long run, outright detrimental effects on growth, a
later paper, by Dixon and Boswell (1996, hereafter DB), reopened the debate, both on theoretical
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and empirical grounds. The theoretical contribution by DB can be described as follows: central
to capital dependency theory is a distinction between foreign investment and foreign capital
penetration. Penetration refers to the degree of control foreign investors hold over an economy
through their ownership of existing capital stock. Investment may denote a short term inflow or a
longer term accumulation of foreign capital, whereas penetration only refers to accumulated
capital and only in relation to the overall economy. The main accusation they move to Firebaugh
is that of not making this conceptual distinction, and it is this failure that leads him to
conclusions that contradict prior capital dependency studies. While DB agree with Firebaugh on
the different productivity that characterizes foreign and domestic capital, they also argue that a
lower growth rate for countries that are more penetrated by foreign capital depends not only on
this productivity differential but also on a negative externality that is attached to higher degrees
of foreign capital penetration. Indeed, this negative externality can be so strong that countries
with a higher proportion of total capital owned by foreigners not just grow more slowly than they
would have if that same capital was owned by domestic enterpreneurs, but they even grow more
slowly than they would have if the proportion of capital owned by foreigners had not been
injected in the economy at all. Examples of negative externalities arising from foreign capital
penetration include tax burdens, sectoral imbalance, overurbanization, adoption of inappropriate
technology and so forth. In order to empirically test their claims, DB introduce the following
model:
(2.5)YY = 0 − 1P + 2 FF + 3 DD + ixi + 
Where the term on the left hand side denotes average annual percentage change in GNP per
capita, F and D represent foreign and domestic capital stock,  indicates change, and   and   FF
 indicate foreign and domestic investment rate respectively. The term P ( ) denotesDD P = FF + D
foreign capital penetration. The remaining terms, collected under the summation sign are
controls similar to those of the BCD and Firebaugh studies. All the coefficients are signed in
accordance with hypothesized theory. This specification, unlike the BCD model,  should not
suffer from the denominator effects problem, neither does it suffer from missing the foreign
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penetration term, unlike Firebaugh. For the sake of easier comparisons, we write below both
specifications (as summarizd in DB):
(2.6)YY = 0 − 1F + 2F + 3D +  ixi + 
(2.7)YY = 0 − 1F + 2F + 3D − 4D + ixi + 
The empirical results obtained by DB do confirm the negative growth effect of foreign
capital penetration while controlling for foreign and domestic investment rates. The capital
dependency hypothesis emerges surprisingly strong from a decade long debate that we have
briefly surveyed in this section. 
To recap, capital dependency theory states that developing countries are harmed by
excessive foreign capital penetration (i.e. they grow more slowly than if more of the country’s
economy was owned by locals). This is alleged to happen because such an economy would be
characterized by few big foreign enterprises that would not develop strong linkages with the rest
of the economy, they would repatriate profits, and their activities would entail negative
externalities, examples of which are overurbanization, adoption of inappropriate technology,
disregard for the local environment and so forth. The economic theory that underpins these
arguments is the Harrod Domar model. We shall describe in the next section the model and the
way in which it justifies the arguments of the capital dependency theory.
1.3 The Harrod Domar Theory of Growth
Capital dependency theorists base their argument on the Harrod Domar theory of growth. Their
choice of this particular model, rather than for example the neoclassical models of growth is
motivated by their need to have growth explained by accumulation of capital. In neoclassical
models (probably the most famous being the Solow model), there cannot be economic growth in
the long run by the accumulation of capital alone. This is due to the (wholly reasonable)
assumption of decreasing marginal returns to capital. In such models, growth is only a temporary
process towards a higher steady state level of output. The only way to achieve long run growth is
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to introduce exogenously technical progress or population growth (or both). In the Domar theory
of growth on the other hand, long run growth does depend on capital (and also on savings). This
is because this theory assumes a fixed proportions (also known as Leontief) production function:
(3.1)Y = F(K, L) = min(AK, BL)
where A>0 and B>0 are constants. With this technology, for capital to be fully employed, we
need   . In that case, output is given by: Y=AK.AK [ BL
If AK<BL, the system faces unemployment equal to  , while the only situationL − AB K
where both machines and workers are fully employed is when AK=BL (obviously the opposite
case where AK>BL, entails full employment of workers and some idle machines, namely  
 ). Both the situations AK<BL and AK>BL are unstable and lead to undesirableK − BA L
outcomes, in the form of ever increasing numbers of idle workers or idle machines respectively,
due to the Leontief technology assumption. To see this, divide the above Leontief production
function by L to get per capita output as a function of per capita capital:
(3.2)y = min(Ak, B)
where  is per capita output and  is per capita capital. This production function isy = YL k = KL
shown in Figure 1.2. The function is increasing in k at the constant rate A, up to the point where 
. From then on, the function is constant at  . Next, notice that the net increase in thek = BA f(k) = B
stock of capital at a point in time is given by output saved (or gross investment) minus
depreciation, as follows:
(3.3)
*
K= sF(K, L) − K
where δ is the rate of depreciation of capital, and a dot on the variable denotes derivative with
respect to time. In order to arrive at the growth rate of per capita capital we proceed in two steps:
First we divide the latter equation by L, to get:
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(3.4)
*
K
L = sf(k) − k
Second, we use:   (with n expressing population growth rate) and divide
*
K
L =
*
k +nk
through by k, to get:
(3.5)k =
*
k
k =
s min(Ak, B)
k − (n + )
where the particular (Leontief) production function has been introduced in lieu of the general
one). The steady state corresponds to the point where  or where . FullK = 0 s min(Ak, B)k = n + 
employment of capital, in per capita terms, is described by the condition  . When thisk [ BA
condition is satisfied, the production function is given by:  and the growth rate of pery = Ak
capita capital is given by :  . Therefore, if  , there is no positive steady
*
k
k = sA − (n + ) sA < n + 
state value k , the growth rate of k is always negative, and in the limit k approaches zero. As a
consequence, the economy ends up with a permanent and ever widening unemployment,
expressed by  . This situation is depicted in Figure 1.3. If, on the other hand, the savingBA − k
rate is high enough so that  , the positive growth rate of k implies that when k attainssA > n + 
the value  , from then on the production function becomes   and k starts falling until theBA y = B
n+δ   line is crossed. We define this steady state, no-growth level of k as  . The crucial pointk&
here is that . This situation is represented in Figure 1.4. If the economy starts at a level ofk& > BA
k larger than , then the growth rate of k is once again negative but approaches zero as kk&
approaches its steady state value. Again, we shall have . In both the latter two cases k isk& > BA
constant in steady state, which in turn implies that K grows at the same rate n as L, implying that
the quantity of idle machines also grows at the rate n.
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Figure 1.2 - Leontief Production Functions in Per Capita Terms
Figure 1.3 - Steady State Dynamics of k when sA < n + δ
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γ <0k
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The only situation in which productive capacity is fully utilized, and no machines or
workers are left idle, is when the condition  occurs exactly for  , so that we have sA = n +  k = BA
 . In that case equilibrium coincides with AK=BL. In such a situation, therefore, aggregatek& = BA
demand must be equal to productive capacity at all times. What this short description of the
dynamics of the model shows is that the only way for the economy to achieve a steady state
characterized by full emplyment of capital and workers is to be there immediately. As soon as
the economy deviates from this steady state, the inherent instability of the the model leads to a
situation of ever growing unemployment of workers or to an ever growing number of idle
machines. For capital dependency theorists, the trigger that causes the system to abandon the
steady state is the long run strategy of transnational corporations that tend to withdraw resources
from the developing country in which they so enthusiastically invested in the first place. The
claim of capital dependency theorists is that once transnational firms make an investment in a
given market of a developing country, in the long run that market is bound to suffer from
overcapacity.
Overcapacity occurs because transnational firms which have sector specific knowledge
and capital, do not have an interest to move to other sectors of the economy. In addition the
income distribution of developing countries prevents the phenomenon of mass consumption in
that market. This overcapacity triggers the long run withdrawal of investments by transnational
corporations which adds to the short run repatriation of profits.
Two things should clearly emerge from this brief exposition of the Harrod Domar theory
of growth. The first is that this theory as it stands, with its linkage between accumulation of
capital (investment) and growth, provided a suitable platform for capital dependency theorists
and their arguments. But the second is that the consequences of the fixed coefficient (Leontief)
assumption, namely that economies are either in equilibrium along a growth path with full
employment of factors of production, or they are condemned to ever increasing
underemployment of one of those factors, do not find any confirmation in the real world.
Therefore, there should not be any doubt that an effort ought to be made to move on and search
for theories that while still being attractive for their suitability come closer to the real world. The
next section is thus devoted to the ‘new growth theories’ that put technical change at the centre
of the growth process.
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Figure 1.4 - Steady State Dynamics of k when sA > n + δ
1.4 Reasons for Surveying the Endogenous Growth Literature - Failure of
Neoclassical Growth Models to Account for Long Run Economic Growth
A first attempt to go beyond the Harrods Domar theory (and its awkward razor edge equilibrium)
is represented by the neoclassical growth theory. However this theory, whose most famous
example is probably the Solow model, implied that in the absence of exogenous technological
change long run growth was zero. To illustrate, consider the standard Cobb-Douglas production
function:
(4.1)Yt = AtF(Kt, Lt ) = AtKtLt1−
where K and L are the stock of capital and labour respectively. Suppose L is fixed, and denote by
y and k the per capita levels of output and capital. Since this function exhibits constant returns to
scale, we can write the production function as:
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γ >0k
n + δ
k
sA
k- k*
(4.2)yt = AtF(kt, 1) = Atf(kt) = Atkt
Suppose that the level of technology is given. The rate of output growth is:
(4.3)gt =
*yt
yt =
*
kt Øf
Øk
yt =
*
kt Atkt−1
Atkt
= 
*
kt
kt
Imposing the condition that aggregate savings are equal to investment, the resulting rate
of output growth is:
(4.4)gt = 
*
kt
kt = 
sAtf(kt )
kt = sAtkt
−1
where s is the savings rate. In the long run, as capital per worker increases, g goes to zero. The
reason is that as more capital is accumulated, its marginal product falls. The resulting increases
in output become smaller and smaller, and the rate of output growth falls. The only way to obtain
long run growth in this class of models, is by introducing exogenous (i.e. not explained within
the model) technological change. It soon became apparent though that this way of proceeding
was not satisfactory, as it left the main reason for long run growth - technological change -
unexplained, a sort of de facto black box. For our purposes, we want to put forward the centrality
and importance of technological change for the economic development of peripheral countries,
therefore a theory that is not able to explain technological change, as the one illustrated here,
cannot be satisfactory. For this reason we shall once again move on and survey the models that
could explain the long run growth rate within the model. This new approach has been termed
endogenous growth.
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1.5 New Growth Theories
1.5.1 The Model with Endogenous Technological Change 
This model presented by Romer in 1990 is the first genuinely endogenous growth model, in the
sense that long run growth is caused by technological change, which for the first time is not
exogenously forced into the model, but is an endogenous product of the model itself. Romer
himself arrived at this result by following a conceptual path through two earlier contributions of
his own (Romer 1986 and 1989). Even though these contributions predicted long run growth, the
latter was not yet an endogenous result of the model, but was produced by an externality. In his
first study of 1986, this externality was due to increasing returns through specialization in inputs
to production. In his second study of 1989, it was due to the availability of economy-wide
knowledge. In both these studies however firms operate in competitive settings, and have no
market power. In the model of 1990, Romer assumes that firms enjoy a degree of market power,
and this is the real novelty of his model. The resulting endogenous growth is made possible by
the following three fundamental arguments:
1) Technological change is at the core of economic growth,
2) Technological change arises in large part because of intentional actions taken by people who
respond to market incentives,
3) Technology is a non rival good in the sense that once the cost of creating a new set of
instructions has been incurred, instructions can be used over and over again at no additional cost.
The novelty of these three arguments considered together is that the second argument, the
presence of market incentives, implies that technology, confers to its owner benefits that are at
least partially excludable, in the sense that the owner can prevent at least partially others from
using it; yet by the third argument technology is a non rival good. By the first argument then, one
can conclude that long run economic growth is driven by the accumulation of a partially non
excludable, non rival input. Because it is a non rival good, technology can grow without bound,
and for the same reason technology is characterized by incomplete appropriability, that is, agents
who own it cannot fully appropriate the economic rents stemming from it. Hence we can talk
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about knowledge spillovers. These two features (non rivalry and partial excludability) which
characterize one of the inputs (technology) in the production function imply that such a
production function cannot be a constant-returns-to-scale function of all its inputs taken together
and that it will therefore exhibit non convexities.
The four production factors in the model are capital (K), labour (L), human capital (H)
and an index of the level of technology (A). The difference between L and H is that L denotes
skills that are innate in a healthy physical body, and is measured by counts of people, whereas
human capital is a measure of the cumulative effect of activities such as formal education and
on-the-job training. 
The economy has three sectors: a research sector that uses human capital and the existing
stock of knowledge to produce new knowledge. An intermediate goods sector that uses the
designs from the research sector to produce capital goods. The third sector is a final goods sector
that uses labour, human capital, and the set of capital goods that are available to produce final
output. In the final goods sector the production function, of the Cobb-Douglas type, is as
follows:
(5.1.1)Y(HY, L, x) = HYL ¶0∞ x(i)1−−di
where  denotes human capital devoted to final output, L is physical labor and x(i) are theHy
inputs used by a firm that produces final output. The index  for the different types ofi
intermediate goods is treated as a continuous variable, hence the integral sign. An important
feature of this functional form is that new goods never replace existing goods, but merely add to
them, since all intermediate durable goods enter into production in an additively separable
fashion. This characteristic rules out the possibility of obsolescence completely. As we shall see
shortly, this is quite different from subsequent “Schumpeterian” models of endogenous growth,
where the threat of obsolescence exerts a negative externality on incumbent producers.
Output can be either consumed or saved as new capital:
(5.1.2)Yt = *Kt + Ct
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It is assumed that it takes η units of forgone consumption to create one unit of a capital good, so
K is related to the durable goods that are actually used in production by the relation: 
  (A being an index for the level of technology). With this formalization, H and LK =  ¶0A x(i)di
are fixed, and K grows by the amount of forgone consumption.
The formal description of the research sector is as follows: the non-rivalry of knowledge
implies that anyone engaged in research has access to the entire stock of knowledge. The larger
the total stock of knowledge is, the higher the productivity of a worker engaged in research.
Therefore, even if the human capital of a skilled worker is the same through different
generations, the later worker produces more designs because he combines his skills with all the
knowledge produced by the previous generations. The aggregate stock of research designs
evolves according to:
(5.1.3)
*
A= HAA
where δ is a productivity parameter and  is human capital employed in research. The changeHA
in knowledge is linear in A, making unbounded growth possible. If it were a concave function of
A, the marginal productivity of human capital in the research sector would fall as A grows,
slowing down growth10.
This specification implies that knowledge enters the production function in two ways. A
new design enables the production of a new good that can be used to produce output. A new
design also increases the total stock of knowledge and thereby increases the productivity of
human capital in the research sector.
Any person can devote human capital to either the final output sector or the research
sector, hence we have the following constraint: .HY + HA = H
As the final good sector is assumed to be competitive, the aggregate demand for
intermediate capital goods is derived from the following maximization problem:
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10With linearity, the marginal productivity of human capital is given by: , constant, while if the changeØ
.
A
ØHA = ØA
in knowledge were concave, say  , we would have:  which goes down as A
.
A= HaA, < 1 Ø
.
A
ØHA =

A1−
increases.
(5.1.4)xmax ¶0
∞ HYLx(i)
1−− − p(i)x(i) di
From the first order conditions for maximization, it is possible to derive the following
inverse demand function:
(5.1.5)p(i) = (1 −  − )HYLx(i)−−
In words, the price of intermediate goods must equal the marginal product of the
intermediate input x in producing the final good.
In the intermediate goods sector, which is monopolistically competitive, each firm
chooses output to maximize profits:
(5.1.6)x(i) =
x
arg max (p(x)x − rx) =
x
arg max ((1 −  − )HYLx1−− − rx)
Because the elasticity of demand implied in the derived demand function is constant, the
price chosen by the monopolist is a simple mark-up over marginal cost:
(5.1.7)p = r1 −  − 
The profit maximizing level of output can then be explicitly computed:
(5.1.8)x = (1 −  − )
2HYL
r
1
 + 
The flow of monopoly profits is:  = x(p − r) = xp( + )
At every point in time the following zero-profit condition applies:
(5.1.9)(t) = r(t)PA
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where PA is the price of new designs. This condition says that at every point in time, the
instantaneous excess of revenue over marginal cost must be just sufficient to cover the interest
cost on the initial investment in design. 
The final element of the model is the usual CES (constant elasticity of substitution)
intertemporal preference specification: The implied intertemporal optimization condition for a
consumer faced with a fixed interest rate r is that   . Preferences enter the solution of
*
C
C =
r − !
"
the model only through this relation between the consumption growth rate and the interest rate.
In order to find the equilibrium growth rate of output, start with the consideration that, because
of the symmetry in the model, all the capital goods that are available are supplied at the same
level, denoted by  . The relation linking capital K with the durable goods xi then becomes  x
 . This yields the following production function:K = Ax
(5.1.10)Y(HY, L, K(x)) = (HYA)(LA)(K)1−−+−1
Table 1.1 summarizes the workings of the three sectors. The equilibrium flow of profits
in the intermediate goods sector is, as seen before, . The zero profit condition gives = ( + )px
us the equilibrium price of designs:
 
(5.1.11)PA = 1r  =  + r (1 −  − )HyLx1−−
Let  denote the wage for human capital. Notice that in the final good sector, the wage forwH
human capital is its marginal product. But, because human capital receives all its wage from the
research sector, we can equate the wage there ( ) to the marginal product of human capital:PAA
(5.1.12)PAA = HY−1LAx1−−
After substituting for PA in this last relation and solving for HY, we get:
(5.1.13)HY = 1

(1 −  − )( + ) r
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We observed before that human capital is constrained to be devoted to either final output
production or research . We have also seen that the exponentialH = HY + HA w HA = H − HY
growth rate for A is:  . The production function tells us that for fixed L, HY, and ,
*
A
A = HA x
output Y grows at the same rate as A. Capital K also grows at the same rate as A because we
know that . Thus we can write the growth rate of all these variables as follows:K = Ax
(5.1.14)g =
*
C
C =
*
Y
Y =
*
K
K =
*
A
A = HA = H −

(1 −  − )( + ) r h H − zr
where, for convenience, the following convention has been adopted: .(1 −  − )( + ) h z
Using the relation between the growth rate g and the interest rate r implied by the
preference side of the model12, we can write the growth rate as a function of human capital H,
rate of time preference ρ and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ as follows:
(5.1.15)g = H − z!"z + 1
Now that we have fully unravelled the model and its solution, we are in a position to
appreciate the contributions that such a model can give to the debate on whether foreign capital
penetration is harmful or rather beneficial to developing countries. The first conclusion that can
be drawn from the growth equation (5.1.14) is that in such an economy as the one described by
Romer, the rate of growth is inversely correlated to the interest rate. This is because the interest
rate affects the return to investing human capital in research, represented by a stream of net
revenues that the design generates in the future. With a higher interest rate, the net present value
of this stream of revenues will be lower, and the rate of growth will be lower as well.
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12This is .
*
C
C =
r − !
"
Table 1.1 - The structure of the Romer model of Endogenous Technological Change
Y = HYLAx1−−
or, after substituting
Y = (HYA)(LA)K1−−+−1
Final outputy Labor
y Human capital
y Capital goods
Final goods
x = KACapital goodsDesigns from theresearch sector
Intermediate
goods
*
A= HAANew
knowledge
y Human capital
y Knowledge
Research
Production FunctionOutputInputsSectors
Any alteration to the interest rate of the host country that might be provoked by the
arrival of multinational corporations is bound to have an impact on the growth rate of the host
country too. Another observation worth doing is that new designs, as a primary input in the
model, enter production in two distinct ways. New designs increase the total stock of knowledge,
with benefits that accrue to anybody willing to commit human capital to that sector. In this sense,
new designs are a non rival and non excludable input. But new designs also enter the production
of new goods in the intermediate sector that can be used to produce output. In this sector, the
owner of a design has property rights over its use. Therefore, the benefits from this productive
role for a design are excludable. 
This excludability ensures that proper profit incentives are in place for those who are
involved in the intermediate goods sector. In the real world, complete excludability in the
intermediate goods sector can be the norm only when an enforceable set of laws over property
rights is in place. In the case of developing countries, where laws over property rights are often
not as strictly implemented as in the industrialized world, intervention by multinational
corporations could contribute to making laws on property rights more stringent there.
A further point stems from the fact that in such models an increase in scale has the effect
of speeding up the rate of growth. In particular, in the Romer model being discussed here, scale
is measured by total human capital H. Human capital is the relevant scale variable in this model,
because it is the input that is used most intensively in research.
It is instructive to study the relationship between growth and human capital, that can be
derived on the basis of the growth equation (5.1.15), presented again below in a slightly different
form and under the assumption that : = 1
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(5.1.16)g = HA = − z!"z + 1 + 1"z + 1 H
Since the allocation of H between the research and the capital goods sectors is
constrained by the requirements that HA be non negative and that HY be no larger than H, for too
low levels of human capital, growth may not take place at all. This observation may not only
serve to explain and justify why growth in income per capita in some countries has been close to
zero, but it may also provide the basis for researching whether intervention by multinational
corporations in developing countries contribute to bringing the total level of human capital there
above the minimum required threshold for some human capital to be devoted to research, and
thereby for growth to take place in the country concerned.
1.5.2 The Grossman and Helpman Model with Expanding Product Variety 
The next endogenous growth model we survey was developed by Grossman and Helpman and
published in their 1991 book “Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy”. This model takes
the same Dixit-Stiglitz specification as in the Romer models:
(5.2.1)D = ¶0
n
x(j)dj
1
This specification illustrates the technology that is used to manufacture a final good using
varied intermediate goods as inputs in production. Under this interpretation13, D is the quantity
of the single homogeneous good that is obtained from the intermediate inputs according to the
production function as described in equation (5.2.1). The Dixit-Stiglitz specification, under the
restriction that  describes a preference for product variety, since it yields strictly convex0 <  < 1
isoquants. Again, as in the Romer model, there is complete symmetry between the x(j) goods so
that no provision whatsoever is made for obsolescence. By contrast, both in the second “rising
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13 An alternative interpretation is to take the Dixit -Stiglitz specification not as a production function but, as a utility
function, in which case it describes consumer behaviour directly. Under this interpretation, D is a consumption
index.
product quality” model by Grossman and Helpman and in the models developed by Aghion and
Howitt obsolescence will play a central role. The similarities with the Romer models however
end here. The main difference with the Romer model of product differentiation is that there the
market for intermediate goods is assumed to be perfectly competitive, while here agents
operating in that market are monopolists with considerable degree of market power who respond
to market incentives. The main difference with the Romer model of technological change is that
here the only input to production are these intermediate inputs and no other input enters the
production function, in particular, human capital that plays a central role in the Romer model, is
not an input to production here. Another (minor) difference is that the instantaneous utility D
enters logarithmically, as follows:
(5.2.2)Ut = ¶t∞ e−!($−t) logD($)d$
We will come back to the similarities and differences between Romer on one side and
Grossman and Helpman on the other after a description of the latter. That way we will be in a
position to appreciate the significance of these similarities and differences for our objectives.
Demand functions for the products x(i) as derived from the first order condition of the
following (instantaneous) maximization problem:
(5.2.3)
x(j)
max D subject to E = ¶0n p(j)x(j)dj
are as follows14:
 (5.2.4)x(j) = Ep(j)
−
¶0
n p(j ∏ )1−dj ∏
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14The Lagrangian for this problem is:  . Taking derivative with respect toL = [¶0n x(j) ]
1 − (¶0n p(j)x(j)dj − E)
x(j) and setting it equal to zero yields:  ,  where the[¶0
n x(j) ]
1 −1x(j)−1 − p(j) = 0 g x(j)p(j) = −D
definition of D has been used along with the fact that   . = 11−
From here, the final step needed to arrive at the demand functions is to substitute in the budget constraint for the
x(j)s as computed in the first order conditions as follows:  and to use the fact that  isx(j)
∏ = x(j)p(j)

p(j)
∏ x(j)p(j)

independent of j and can be pulled outside the integral.
Here, E, standing for expenditure, denotes the value of spending as described in the
maximization problem (5.2.3).
Given the above mentioned intertemporal consumer problem, the implied optimization
condition for a consumer faced with a fixed interest rate r is: 
(5.2.5)
*
E
E = r − !
 
In words, the optimal instantaneous rate of growth of expenditure E is equal to the difference
between the rate of interest r and the rate of time preference  . Thus, expenditure is optimally!
kept constant by equating the interest rate to the (subjective) rate of time preference. With the
further normalization that  for E(t) = 1 for all t, we get:  for all t. In the Romer model ofr(t) = !
endogenous technical change, the optimization condition implied by the constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) specification was:  . Here the special case of , corresponding
*
E
E =
r − !
" " = 1
to logarithmic utility, has been used.
When moving on to the production side of the economy, Grossman and Helpman assume
that each known differentiated product is produced by a single atomistic firm that uses a
common, constant-returns-to scale technology. The economy is endowed with a single primary
input to production, labour. The unique supplier of variety j maximizes operating profits: 
(5.2.6)(j) = p(j)x(j) − wx(j)
Plugging the demand functions (4.2.4) derived earlier and equating to zero the derivatives
computed with respect to p(j) (to maximize the profits) yields:
(5.2.7)0 = (1 − )p(j)− + wp(j)−(+1) w wp(j) =
 − 1
Further algebraic manipulation and recalling that   yields the profit maximizing = 11 − 
price:
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(5.2.8)p(j) = w
When we substitute this optimal price into the profit equation, we get the per brand
operating profits:
(5.2.9)(j) = w w
w
−
n w
1− − w
w
−
n w
1− w (j) = 1 − n
Owners of the firm enjoy these profits in the form of continuous dividends and in
addition they may enjoy capital gains or suffer capital losses due to their holding of a share in the
firm whose value is denoted by . The total return to these owners is therefore  . Thev dt +*v dt
possibility of arbitrage in capital markets dictates that this return be equal to the yield on a
riskless bond, which, for an investment of size  would be rvdt. Thus equilibrium in capitalv
markets requires:
(5.2.10)+*v= rv
To close the model we need finally to describe the RnD sector and the labour market.
As for the RnD sector, Grossman and Helpman consider two different cases that allow
them to put in sharp focus the one-to-one relationship between the private good or public good
nature of knowledge on one side, and the absence or presence of long run growth on the other. In
the simplest case, where knowledge is treated as an entirely private good, the number of new
products dn that can be produced when  units of labour are devoted to it, is:Ln
(5.2.11)dn = Lna dt
where a is a labor coefficient and  is aggregate employment in RnD. This is a special case ofLn
the more general specification where knowledge is treated as a partially non rival good, as
follows: 
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(5.2.12)*n= LnKna
 
where the notation  has been used. and Kn is a stock of general knowledge capital. It is
.n= dndt
clear, as claimed, that the former specification is a special case of the latter with  . Kn = 1
We skip the description of the special case where knowledge is treated as a private good,
because it does not yield long run growth (the interested reader can find a detailed description of
this case in Grossman and Helpman (1991)). We concentrate our attention on the general case. In
order to avoid complications, however, an assumption is made that the knowledge capital stock
be proportional, at every moment in time, to the economy’s cumulative experience at RnD, with
a factor of one, so that   .Kn = n
The value to the entrepreneur from the creation of a new product is: vdn, since each new
blueprint has a market value of v. Therefore, the value to the entrepreneur can be reexpressed as 
 . The total cost of such a research effort is  . Free entry is assumed into the RnDv Lnna dt wLndt
sector, so that enterpreneurs cannot expect to make positive profits. The free entry condition can
be written as:
with equality whenever (5.2.13)v Lnna dt − wLndt [ 0 w v − wan [ 0 *n> 0
since the constraint is binding whenever new product varieties are developed at a positive rate.
The final requirement for a static equilibrium is that the labor market clears. That is, the total
supply of labor must be equal to the demand for labor in the RnD, which is equal to   , anda
*n
n
demand in the manufacturing sector, equal to  . Thus the condition for labor markets to clear1p
is:
(5.2.14)a
*n
n + 1p = L
The model is now complete. The dynamics are characterized by two differential
equations in the variables n and v. The first equation is obtained from the labor market clearing
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condition upon solving for and replacing p with  from the pricing and free-entry-into-RnD
*n
n
vna
conditions15, to get:
for (5.2.15)g =
*n
n = La − vn v > anL
for g =
*n
n = 0 v [ anL
where  denotes the instantaneous rate of innovation in the economy. Next we substitute theg =
*n
n
profit equation into the no-arbitrage condition, and recall the intertemporal optimization
condition that , to derive an equation for the change in firm value as a function of ther = !
current value of a blueprint v and the number of available brands n:
(5.2.16)*v= !v − 1 − n
With the change of variable  , we can rewrite the first equation as:V h 1nv
for  (5.2.17)g = La − V V < La
for  g = 0 V m La
and the second equation becomes:
(5.2.18)
*
V
V = (1 − )V − g − !
Let us examine the features of the system so obtained. We shall do so by looking at
Figure 1.5. The first equation, the one regarding g, is a side condition that must be respected at
all times, and that can be graphed in the (g,V) plane as a negatively sloped segment with vertical
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15We recall from equation (4.2.8) that  and calculate  from the "free entry into RnD" conditionp = w w = vna
(4.2.13), to get the expression in the text.
intercept   and horizontal intercept  . The second is a differential equation that canV = La g = La
be graphed in the same (g,V) plane as a positively sloped line with vertical intercept at V = !1 − 
. In the event that  , these two lines must cross in the positive orthant (intersectionLa > !1 − 
point E). 
When the economy is not at this intersection point, then  . Since the economy is on
*
V! 0
the line represented by equation (5.2.17) at all times, we can conclude that for points of this line
above the locus , the economy moves northwards and away from the intersection point. For
*
V= 0
points below the locus , the economy moves away in the opposite direction (southwards).
*
V= 0
Only at the intersection point the economy is in a state of rest where   and g is
*
V= 0
constant. That point is therefore a steady state equilibrium where innovative activity takes place
at a constant rate. The latter is easily calculated as being:
(5.2.19)g =
*n
n = (1 − ) La − !
Notice that such a steady state can be reached only if the economy jumps there immediately.
There is no transitional dynamics towards the steady state, unlike the Romer model where
transitional dynamics, though not explicitly analysed, were said to be part of the dynamic
process that brought the system to its steady state equilibrium. The world envisaged by this
Grossman and Helpman endogenous growth model with product diversity is one where, provided
rewards for new ideas are not fully appropriated by those ideas’ inventor, each country grows at
a constant, albeit different, rate.
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Figure 1.5 - Equilibrium and Dynamics in the Model with Expanding Product Variety
This rate is inversely related to the rate of time preference  (similar to the Romer!
model), directly related to the size of the labour force L, and directly related to a higher
preference for product variety, represented by lower values of the parameter α. While there is no
empirical evidence suggesting that countries with a bigger labour force can boast higher long run
growth rates (in this respect the Romer scale variable, human capital, seemed more plausible and
appropriate in justifying growth rate differences among countries), the new input here is that
countries whose people have a greater appetite for variety, also enjoy higher long run growth
rates. Such a prediction raises the question of whether an inflow of foreign direct investment into
a developing country would increase the appetite for variety of the people in the host country,
thereby bringing a beneficial effect to the host country’s long run growth prospects. To reiterate,
this result owes itself to the different treatment of knowledge capital, that is seen now as a
partially non appropriable resource, so that its accumulation causes the cost of product
development to fall. Notice however that such an equilibrium is unstable, in the sense that if the
economy does not begin at the equilibrium, it will never get there.
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1.5.3 Aghion and Howitt Model of Endogenous Growth with Product Obsolescence
The model we survey next is the ancestor of a family of models that draws on the concept of
quality ladders. Since this concept forms the basis for our theoretical research, it is easy to
appreciate the relevance to this research of the model developed by Aghion and Howitt. To start,
recall the three building blocks of endogenous growth theory laid down by Paul Romer. 
They were:
1. Technological change lies at the core of economic growth
2. Those involved in innovative activity enjoy some degree of market power
3. Technology is a non rival, yet partially excludable good
To these three elements Aghion and Howitt add a fourth crucial element: obsolescence. They do
so by making their own the Schumpeterian concept of creative destruction, whereby capitalist
economies are kept alive by the incessant arrival of new products/processes that make the
existing ones obsolete. According to Schumpeter, this process of creative destruction is at the
same time both the engine that feeds economic growth, and a condition for survival for the
capitalist economies. The creative destruction of products/processes ensures that the latter move
along a ladder characterized by different, increasing levels of quality (whence the name “quality
ladders”). Aghion and Howitt contribution is that of successfully accommodating these ideas
into a formal model of endogenous growth. Their starting point is the usual Cobb-Douglas
production function:
(5.3.1)y = Ax 0 <  < 1
where y denotes output of a (final) consumption good and x is an intermediate good used in the
production of the consumption good. The latter also enters consumers intertemporal preferences,
as follows:
(5.3.2)u(y) = ¶0∞ y$e−r$d$
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In this specification16, r is the rate of time preference, also equal to the interest rate
(because of the implied maximization condition). Consumers in this economy form a mass of
individuals, denoted by L, and each one of them is endowed with one unit flow of labour.
Going back to the Cobb-Douglas production function, notice that behind its standard look
hides all that is needed to introduce product obsolescence formally. Its two components are the
technology parameter, A, and the intermediate good x. This intermediate good is characterized by
a certain level of quality which profit seeking innovators (entrepreneurs) strive to improve.
Therefore, each time one of them is successful and innovates, this innovation introduces a new
variety of intermediate good that replaces the old one (obsolescence) and moves higher on the
quality ladder. At the same time, the use of this new intermediate good raises the technology
parameter A by a factor  , according to: > 1
(5.3.3)At+1 = At
The process by which innovations come about is itself a crucial feature of the model. It is
a Poisson (random) process. In particular, the event “an innovation occurs when an amount n of
research is used” (call this event X), is assumed to be a Poisson process with arrival rate .
Therefore, the time T  necessary for X  to occur is an exponential distribution with parameter :
(5.3.4)F(T) h Pr{X occurs before T} = 1 − e−T
The probability density of T is:
(5.3.5)f(T) = F∏(T) = e−T
This is the probability that X occurs between T and T+dt. Upon setting T=0, we can find
the probability that the innovation takes place dt from now. We get:
(5.3.6)f(0) = e−0 = 
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16 This is a linear specification, in contrast with Romer (CES) and Grossman and Helpman (logarithmic)
specifications.
λ is the probability per unit of time that the event will occur now.
The next three equations constitute the backbone of this model. First comes the labour
market clearing condition:
(5.3.7)L = x + n
where L is the supply of labour, and x and n are labour demanded  in manufacturing and
research, respectively. Second is an arbitrage equation in the labour market:
(5.3.8)wt = Vt+1
where t is not time but the number of innovations that have occurred so far. This equation says
that remuneration (wage) in the manufacturing sector must be equal to the remuneration paid in
the research sector at all times. The LHS is the value of an hour in manufacturing, while the RHS
is the expected value of an hour in research.  is the discounted expected  payoff to theVt+1
(t+1)th innovation. The third equation is an asset equation:
(5.3.9)rVt+1 = t+1 − nt+1Vt+1
This condition equates the annuity flow that accrues to the (t+1)th innovation (LHS) to
the sum of the profit flow enjoyed by the innovator during his tenure and the capital loss that
stems from her product eventually becoming obsolete (RHS). If we solve the latter arbitrage
condition for , we get an expression for the (t+1)th innovation as a discounted flow ofVt+1
profits, where the discount factor consists of the interest rate r and the “creative destruction”
term :nt+1
(5.3.10)Vt+1 = t+1r + nt+1
Chapter 1
50
The incumbent monopolist in the intermediate good sector maximizes her profits by
solving the problem: 
(5.3.11) t = xmax [pt(x)x − wtx]
Since the final good sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive, the inverse demand
curve facing the tth innovator can be found by equating the price of the intermediate good to the
marginal product of the intermediate input x in producing the final good, in the following
fashion:
(5.3.12)pt(x) = Atx−1
The first order conditions to the above maximization problem yield the following
optimizing quantity of the intermediate input:
(5.3.13)xt =
x
arg max {Atx − wtx} = 2wt
At
1
1 − 
and the following optimal profits:
(5.3.14) t = Atxt − wtxt = At wtAt
where the tilde above a letter now denotes a function of the following term in brackets. Before
proceeding, let  denote the productivity-adjusted wage. We can then rewrite the*t = wtAt
arbitrage equation and the labour market clearing condition in terms of this new variable:
(5.3.15)* t =  (* t+1 )r + nt+1
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(5.3.16)L = nt + x(*t )
The steady state is obtained simply by imposing  and   in both*t+1 = *t = * nt+1 = nt = n
equations, to obtain them in the following form:
(5.3.17)* =  (*)r + n
(5.3.18)L = n + x(*)
These two equations yield a unique steady state equilibrium in the (n, ω ) space, which
we denote by . This equilibrium is represented in Figure 1.6. (n,*)
In a steady state, the flow of consumption good produced during the time interval
between the tth and the (t+1)th innovation is:
(5.3.19)yt = Atx = At(L − n)
which implies that:
(5.3.20)yt+1 = yt
This equation says that the log of final output increases by an amount equal to  eachlog
time an innovation occurs. In a unit time interval between τ and τ+1 we thus have:
(5.3.21)E(lny($ + 1) − lny($)) = n ln
where the symbol E denotes expected value and the LHS is the average growth rate. Thus we
obtain the following expression for the growth rate of this economy:
(5.3.22)g = n ln
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In order to perform comparative statics on the steady state level of research and rate of growth,
we use the fact that the productivity-adjusted flow of profits in steady state is equal to: 
(5.3.23) = 1 −  *x = 1 −  (L − n)
Next, combine the arbitrage and labor market clearing equations as follows:
(5.3.24)1 =  
1 −  (L − n)
r + n
It is clear now that the steady state level of research, , is a decreasing function of α, then
elasticity of the demand curve faced by the intermediate monopolist17. When α is read as a
measure of product market competition, it is possible to conclude that product market
competition is unambiguosly bad for growth. We will use this result, along with the argument
that income inequality may affect the degree of product market competition, to present models
that call for a possible effect of income inequality on the level of research (technical progress)
and growth.
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17To see this, consider an increase in α; the term   becomes smaller and the equilibrium level of n has to drop1−
for equation (4.3.24) to hold. 
Figure 1.6 - Equilibrium in the Model with Product Obsolescence
1.6 Literature on Foreign Direct Investment and its Impact on the Economic
Performance of Developing Countries. 
Before moving on, here is a short summary of what has been done so far. We started by
surveying – in Section 1.2 – a literature in sociology that goes under the name of capital
dependency theory, which claims that foreign investment in developing countries by big
multinationals based in developed countries causes more harm than good to the host country,
especially when compared with the effects of domestic investment of similar magnitude. Next,
we looked – in Section 1.3 – at the economic theory used by that literature to support these
claims. 
Unconvinced by these claims, we undertook – in Section 1.5 – a survey of the new
growth theory, which puts technological change at the core of economic growth. We did that in
order to unveil the factors that this theory believes are responsible for spurring technological
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L n
ω
(5.3.17)
(5.3.18)
n^
change and thereby economic growth. For each model, we also tried to bring to the fore those
aspects that were most relevant for our research agenda.
In Section 1.6 we hope to close this conceptual circle, by reviewing the literature that
studies the link between foreign direct investment in developing countries and the economic
performance of these countries. Since this literature is mostly based on extensions of new growth
theory, it seems natural to survey it in this section, after the core new growth models. We also
check whether this literature can suggest further links worth of empirical investigation, beside
those suggested by the core models of new growth theory.
Once again Grossman and Helpman (1991) seem to be the benchmark whose
methodology is widely used in successive work. This is because the contribution by Grossman
and Helpman (1991) to new growth theory extends beyond the endogenous growth model of
expanding product variety that we have surveyed, and a quality ladder model of their own, to
include, among others, imitation based on product diversity (their chapter 11) and product cycles
based on quality upgrading (their chapter 12) to form an important pillar of the theory on
openness and growth. 
We will focus on imitation based on product diversity because it introduces a two blocs
economy, a rich North and the developing South, with imitation carried out by the South, in a
model where the assumptions are the same as those made when modelling a closed economy.
Therefore such a model lends itself well to comparisons between the economic performance of a
country that lives in isolation (autarky) and the economic performance of countries that are open
to trade and compete with each other by undertaking innovative or imitative activities, depending
on their specific endowment in knowledge. 
The same cannot be said of the theory about product cycles based on quality upgrading,
because there Grossman and Helpman chose to change their assumptions on the process of
innovation. In the core quality upgrading model, innovative activity is modelled as a memoryless
process, so that incumbent monopolists enjoy no advantage in the research lab when trying to
come up with the next innovation. For a given research intensity , the same labor coefficient a is
assumed in the research lab for both incumbent monopolists and outsiders. Both have to devote
the same  units of labour in the time interval dt, to have a probability of success . On theadt dt
other hand, in the extension with product cycles, in the Northern bloc a distinction is made
between leaders and followers, so that leaders can acquire a probability of success  indt
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innovating by devoting  units of labour, and followers to buy the same probability ofaLdt
success, have to devote  units of labour, where aF>aL. As a result of this difference inaFdt
modelling the innovative process in the North, in the steady state followers may or may not
conduct research, depending on parameters values, and comparisons with the situation under
autarky become impossible. Since this model does not add much insight beyond that provided by
the basic quality ladder model surveyed in section 4, we do not spend any more time on it.
Instead we will describe the additional features of a quality ladder model in an open economy
context, when we review Glass and Saggi (1998), a study that takes Grossman and Helpman
(1991) as point of departure, to introduce foreign direct investment.
The extension of Grossman and Helpman (1991) with imitation based on product
diversity does not feature FDI. What they model is a situation where the transfer of technology
from the North to the South takes place because economic agents based in the South strive to
imitate products and processes of the firms based in the North, with or without their consent, not
because those same firms make willing investments in the South. Arguably it is the latter
situation, which is well represented by FDI, that may see developing countries in a weak position
and therefore may harm them (or so capital dependency claims). For this reason, the review of
the product diversity model with imitation will be followed by the survey of the literature on FDI
and its influence on the economic performance of developing countries.
1.6.1 The Product Diversity Model with Imitation
This extension accomodates the imitative efforts of economic agents based in the developing
South into a model of product diversity wholly similar to that surveyed in our Section 1.5.2.
Hence the assumed specifications for consumer preferences and for production activities are the
same as in the basic model. But because here we are in a world with two economic blocs – the
“North” and the “South” – instead of one, this fact entails that when producing a good with one
unit of labour per unit of output, the marginal cost faced by firms located in the North is wN ,
while the marginal cost of firms located in the South is wS.
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Since the pricing strategy of a typical Northern firm is the same as in the basic model, the
price of a Northern brand is given by:   and the profit obtained by the NorthernpN = wN
monopolist realizing sales of xN is:   .N = (1 − )pNxN
As for the typical firm based in the South, Grossman and Helpman distinguish two cases:
in what they classify as “the narrow-gap case”, the Southern producer enjoys only a small cost
advantage over its Northern counterpart. In particular  but  , where    is thewS < wN wS > wN w
S

unconstrained monopoly price that the Southern producer would have set if he did not face
competition from the Northern firm. In this case the Southern firm can only apply a limit pricing
strategy and set the price for its product equal to the marginal cost of its Northern rival, that is: 
 . The ensuing profits for the Southern producer would then be:   .pS = wN S = 1 − wSwN psxs
The remaining situation, classified by Grossman and Helpman as “the wide-gap case”,
is one in which the Southern producer has a big enough cost advantage over its Northern rival,
where now “big enough” means that respective costs in the North and the South should satisfy
the condition  . Then the Southern monopolist is able to charge the unconstrainedw
S
 < wN
monopoly price  , and earn consequent monopoly profits equal to:  .w
S
 S = (1 − )pSxS
The other new feature of this model is that firms in the South have incentives to imitate,
and thereby they gain the ability to produce an existing variety by devoting  units of labouramKm
to the task of imitation; am is the labour coefficient relative to imitation, while Km represents the
stock of knowledge capital that can be used in the South to assimilate foreign technologies. It is
the Southern counterpart of Kn , the Northern stock of knowledge, and just as the basic model
posited  , in this extension the assumption is:  , where nS is the number ofKn = n Km = nS
technologies that the South has already acquired.
In order to close the model three more pairs of equations are needed: free entry
conditions for the RnD sector in the North and the imitation sector in the South, asset arbitrage
equations for the North and the South, and clearing conditions for the labour markets of the
North and the South. Since all these equations are the same as those of the basic product
diversity model, with appropriate superscripts    indicating to which of the two economici = N, S
blocks the variables concerned belong, they have not been reported here. Instead, the interested
reader may find them in the appendix at the end of this chapter. 
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The relevance of this model to our theme can be appreciated by comparing the
characteristics of its steady state equilibrium, both in the wide and narrow gap cases, with the
steady state equilibrium of a closed economy, like the one described by the product diversity
model surveyed in our section 4. Here the steady state is characterised by a fixed intersectoral
allocation of labour in each country. Hence the share of each region in the total number of
differentiated products must approach a constant in steady state. This in turn requires
convergence in the growth rates of the number of varieties manufactured in each region. That is 
  in steady state, where  . A further characteristic of the steady state isgN = gS = g gi h
.ni
ni , i = N, S
that interest rates in each region are equal to the rate of time preference:   . rN = rS = !
All these steady state features, and the introduction of the rate of imitation, defined as: 
 , allow us to write the relationships between the long run rates of innovation g andm =
.nS
nN
imitation m that are implied by market clearing, both in the North and in the South.  For the
North we have: 
(6.1.1)1 −  L
N
a − g g + mg = ! + g + m
This relation can be represented in the (g, m) plane by a schedule having positive slope
and intercept (see Figure 1.7). Notice in passing that the intercept of this schedule, obtained by
setting m = 0 and solving for g , is equal to:  , and represents the rate ofg = (1 − )LNa − !
innovation that the North would achieve if it were a closed economy. This is always less than the
rate of innovation achieved after trading with the South, because the schedule slopes upwards
and it meets the corresponding schedule characterising equilibrium in the South, in the positive
orthant. To understand why schedule (6.1.1) slopes upward, it is necessary to compare steady
states with different rates of innovation and steady states with different rates of imitation.
Starting with the former, the steady state with a larger rate of innovation has two features. It has
a higher cost of capital (the right hand side of equation 6.1.1), because the rate of capital loss for
the typical Northern firm is higher in this case. The second feature is a lower profit rate in the
equilibrium with the higher g because sales per brand are smaller. In the case of imitation, the
steady state with the larger m also has the higher real cost of capital because an increase in the
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rate of imitation raises the risk of displacement for the typical Northern firm. But a higher rate of
imitation produces an increase in the typical firm’s profit rate. The CES specification of demand
entails that the effect of m on the profit rate is proportionately greater than the effect on the cost
of capital. It follows that a higher rate of innovation must be matched by a higher rate of
imitation in order to preserve equality between the two sides of the equation (6.1.1). 
As for the South, in the wide-gap case, the relationship implied by market clearing is
independent of the rate of imitation m:
 (6.1.2)1 −  L
S
am − g = ! + g
and can thus be depicted as a flat schedule in the (g,m) plane (again see Figure 1.7).
In the comparison between a South that is open to economic activity with the North and
tries to imitate the Northern products, and a South that is self-sufficient and tries to develop new
varieties from scratch on its own, we see that the former would grow at a rate: 
(6.1.3) gS = g = (1 − ) LSam − !
while the latter would grow at a rate:
(6.1.4)gS = (1 − ) LSaS − !
where  is the growth rate of a self-sufficient South, and aS is a parameter reflecting thegS
productivity of Southern labour in product development. If one makes the natural assumption
that to develop a new product requires more resources than to imitate an existing one, that is 
 , then this implies a growth rate with trade and imitation that will be greater than theaS > am
growth rate under autarky, i.e.  .gS > gS
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Figure 1.7 - Market Clearing Schedules in the Wide-gap Case
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So we have found that a South that has a significant cost advantage over the North will
surely benefit from opening itself to the North. But what about the case when the cost advantage
of the South is smaller (narrow-gap case)? In particular, we are interested in investigating
whether in such a scenario, a situation may arise whereby the South’s long run growth rate is
lower when it opens up to the  North than under autarky.
The growth rate of a trading South in the narrow-gap case is:
(6.1.5)gS = 1 − wSwN L
S
am − w
S
wN !
This rate is lower than the corresponding one in the wide-gap case18. If the resources
needed for new product development under autarky were not very different from the resources
required for imitating existing products, i.e. if   , then the growth rate under autarkyaS l am
could be higher than the growth rate obtained with trade and imitation, that is we would have 
  in the narrow-gap case. gS > gS
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18In the wide-gap case, new products are introduced to the economy at the rate  , as given in equation 5.1.3.gS = g
Since  in a narrow-gap equilibrium,  .w
S
wN >  gS < (1 − ) L
S
am − !
It would also mean that under autarky the South innovates more rapidly than the North,
or in symbols, that  . This in turn requires that the labour force in the South be greatergS > gN
than that in the North, in the sense  . For this to be true and the South to undertake noL
S
aS > L
N
a
innovation in the free trade equilibrium, as we have assumed, it must be that the South initially is
far behind in terms of its stock of knowledge capital and lacks the ability to exploit an
international pool of knowledge in order to catch up. 
It is worthwhile at this point to summarise what we have found. We have seen that the
extended product variety model may indeed yield a situation where the South can grow faster if
it chooses to go solo than if it trades with the North and competes with the North by imitating the
varieties invented there. The necessary factors for this to happen may be listed as follows: 
1) the cost advantage enjoyed by the South over the North should be small. In particular: 
 . wS > awN
2) Resources required for new product development should be almost the same as those required
for imitating varieties already invented in the North.
3) The South should be bigger than the North in the sense that  and the South undertakesL
S
aS > LNa
no new product development in the free trade equilibrium, that is, the South is so far behind the
North in terms of its stock of knowledge capital that it finds impossible to exploit its bigger size
when trading with the North by imposing newly invented varieties. Notice that this is the first
time that new growth theory hints at the fact that there may be circumstances under which it
would not be beneficial for the South to engage in economic activities with the North. In
practice, the cost advantage enjoyed by the South over the North, especially labor cost, is known
to be large, and resources required for new product development are notoriously far larger than
those required for imitation. Such circumstances are thus likely to remain purely theoretical.
A final but important point we would like to make before moving to surveying the next
model, is that if the South were to engage in imitation of Northern varieties without trading with
the North, its growth rate would be :   , the same as the growth rate thatgS = g = (1 − ) LSam − !
the South achieves in the wide-gap case, and greater than the growth rate achieved when both
imitating and trading. Thus, when the South only has a small cost advantage over the North, a
“hostile” strategy towards the North – copy its products, don’t trade with it – could be better than
an open one – also engage in trade with the North.
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1.6.2 Innovation, Imitation and Intellectual Property Rights, with Foreign Direct
Investment
Because of the reasons discussed in the introduction to this section, we do not survey the
Grossman and Helpman quality ladder model with imitation. Instead we review a Helpman
contribution (Helpman, 1993) that studies the effect of different intellectual property rights
regimes on growth prospects, in a world with two economic blocs, a more developed North, and
a developing South. You may recall that in Section 1.5.2, the Romer model of endogenous
technological change authorised us to conclude that a tightening of intellectual property rights
(henceforth IPR), would be beneficial for long run growth prospects. That conclusion applied to
a closed economy. Here, we want to investigate whether in a world with two blocs, the same
conclusion applies, or whether there are features specific to the Southern bloc that make this part
of the world rather benefit from a more relaxed IPR regime. In this paper foreign direct
investment is an additional feature in a model otherwise similar to those we have reviewed so
far.
As in the product variety model with imitation, the rate of innovative activity is ,g =
.n
n
where n represents the number of products that society knows how to produce. Again, in similar
fashion to the previous model, the South is assumed to imitate Northern products at the rate 
, where nN represents the number of products that the South has not yet imitated, so that m =
.nS
nN
.nS + nN = n
The fraction of goods that have not been imitated, which can also be thought of as the
share of the Northern region in the total number of differentiated products, is  , and obeys = nNn
the following differential equation: 
(6.2.1)
.= g − (g + m)
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Its long-run, steady state value (obtained by imposing  in 6.2.1), is   . Thus
.= 0  = gg + m
the fraction of goods that have not been imitated attains a higher long run value the faster the
pace of innovation and the slower the rate of imitation.
In order to introduce foreign direct investment, Helpman (1993) assumes that a Northern
company can costlessly form a manufacturing subsidiary in the South, in order to take advantage
of lower labor costs there. Such an assumption runs counter to the modern modelling approaches
of FDI, as in Markusen (2002). Helpman himself admitted as much in the following passage (see
Helpman, 1993, page 1268):
“...an approach that presumes that whenever wages are lower in the South innovating
companies in the North find it profitable to shift manufacturing facilities to the South
greatly oversimplifies the problemat hand. It may even lead to misleading conclusions,
and especially so in one-factor one-sector frameworks.”
Having shown awareness of its problematic nature, Helpman (1993) justified that
assumption as follows:
“Nevertheless, in order to obtain some feeling for the role that FDI may play in the
evaluation of tighter intellectual property rights I provide in this section a simple
analysis that builds on this very presumption.” 
For our purposes, the assumption made by Helpman (1993) may in fact be rather
harmless. Our objective here is not to explain why multinational enterprises undertake FDI
against other forms of economic activity such as international trade19. Our aim is to study
whether FDI, as a vehicle for technology transfers, can promote development in host countries. 
Assuming that the risk of imitation is independent of whether a company goes
multinational, the value of national and multinational companies are the same. We split  intonN
national companies whose measure is  and multinational companies whose measure is ,nNN nNM
.(nN = nNN + nNM)
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19This is the aim of the literature that is summarized in Markusen (2002).
For Northern firms to be active in both regions, we must have the same equilibrium wage
rate everywhere: . Putting together this condition, the usual CES demand functions w = wS = wN
 , monopoly pricing for products that have not yet been imitated  , andx(j) = p(j)− Ep1− pN = w
N

marginal cost pricing for products imitated by the South , allows us to express relativepS = wS
per product output flows of national, multinational and Southern based companies as follows:  
 , , where  is the output flow of a Northern based national firm withxNM = xNN xS = −xNN xNN
monopoly power,  is the output flow of a Northern based multinational firm with monopolyxNM
power, and  is the output flow of a Southern based firm.xS
We assume that all imitated products are produced in the South, so that we get the
following labor market clearing condition (for both markets):  , nNNxNN = LN nNMxNM + nSxS = LS
.
Define  as the fraction of multinationals among Northern based companies = nNMnN
whose products have not yet been imitated. The labor markets clearing conditions, together with
the equations on output flows, imply the following relationship between   and   :  
(6.2.2) = LSLS + LN − −
1 − 

LN
LS + LN
In conducting our dynamic analysis we study equation (6.2.2) along with equation
(6.2.1). The analysis that follows is based on the phase diagram of Figure 1.8. Equation (6.2.2)
can be depicted in the  plane as a positively sloped curve, with negative vertical intercept,(,)
so that the curve intersects the horizontal   axis  at . Equation (6.2.2) describes a relationship c
that must be satisfied at each point in time, so that the world economy must be on this curve as
long as  . In what follows, we confine our discussion to values of  greater than   m c  c
As for equation (6.2.1), since we are interested in the steady state equilibrium, we
consider the locus  , corresponding to  . This locus can be depicted as a
.= 0 g − (g + m) = 0
vertical line standing at  . This vertical line intersects schedule (6.2.2) at some point that = gg+m
we call point A. Point A is a steady state equilibrium where the fraction of goods that have not
been imitated does not change. A quick inspection of schedule (6.2.1) reveals that for values of 
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greater than   this fraction declines, while for values of  lower than , it increases. Thus the  
world economy converges to point A.
We wish to study the effect of a tightening of IPR on an economy that starts at point A.
Such a tightening of IPR would reduce the rate of imitation m and thereby raise , the steady
state fraction of goods that have not been imitated. Thus the  locus would shift to the right,
.= 0
so that  and  raise gradually along the schedule represented by equation (6.2.2) to the new 
steady state point. This analysis shows that a tightening of IPRs gradually increases the fraction
of goods that have not been imitated  and the fraction of products with monopoly power that are
produced by Northern-based multinationals .
The next step is to assess the impact of changes in the variables   and  , as caused by a 
tightening of IPR, on welfare both in the North and in the South. We expect the North to benefit
from a tightening of IPR, as predicted by the closed economy Romer model of section 4, while at
this point the effect on Southern welfare is more ambiguous, and we hope this model can clarify
the direction of influence for the South. 
In both the North and the South the indirect flow of instantaneous utility is given by the
log of real spending:  where u is utility flow per unit of time, E is aggregatelnu = lnE − lnP
expenditure and p is a price index such that: 
(6.2.3)P = ¶0n p(j)1−dj
1
1−
Taking account of Northern monopoly pricing and Southern marginal cost pricing, this
price index can be represented by:
 
(6.2.4)P = n 11− (pN )1− + (1 − )(pS )1−
1
1−
Furthermore, recalling that with foreign direct investment, wage rates are the same in
both regions, we can write the price index as follows:
(6.2.5)P = n 11− w[−1 + (1 − )] 11−
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Next, plug this price index into the log of real spending and notice that, as in the South
income per capita equals the wage rate w, the logs of E and w cancel out.
Figure 1.8 - Phase Diagram and Dynamic Equilibrium for the Helpman Model
We are left with the following utility flow for the South:
(6.2.6)ln uS = 1 − 1 ln n + 1 − 1 ln[−1 + (1 − )]
It is easy now to calculate the impact of a change in  on 5.2.3:
(6.2.7)Ø ln u
S
Ø =
Ø[−1 + (1 − )]
Ø = −1 − 1 < 0
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 20Recall that   and that 0 < α < 1 so that   . = 11− > 1 g  − 1 > 0 −1 < 1 g −1 − 1 < 0
A
ζ
µ
_ζζ
c
6.2.2
ζ=0.
Thus the sign of the change is negative20 and this model’s prediction is that an increase in
 , in turn caused by a tightening of IPR, hurts the South, by reducing its welfare. 
This prediction contradicts that of the closed economy model with endogenous
technological change of section 4.1, which led us to conclude that tighter IPR benefit growth.
The main determinant of such a different conclusion seems to be the fact that this model, unlike
the other, is in the context of an open economy. Although empirical investigation in support of
either of these conclusions is required, an important insight emerges from reviewing this model:
one should be very cautious when applying conclusions derived in a closed economy context to
an open economy or indeed to a developing country within an open economy framework.
1.6.3 A Complete, Two-blocs, Quality-ladder Model with Innovation, Imitation and
Foreign Direct Investment
The time has come to survey a full-fledged quality ladder, open-economy model with innovation,
imitation and foreign direct investment (FDI), all determined endogenously as a result of the
reciprocal influence and feedback that these three activities exercise on one another. The model
in question is Glass and Saggi (1998), where once again a world is hypothesized with two
economic blocs, the more developed North and the developing South. 
The framework used, that of quality ladders, serves the purpose of making possible the
introduction of crucial concepts such as that of technology frontier – the state-of-the-art
production – that of technology gap – the distance between some product and the technology
frontier – and that of technology transfer – a movement of technology to fill that gap. The
vehicle used for the transfer of technology is foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Our main goal when surveying this model is still unchanged, and it is to determine, in
this case with the aid of this model, whether FDI of rich countries, or , more precisely, of
multinational enterprises based in rich countries, into a developing country, is beneficial or
harmful for the host country. 
The basic features are similar to Grossman and Helpman (1991) quality ladder model
with imitation. Thus we have a world with two countries, indexed by , North andi c {N, S}
South. Firms in these two countries differ in their RnD abilities so that Northern firms innovate
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while Southern firms imitate. Consumers who inhabit these two countries can choose from a
continuum of products indexed by , available in a discrete number of quality levels,j c [0, 1]
indexed by m. One important difference with respect to Grossman and Helpman (1991) is that
here there is a necessity to have more than one quality level of each product to sell in equilibrium
(the reasons for this are provided below). This is achieved by replacing the representative
consumer with the assumption that consumers are of two types, indexed by , low and* c {A, B}
high, and by assuming that the taste for quality improvement, as measured by , differs acrossm
types. We posit , so that high type consumers value quality improvements more thanB > A > 1
low type consumers. Consumers’ intertemporal preferences are:
(6.3.1)Ui* = ¶01 e−!t log ui*(t)dt
whereas instantaneous utility is:
(6.3.2)log ui*(t) = ¶01 log m(* )mxim* (j, t) dj
where  is consumption by type  consumers of quality level m of product j at time t. Thesexm*(j, t) *
preferences are the same as in Grossman and Helpman (1991), except that here the index for
different consumer types  is added.  Consumers maximise lifetime utility subject to an*
aggregate intertemporal budget constraint. Since consumers are of different types who value
quality differently, the price that makes a consumer indifferent between one quality level and the
quality level below varies across types. Therefore, provided that a sufficient percentage of
income is in the hands of high-type consumers, we have a situation where more than one quality
sells in equilibrium (separating equilibrium). 
We want to focus on the separating equilibrium in order to be able to rank FDI as either
high quality FDI or low quality FDI, depending on the technology transferred relative to the
state-of-the-art. In particular, in a separating equilibrium with two types of consumers, two
quality levels of each product sell at any point in time. Since it is also assumed that Southern
firms have access to so called “discarded technology”, technology that is no longer profitable,
the Southern technology frontier is at most two quality levels below the Northern technology
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frontier for any product. Northern firms may produce in the South, where costs are lower, but
only for appropriate technologies, technologies for producing quality levels no more than one
step ahead of the Southern technology frontier. Therefore in those markets where the North has
one quality level lead over the South, Northern firms export state-of-the-art technology to the
South. We classify this as high quality FDI. By contrast, in those markets where the North
enjoys a two quality level lead over the South, Northern firms export to the South technologies
that are one step below the state-of-the-art. We call this low quality FDI. This model captures
well the idea that some developing countries are so backward with respect to the Northern
technology frontier that they cannot attract high quality FDI. 
In order to describe production, we need to define production costs for each type of firm.
If we normalise the unit labour requirement in production to 1, and all prices by the Southern
wage, we have that the marginal cost of production is  for Southern firms and wS = 1
  for Northern firms. We further define the marginal cost of production for aw = wNwS = wN
multinational to be  for quality levels one step above the Southern technology frontier. Assume
that multinationals have a cost disadvantage over Southern firms, , stemming from their > 1
lack of familiarity with the Southern environment.
Now the model rolls in a well known fashion. Firms both in the North and the South set
prices and enjoy profits along the same lines as in Grossman and Helpman (1991). Each firm
applies limit pricing with respect to the marginal cost of the competitor producing the quality
level immediately below, just to prevent it from being profitable.  Thus in markets where
Northern firms have a two quality level lead over Southern firms, the firm producing the low
quality good becomes a multinational, to produce it in the South too (low quality FDI). Such a
multinational sets a price  . Given that its marginal production cost is  , this firm willpML = A 
have sales of   and profits equal to:E
A
A
(6.3.3)ML = EA 1 − A
As for the Northern firm producing the state-of-the-art, it too applies limit pricing with
respect to the multinational competitor, so that its price is   and the sales it enjoys are pNH = BA
 . Its profits will then be:E
B
BA
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 (6.3.4)NH = EB 1 − wBA
In the same manner, in markets where the Northern technology frontier is only one step
ahead of the Southern one, and where the multinational firm that transfers high quality FDI is
now the Northern firm which produces the best quality, the price set by the latter is  , itspMH = B
sales are  , and its profits are:E
B
B
(6.3.5)MH = EB 1 − 1B
The Southern firm competing with this multinational sells the quality level one step
below the state-of-the-art, sets a price  , equal to the marginal cost of the multinationalpSL = 
(again, limit pricing), and enjoys profits of:
(6.3.6)SL = EA 1 − 1
In order to close the model, following a well known pattern, we need three more sets of
equations: the equations defining the value of producing firms (asset arbitrage equations), free
entry conditions for the RnD sector in the North and the imitation sector in the South, and
clearing conditions for the labor markets of the North and the South. Once again, these equations
have been relegated at the end, to Appendix A.1.2. In the main text, we proceed with the study of
the steady-state equilibrium and the conclusions that can be derived from it.
To begin the study of steady-state equilibrium, notice that in steady-state the extent of
high quality FDI, denoted by , remains constant at the aggregate level. FDI shifts from low
quality to high quality are due to imitation and are measured by , where  is the imitation(1 − ) 
intensity undertaken by a Southern firm, and , is the extent of low-quality FDI. In the(1 − )
same manner, FDI shifts from high quality to low quality are due to innovation and are measured
by , where  is the innovation intensity undertaken by Northern firms. Constancy in the 
aggregate extent of high quality FDI suggests that the following condition must hold:
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(6.3.7) = (1 − )
Other important quantities that we want to introduce at this point are:
1) The rate of imitation relative to innovation. Since imitation targets only low quality FDI
markets, while innovation targets all markets, we can define this rate as follows:
(6.3.8)I h (1 − ) =  = 
after applying condition (6.3.7). We see that the rate of imitation relative to innovation equals the
extent of high quality FDI.
2) The aggregate flow of technology transferred to the South through FDI expressed by:
(6.3.9)F h (1 − ) + (1 − ) =  −  +  = 
once again, in force of condition (6.3.7). This flow is equal to the rate of innovation.
3) The average technology gap from the Northern technology frontier, expressed by:
(6.3.10)G = 2(1 − ) +  = 2 −  = 2 − I
Therefore, forces that increase the rate of imitation relative to innovation I, shrink the
technology gap G and expand the extent of high quality FDI . The equilibrium is characterised
by 4 equations in 4 unknowns. Define relative labour as  , let  denote) = LNLS & = f(B) = 1 − f(A)
the share of income spent on high quality levels, so that  and  , and let EB = &E EA = (1 − &)E
 represent the base quality increment and   represent the quality premium in h A > 1  h BA > 1
the view of high-type consumers. The system of the four equations in four unknowns can then be
written as follows:
 
(6.3.11) + &(1 − )2 E = )L
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(6.3.12)  + (1 − &) + [& + ( − )(1 − &)] E = L
wa =
(! +  + )& 1 − w2 + (1 − &) 1 −

 +
(! +  + )& 1 − 1! +  + 
(1 − &) 1 − ! +  E
(! +  + )2
(6.3.13) 
(6.3.14)(1 − &) 1 − 1 E = a(! + )
Two of the four equations are given by the two labour market clearing conditions.
Equation  (6.3.11) is the labor market clearing condition for the North and (6.3.12) is the labor
market clearing condition for the South. The remaining two are derived by replacing firm values
and profits into the free entry conditions for RnD and for imitation. Equation (6.3.13) is the
innovation valuation condition and equation (6.3.14) is the imitation valuation condition. The
four unknowns are aggregate spending E, relative wage w, the rate of innovation  and the extent
of high quality FDI . A quick inspection at the system reveals that it is possible to reduce it to
two equations in two unknown (  and ), by solving the innovation valuation condition for the 
relative wage w and the imitation valuation condition for aggregate spending E, and replacing
them in the two labour market clearing conditions. The two equations system so obtained is
reported below:
(6.3.15)a + &(1 − )2
a(! + )
(1 − &) 1 − 1
= )L
(6.3.16)a + (1 − &) + [& + ( − )(1 − &)]
a(! + )
(1 − &) 1 − 1
= L
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Such a system admits a pictorial representation in the plane , as in Figure 1.9, which(,)
facilitates the analysis. The Northern labour constraint (6.3.2) can be drawn as an
upward-sloping schedule, whereas the Southern labour constraint (6.3.3) is drawn as a
downward-sloping schedule. The two schedules meet once in the positive orthant to ensure a
unique positive rate of innovation and a positive percentage of markets with high quality FDI in
equilibrium. Change in the parameters will obviously affect the equilibrium outcome. Changes in
two of the parameters are particularly easy to study, because they only appear in one of the two
equations, leaving the other unaffected. First consider a change in , which expresses relative)
labour supply, and could more generally be taken to express relative resources, including for
instance human capital. If this wider meaning is accepted, an increase in  would mean larger)
Northern resources relative to Southern resources. Such an increase shifts the (6.3.2) curve to the
right, while (6.3.3) remains unchanged. The new equilibrium is therefore characterised by a
higher innovation rate , along  with a lower percentage of high quality FDI markets.
The new equilibrium results in an increased aggregate flow of technology transferred to
the South, but an increase in the average technology gap too, as the South sees the Northern
technology frontier move further away from its own frontier. Needless to say, the reverse applies
to a decrease in relative resources supply, with the result being a lower , a higher , less 
technology transferred to the South, but a narrower technology gap between the North and the
South.
The other parameter change that is easy to study is , the resource requirement in
innovation relative to imitation. As shown in Figure 1.10, when imitation becomes relatively
easier to carry out than innovation, i.e. an increase in   , the (6.3.2) curve moves to the left and
the new equilibrium point moves to the left too, along the (6.3.3) curve which stays once again
unchanged. Because the (6.3.3) curve slopes downward, the new equilibrium features a lower
rate of innovation  and a larger extent of high quality FDI . The result is again a smaller 
absolute flow of technology to the South, but also a smaller technology gap between the South
and the North.
One can think of many factors that might translate into an increase in relative innovation
difficulty (a higher ). Certainly globalisation of markets, improvement in communications or a
more skilled labour force in the South are only a few obvious candidates that would render
imitation a relatively easier activity than innovation.
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Other parameter changes studied by Glass and Saggi (1998) are an increase in the share of
income spent on high quality levels  and an increase in the cost disadvantage faced by&
multinationals . Glass and Saggi (1998) also investigate the effect on the equilibrium outcome
of the introduction of a tax on the production of a low quality multinational, and the introduction
of a subsidy to Southern imitation.
Other parameter changes studied by Glass and Saggi (1998) are an increase in the share
of income spent on high quality levels  and an increase in the cost disadvantage faced by&
multinationals . Glass and Saggi (1998) also investigate the effect on the equilibrium outcome
of the introduction of a tax on the production of a low quality multinational, and the introduction
of a subsidy to Southern imitation.
When the share of income spent on high quality levels increases, both the extent of high
quality FDI markets and the rate of innovation decrease, while aggregate spending increases. As
a result, the flow of technology transfer to the South decreases and the average technology gap
increases. This somewhat counterintuitive result is due to the effect on the incentives to
innovation that an increase in  has. Indeed, more money spent on high quality levels, pushes up&
the profitability of innovative activities, thereby giving innovators a stronger incentive which
contributes to a reduction of the rate of imitation relative to innovation.
A higher cost faced by multinationals, (a higher ) results in more markets with high
quality FDI and a higher rate of innovation. Aggregate spending however goes down. Thus more
technology is transferred to the South and the technology gap shrinks. The reasons for these
positive developments for the South, in the face of a higher cost disadvantage by multinationals,
is that such a higher  allows Southern firms, which apply limit pricing and price their goods at  
, to increase their prices and their profits. This increase translates into higher incentives for
imitation. Lower production levels, because of higher prices, also free up resources that can be
transferred to imitative activities.
A tax on low quality multinationals and a subsidy to Southern imitation have both the
positive effect of rising the extent of high quality FDI and the rate of innovation, which, as it
should be clear by now, result in higher imitation relative to innovation, a bigger flow of
technology transferred to the South and a smaller technology gap.
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Figure 1.9 - Increase in Relative Resource Supply ψ
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Figure 1.10 - Increase in Relative Innovation Difficulty
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The two most important contributions that emerge from the model just surveyed are: in
the debate on whether FDI contributes positively or not to the development of “Southern”
countries, the focus cannot be just on whether for a developing country it is beneficial to accept
FDI or not, but it is important to be aware of the fact that there are different types of FDI, and
they may contribute to developing countries in differing degrees. In particular, there is little
argument that FDI with high technological content benefits the host country. On the other hand,
FDI of the low quality type may be much less appealing for long run growth prospects of the
host country.
The second contribution of this model is that developing countries must make themselves
attractive to the high quality type of FDI. The best vehicle for reaching this goal is to encourage
in every possible way imitative activities of the high technologies invented in the rich world. It is
through imitation that the developing country leaps nearer to the Northern technology frontier,
and that advance provides the correct incentives to foreign multinationals to bring in
state-of-the-art technologies.
As for this model’s contribution to our research agenda, the most obvious suggestion is to
carry out a fact-finding study in a selected number of developing countries, the outcome of
which should be to classify the chosen countries on the basis of the technological content of the
FDI that they host. Such a classification would form a valuable database that could be used to
carry out a regression analysis on the effect of each type of foreign direct investment on recent
economic performance of the host countries.
Other relevant empirical investigations concern the relationship between the type of FDI,
the degree of imitative activity in the host country, the size of the stock of human capital (a
factor that influences both the relative resource supply parameter and the relative innovation
difficulty parameter), and the relative competitiveness of domestic firms (a factor that increases
the relative cost disadvantage of foreign multinationals).
1.6.4 The Compounded Effect of FDI and Human Capital on Economic Growth
The examination of whether and how FDI and the stock of human capital interact to affect
growth rates in developing countries is the topic investigated in Borensztein et al (1998). This
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study consists of two parts, a theoretical model which aims at providing an illustrative
framework that can explain the compounded effect of FDI and human capital on growth and a
second part which empirically tests it.
The theoretical model posits that growth happens through expansion in the number of
product varieties, along the lines of Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991, chp. 3 and
11). Foreign direct investment, a main feature of this model, is introduced as follows: total
capital in a given economy is assumed to be a composite of a continuum of varieties of capital
goods, as given by:
(6.4.1)K = ¶0N x(j)1−dj
1
1−
where each variety is denoted by . Total capital enters the production of a consumption good,x(j)
according to the following technology:
(6.4.2)Yt = AHtKt1−
where H, for human capital, is the other input to production, and A represents the exogenous
state of environment. Capital goods are produced both by domestic and foreign firms that have
undertaken a direct investment in the economy. The number of goods produced by domestic
firms is n, while foreign firms produce  goods, to yield a total number of varieties: .n& N = n + n&
To repeat, N is the total number of varieties produced in a certain economy; n of them are
produced by domestic firms and  of them by foreign firms.n&
To increase the number of varieties, technology which is available in more advanced
countries must be adapted so that new capital goods can be introduced. This process calls for a
fixed setup cost F, that is a function of the following: , where  F = F n&N , NN&
 . Here the new element is , which denotes the number of varietiesØF
Ø
n&
N
< 0, ØF
Ø
N
N&
> 0 N&
produced in the more advanced countries. Thus , the ratio of foreign produced varieties ton
&
N
total varieties, gives a measure of foreign direct investment, whereas  , the ratio of varietiesNN&
produced domestically to those produced in the more advanced countries, measures the relative
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backwardness of the economy. A lower   indicates a country that is more backward withNN&
respect to the more advanced countries. 
The remaining characteristics of the model follow a well known pattern, already
encountered for example in Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991): specialised firms
are assumed to rent the capital goods they produce to final goods producers at a rental rate .m(j)
Perfect competition in the market for final goods implies the following optimality condition:
(6.4.3)m(j) = A(1 − )Hx(j)−
This condition can be solved for  to get the following demand functions for the capitalx(j)
goods:
(6.4.4)x(j) = H A(1 − )m(j)
1
Assuming a steady state where the interest rate r is constant, and a constant maintenance
cost (set equal to 1) for each capital good, profits for the producer of a new variety of capital j
are: 
(6.4.5)(j) = −F n&N , NN& + ¶ t
∞[m(j)x(j) − x(j)]e−r(s−t)ds
or, in words, the profits consist of the discounted value of the revenues generated by renting the
capital goods out to final producers, net of the maintenance cost for each capital good (this is the
term under the integral on the right hand side of equation 6.4.5), minus the fixed setup cost
which we saw is required in order to adapt a new technology (the first term on the right hand
side of equation (6.4.5). In order to get the optimal monopoly rental rate, the expression to
maximize is that in the square brakets of the integral in the profit equation, after substitution for
the demand equations, namely: . The solution for the monopoly rental(m(j) − 1)H A(1 − )m(j)
1
rate is:  which gives the rental rate as a markup over maintenance costs. Pluggingm(j) = 11 −  ,
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the optimal rental rate back into the demand functions yields the equilibrium level for the
production of each capital good: 
(6.4.6)x(j) = HA 1 (1 − ) 2
To get the equilibrium rate of return r, we assume that there is free entry into the market
for production of capital varieties. Thus we equate to zero the profit of the capital good producer
and solve for r to get:
(6.4.7)r = F n&N , NN&
−1
A
1 (1 − ) 2− H
The final element that enables us to obtain an expression for the growth rate of this
economy, is to consider consumers’ intertemporal utility maximization problem. We posit a
standard specification (as in Romer 1990) for the intertemporal utility function:
(6.4.8)Ut = ¶t∞ Cs
1−"
1 − " e−!(s−t)ds
where C denotes units of consumption of the final good Y. We already know (from Romer) that
the optimal consumption path is given by: . This growth rate of consumption must, in
.
Ct
Ct =
r − !
"
steady state, be equal to the growth rate of output (we call it ). Replacing  with theg r
corresponding equilibrium expression derived earlier, we have:
(6.4.9)g = 1" A
1 (1 − ) 2− F n&N , NN&
−1
H − !
Thus this model predicts that FDI, as expressed by the ratio  , increases the growthn
&
N
rate of the economy through a decrease in the fixed setup cost required for the process of new
technology adaptation. Also, a more backward economy, as measured by a lower  , results inNN&
a lower setup cost and a higher growth rate. Notice further that both the amount of FDI and
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relative backwardness interact with human capital  to determine the growth rate, a desirableH
feature of the model.
Given this illustrative framework, Borensztein et all (1998) carry out an empirical study
to seek confirmation of the predicted interaction between human capital and FDI in determining
growth rates, and to sign the direction of influence. The formulation used is as follows:
(6.4.10)g = c0 + c1FDI + c2FDI x H + c3H + c4Y0 + c5A
Where FDI is foreign direct investment, H the stock of human capital, Y0 initial GDP per capita,
and A is a set of other variables that affect economic growth..
The main result of this empirical exercise is that the overall effect of FDI on the economy
of developing countries is positive. However, when both FDI alone and the interaction term 
 are included, the coefficient for FDI is negative, while the interaction term is found toFDIxH
have a positive and statistically significant coefficient. This result suggests that for countries
with very low or non existent stocks of human capital, this lack of absorptive capability by the
host country prevents FDI from being beneficial. If we were to take the regression results
literally, we could go as far as to suggest that for countries with little human capital, the effect of
FDI is outright negative. Such a possibility is ruled out by Borensztein et al., who rather believe
that the negative coefficient attached to the FDI term is the result of a non linear interaction
between FDI and human capital. Thus, for very low levels of human capital, the contribution of
FDI to growth would be nearly zero, and would rise rapidly at higher levels of human capital. A
linear least squares estimation would fail to detect such a trend and would yield a negative
intercept.
Whatever the nature of the interaction between FDI and human capital, regression results
clearly show that countries with years of secondary schooling (the proxy used for human capital)
above a certain threshold, do benefit positively from FDI. Furthermore, this secondary school
attainment threshold is higher, the greater the number of other variables that are thought to affect
economic growth included in the regression. This result is entirely consistent with Romer (1990)
that, as we saw in Section 1.5.1, predicts output growth to take place only for capital stock levels
above a given threshold. 
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In Section 1.5.1, we saw that the model by Romer (1990) points to an important
relationship between human capital and growth. In that section we reflected on whether
intervention by multinational corporations in developing countries might contribute to bringing
the total level of human capital there above the minimum required threshold for some human
capital to be devoted to research, and thereby for growth to take place in the country concerned.
The direction of influence suggested at that point was FDI→human capital→growth. In
Borensztein et al (1998) however, the envisaged direction of influence is: human
capital→FDI→growth. In other words, it is claimed that multinational enterprises do not invest
into developing countries (at least, they do not make the investment of the “right” type, see our
discussion concerning Glass and Saggi, 1998), unless the host country has a sufficient absorptive
capability to start with. But it could also be that it is FDI that raises the level of human capital.
This topic is certainly bound to attract the attention of further empirical research, including our
own. 
1.7 Conclusion
To conclude, we summarize the results of this survey. We started with capital dependency theory
and its claim that FDI by foreign multinationals in developing countries, in the long run may be
harmful for the host country. Even within capital dependency theory, there has not been
complete agreement on this claim, as some authors have argued that a denominator effect has
been confused with actual harmful long run effect (see in particular Firebaugh 1992). We also
surveyed the Harrod Domar model of growth, which provides the ammunition to capital
dependency theory for its claims. That model was rebutted on the grounds that the fixed
coefficient (Leontief) assumption over which it is based does not describe the actual economic
reality appropriately. This was followed by a foray into the neoclassical growth theory, which
proved ineffective at explaining long run growth.
We then surveyed the core models of new growth theory which envisaged a more
positive role for foreign capital in developing countries, based on the importance assigned to
technological change for growth. These models also provided us with some important insight on
the complex relationship between technological change and growth.
The Relationship Between Foreign Direct Investment and Development: A Selected Survey of the
Relevant Literature
81
Our last step, in Section 1.6, has been to widen the scope of our survey to include new
growth theory models based on an open economy and with foreign direct investment featuring
expressly. In particular, Grossman and Helpman (1991, chp. 11) have suggested that under some
particular conditions the South of the world might be better off under autarky than by opening to
the rich world. Put briefly, these conditions are that the cost advantage enjoyed by the South
should be small, that the resources required for new product development should be almost the
same as those required for imitating existing varieties, and that the South is so far behind the
North in terms of its stock of knowledge capital that it finds it impossible to exploit its size
(assumed to be bigger) when trading with the North, by imposing newly invented varieties. We
noted that these particular conditions, which  might be the subject of empirical investigation, are
not likely to be met in reality. 
This model however, does not consider foreign direct investment explicitly, and the
channels through which the South opens up to rich world economies are trade and imitation.
Helpman (1993) has suggested the presence of a relationship between the existing regime of
protection for intellectual property rights and growth, although  the reading of the results should
go in the opposite direction to what was initially suggested by the closed economy model of
Romer (1990).
Glass and Saggi (1998) have pointed to the importance of distinguishing FDI by content
and hinted at the fact that different types of FDI may have different effects on economic
performances of host countries.
Finally Borensztein et al. (1998) have reiterated the idea that FDI, when it interacts with
acceptable minimum levels of human capital, brings a positive effect to economic growth. It still
remains to be seen whether FDI could be the source, and not only the effect, of rising levels of
human capital.
Among the many potential lines of research that have emerged from this survey, we will
concentrate on those which we feel are more innovative but have somewhat been overlooked so
far in the literature. We will start with an empirical study whose aim is to uncover the
importance of FDI of the high-tech type in the development process. Buoyed by some positive
evidence regarding the latter, we will look at the macroeconomic features of a nation that can
have a significant relationship with technological change. We will point at the income
distribution in the belief that it is an important feature in this respect. Consequently, we will
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develop two models with quality ladders and income inequality at their core, the first in a closed
economy, and the second as an open-economy follow-up. Empirical verification of the role
played by income inequality as a determinant of technological change will form the last chapter
of this research. 
Appendix A.1.1
In this appendix we put those equations of Grossman and Helpman chp 11 that are needed to
fully describe the model. We start with the free entry conditions for the RnD sector in the North,
and the imitation sector in the South:
, with equality whenever   (A.1.1.1)vN [ w
Na
n
.n> 0
, with equality whenever   (A.1.1.2)vS [ w
Sam
nS
.nS > 0
Then, there are the asset arbitrage equations for the North and the South:
(A.1.1.3)NvN +
.vN
vN −
.nS
nN = rN
(A.1.1.4)SvS +
.vS
vS = rS
The final element are the two clearing conditions for the labour markets of the North and
the South:
(A.1.1.5)an
.n +nNxN = LN
(A.1.1.6)amnS
.nS + nSxS = LS
where per brand sales of firms located in each country are given by:
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(A.1.1.7)xi = (pi )
−
nS(pS )1− + nN(pN )1−
In steady state, where the following holds: , the asset arbitrage equation for therN = rS = !
North can be rewritten as:
(A.1.1.8)NvN = ! + g + m
Let  . In the steady state, when gS=g, we have: i = nin , i = N, S
(A.1.1.9)S = mg + m
where the rate of imitation m is as defined in the main text, and the other steady state definitions
introduced in the main text apply.
Substituting the Northern labour market clearing condition into the expression for
Northern profits, we find that:
(A.1.1.10)N = (1 − )wN(1 − S )n (LN − ag)
Then, combining equations (A.1.1.8), (A.1.1.9), and (A.1.1.10) and the free entry
condition (A.1.1.1), we have the relationship between the long run rates of innovation and
imitation that is implied by market clearing in the North:
(A.1.1.11)1 −  L
N
a − g g + mg = ! + g + m
Following an entirely similar pattern, Southern profits can be expressed as:
(A.1.1.12)S = (1 − )wSnS (LS − amg)
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Equation (A.1.1.11), together with Southern free entry condition (A.1.1.2), asset arbitrage
equation (A.1.1.4) and steady state considerations (namely  ), lead us to equation (6.1.2) ofrS = !
the main text.
Appendix A.1.2
In this appendix we complete the description of Glass (1998). The equations defining the value
of producing firms are found by discounting the flow of instantaneous profits for each type of
firm, to account for the probability that the profit stream will be terminated due to innovation or
imitation. We describe low-quality and high-quality FDI markets in turn.
Low-quality FDI markets are targeted both by innovation and imitation. For a high
quality Northern firm, subsequent innovation (ι) makes the firm a low-quality multinational,
while subsequent imitation  makes the firm a high-quality multinational:()
(A.1.2.1)vNH = N
H + vML + vMH! +  + 
For a low quality multinational, subsequent innovation or imitation pushes the firm out of
the market:
(A.1.2.2)vML = M
L
! +  + 
High-quality FDI markets are targeted by innovation only. For a high-quality
multinational, subsequent innovation makes the firm a low-quality multinational:
(A.1.2.3)vMH = M
H + vML! + 
For the low-quality Southern firm, subsequent innovation pushes the firm out of the
market:
The Relationship Between Foreign Direct Investment and Development: A Selected Survey of the
Relevant Literature
85
(A1.2.4)vSL = S
L
! + 
Next we describe the innovation and imitation processes. There is no conceptual
difference with the previous quality ladder or product variety models. Therefore, a Northern firm
undertaking innovation at intensity  for a time interval , devotes  units of labour to dt adt
innovation at a cost , with a probability of success .  A Southern firm undertakingwadt dt
imitation at intensity  for a time interval , devotes  units of labour to imitation at a cost  dt adt
 with a probability of success .adt dt
Innovation is assumed to be more difficult than imitation, and thus to require relatively more
resources: . Free entry into RnD implies: > 1
, with equality whenever  (A.1.2.5)vNH [ wa  > 0
while free entry into imitation implies:
, with equality whenever (A.1.2.6)vSL [ a  > 0
Finally, we close the model by stating clearing conditions for the labour markets in the
North and the South. First, we let η be the percentage of markets with high quality FDI. Then,
for the North we have:
(A.1.2.7)a + (1 − ) EBBA = LN
while for the South we have:
(A.1.2.8)a(1 − ) EAA + 
EB
B +
EA
 = LS
The model is now complete and the steady state equilibrium can be studied.
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Bornschier, Chase-Dunn (1985)
 = foreign capital penetrationPEN
 = capital stockK
 = capital stock owned by foreignersKFDI
 = labor force working in establishmentsLFDI
owned by foreigners
 = population totalPOP
 = compounded rate ofCompound growth rate
economic growth
 = GNP per capitaYN
Firebaugh (1992)
 = growth rate of the economyg
 = stock of foreign capital in initial yearstock
 = flow of foreign capital in relevantflow
interval
 = investment rate (flow/stock)I
Dixon, Boswell (1996)
 = GNP per capitaY
 = foreign capital stockF
 = domestic capital stockD
 = foreign capital penetrationP
 = foreign capital flowF
 = domestic capital flowD
 = foreign investment rateFF
 = domestic investment rateDD
 = control variablesxi
Harrod Domar Theory
 = outputY
 = output per capitay
 = production function constantsA, B
 = physical capital K
 = physical capital per capitak
 = value of  corresponding to k k BA
 = steady state value of k& k
 = laborL
 = savings rates
 = depreciation rate of capital
 = population growth raten
 = growth rate of k k
Solow Swan Theory
 = output at time Yt t
 = level of technology at time At t
 = capital stock at time Kt t
 = stock of labor at time Lt t
 = savings rates
 = share of capital in production
 = growth rate of output at time gt t
Romer model of endogenous technological
change (1990)
 = outputY
 = level of technologyA
 = human capitalH
 = human capital devoted to final outputHY
 = human capital employed in researchHA
 = physical capitalK
 = physical laborL
 = consumptionC
 = quantity of intermediate durable good x(i) i
 = equilibrium quantity of durable goodsx
 = price of intermediate durable goodp(i) i
 = equilibrium price of durable goodsp
 = price of new designsPA
 = profit that accrues to producer of(i)
intermediate durable goodi
 = production share of human capital devoted
to final output
 = production share of labor
 = units of foregone consumption
 = productivity parameter
 = interest rater
 = rate of time preference!
 = elasticity of marginal utility"
 = growth rate of outputg
 = a constant, defined as  z (1−−)(+ )
Appendix A.1.3 - List of Symbols
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Grossman, Helpman (1991)
 = consumption index or quantity ofD
homogeneous good produced
 = quantity consumed of good x(j) j
 = substitution parameter
 = elasticity of substitution between two
goods
 = Lagrange multiplier
 = number of available varietiesn
 = utility at time Ut t
 = expenditureE
 = price of good p(j) j
 = interest rater
 = rate of time preference!
 = profit from production of good (j) j
 = wagew
 = value of investment in a typical firmv
 = a labor coefficienta
 = units of labor servicesL
 = aggregate employment in RnDLn
 = stock of general knowledge capitalKn
 = instantaneous rate of innovationg
Aghion, Howitt (1992)
 = output of final consumption goody
 = intermediate goodx
 = technology parameterA
 = share of intermediate good in production of
consumption good
 = intertemporal utility derived fromu(y)
consumption of good y
 = interest rate and rate of time preferencer
 = aggregate flow of labor supplyL
 = technology constant
 = amount of labor used in researchn
 = arrival rate of innovations
 = an eventX
 = time necessary fo event  to occurT X
 = distribution function of F(T) T
 = probability density of f(T) T
 = number of innovations to datet
 = value of an hour in manufacturing goodwt
of tth generation
 = discounted expected payoff to (t+1)thVt+1
innovation
 = profit flow enjoyed by (t+1)th innovatort+1
 = price of intermediate good  of tthpt(x) x
generation
 = productivity-adjusted wage, defined as *t wtAt
 =  as a function of the term in($), x($) , x
brackets
 = equilibrium values of n,* n,*
 = time$
 = expected valueE
Grossman, Helpman (open economy)
 = research intensity
 = labor coefficient of industry leaderaL
 = labor coefficient of industry followeraF
 = wage paid by Northern firmwN
 = wage paid by Southern firmwS
 = price of a Northern brandpN
 = price of a Southern brandpS
 = quantity sold of a Northern brandxN
 = quantity sold of a Southern brandxS
 = profit obtained by Northern firmN
 = profit obtained by Southern firmS
 = labor coefficient relative to imitationam
 = labor coefficient for Southern productaS
development
 = stock of Southern knowlege capital usedKm
to assimilate foreign technologies
 = number of new varieties invented by thenN
North
 = number of technologies acquired by thenS
South
 = rate of imitationm
 = growth rate of varieties manufactured ingN
the North
 = growth rate of varieties manufactured ingS
the South
 = equilibrium growth rate of varietiesg
 = interest rate in the NorthrN
 = interest rate in the SouthrS
 = rate of time preference!
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 = labor supply in the NorthLN
 = labor supply in the SouthLS
 = value of investment in a Northern firmvN
 = value of investment in a Southern firmvS
Helpmann (1993)
 = rate of innovative activityg
 = number of known varietiesn
 = number of varieties not yet imitated bynN
the South
 = number of varieties imitated by the SouthnS
 = imitation rate, defined as m n
N
nS
 = fraction of goods that have not yet been
imitated by the South, defined as n
N
n
 long run value of   
 = number of Northern companies whosenNN
activity is national
 = number of Northern companies whosenNM
activity is multinational
 = Northern wage wN
 = Southern wagewS
 = equilibrium wagew
= quantity demanded of good  x(j) j
 = price of good  p(j) j
 = substitution parameter
 = elasticity of substitution between two
goods
 = aggregate expenditureE
 = price of Northern products not yetpN
imitated
 = price of products imitated by the SouthpS
 = output flow of a Northern based nationalxNN
firm
 = output flow of a Northern basedxNM
multinational firm
 = Northern labor supplyLN
 = Southern labor supplyLS
 = fraction of multinationals among Northern
firms whose products have not yet been
imitated
 = utility flow per unit of timeu
 = Southern utility flowuS
 = price indexP
Glass, Saggi (1998)
 = countries indexi
 = NorthN
 = SouthS
 = product indexj
 = consumers index*
 = high type consumersA
 = low type consumers B
 = quality indexm
 = low qualityL
 = high qualityH
 = parameter that measures taste for qualitym
improvement
 = technology constant
 = intertemporal utilityU
 = instantaneous utilityu
 = rate of time preference!
 = quantity consumedx
 = Northern wage wN
 = Southern wagewS
 = normalized Northern wage, defined as w wNwS
 = marginal cost of production for
multinational firm
 = expenditureE
 = price of low quality goods produced by apML
multinational firm
 = profit obtained by a multinational firmML
from sale of low quality goods
 = price of high quality goods produced by apNH
Northern firm
 = profit obtained by a Northern firm fromNH
sale of high quality goods
 = price of high quality goods produced by apMH
multinational firm
 = profit obtained by a multinational firmMH
from sale of high quality goods
 = price of low quality goods produced by apSL
Southern firm
 = profit obtained by a Southern firm fromSL
sale of low quality goods
 = extent of high quality FDI 
 = extent of low quality FDI1 − 
 = innovation intensity undertaken by
Northern firms
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 = imitation intensity undertaken by Southern
firms
 = rate of imitation relative to innovationI
 = aggregate flow of technology transferredF
to the South through FDI
 = average technology gap from the NorthernG
technology frontier
 = Northern labor supplyLN
 = Southern labor supplyLS
 = relative labor supply, defined as  ) LNLS
 = share of income spent on high quality&
goods 
 = density function for low type consumersf(A)
 = density function for high typef(B)
consumers
 = quality premium in view of high type
consumers, defined as 
B
A
Borenzstein, De Gregorio and Lee (1998)
 = stock of physical capital at time Kt t
 = quantity consumed of capital good ofx(j)
variety j
 = output of consumption good at time Yt t
 = stock of human capital at time Ht t
 = state of environmentA
 = number of varieties produced by domesticn
firms
 = number of varieties produced by foreignn&
firms in the domestic economy
 = total number of varieties produced in theN
domestic economy
 = total number of varieties producedN&
overseas
 = fixed setup costF
 = rental rate required to rent capital goodm(j)
of variety  j
 = interest rater
 = rate of time preference!
 = intertemporal utilityUt
 = units of consumption of final good C Y
 = elasticity of marginal utility"
 = growth rate of outputg
 = foreign direct investmentFDI
 = initial GDP per capitaY0
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Chapter 2 High Tech Foreign Direct Investment and its
Impact on Economic Development
2.1 Introduction
Among the many economic items that routinely attract the attention of both policy makers and
scholars  across the world, one in particular has been studied with special intensity recently, for
its alleged role as a propellent of economic development and growth. This item is Foreign Direct
Investment (henceforth FDI).21 Among the many issues that have been raised regarding FDI, two
are of interest here: first, and foremost, is FDI a good or a bad thing for the economy of the host
country, and then, quite naturally, given that even though with much controversy, many believe
FDI to be a good thing, what are the factors that cause FDI.
To date, a large number of empirical studies have been carried out to shed some light on
these issues, but, as it is so often the case with empirical research, its boundaries are being set by
the limitations in the availability of data that are required to study the particular variable
concerned. In the case of FDI, the area that those boundaries define, and that lends itself  to
being investigated, is of pretty limited size. This is because countries, particularly those in the
developing world, have only recently, in some cases very recently or not at all, started keeping
records of FDI, as the latter becomes more widely recognized to be a quantity of crucial interest
from social, economic and policy making standpoints. 
It is probably because of these data limitations that a startling discrepancy has appeared
between the empirical and the theoretical literature on FDI and its effects on the economies of
the host countries. On one hand, the literature on FDI has been stressing the heterogeneous
nature of FDI’s structure, with respect to the economic motivation behind FDI flows to the
typology of FDI (Barba-Navarretti and Venables, 2004), to the geographical origin and
destination of FDI flows and to the type of technology embodied in the various components that
make up FDI (Glass and Saggi, 1998). On the other hand, the empirical literature on FDI has
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21For a sample of studies that have devoted their attention to FDI, see next section.
failed so far to fully account for the heterogeneity of FDI when studying the impact of FDI on
the economy of host nations (more details in the next section). 
Recent work on the economic motivation behind FDI flows, distinguishes between
market-seeking FDI and efficiency-seeking FDI. The former is said to occur when firms are
attracted by a host’s market size or by the size of the host’s neighbours’ markets. The firm’s
choice to supply foreign markets by local production rather than by exports, results typically in
the firm duplicating a subset of its activities in the foreign country, a type of investment that is
sometimes referred to as horizontal FDI (HFDI). 
Efficiency-seeking FDI tries to exploit lower factor costs in the host nation. This is
typically achieved by transferring entire phases of the production process to the low cost
country. For this reason, this type of FDI is also referred to as vertical FDI (VFDI)22. In the
present study we shall not make much of the difference between HFDI and VFDI, partly because
until recently the overwhelming proportion of FDI was horizontal rather than vertical, (Although
the share of VFDI has been increasing since the early 90s23), and partly because, in order to be
able to break the data down into horizontal and vertical investment, one would have to work with
firm level data that are likely to be available for developed countries only, if at all. By contrast,
in this study, as will become clear presently, we are going to work with data at the macro level
involving both developed and developing economies. We shall concentrate on the geographical
destination of receivers of FDI flows, and on the heterogeneous nature regarding the technology
embodied into FDI. 
With respect to the heterogeneous types of technologies embodied into FDI, a theoretical
literature that belongs to the strand of the new, endogenous growth theories, has come up with
models that establish a link between the degree of innovative and imitative activities, widely
thought to be crucial for the economic performance of host countries, and the quality of
technology that is transferred through FDI (Glass and Saggi, 1998). Because of the data
limitations discussed earlier, the empirical literature on FDI and economic growth, of which we
shall provide a brief account presently, remains, to the best of our knowledge, totally silent on
this topic. Indeed this literature invariably prefers to treat FDI in its entirety, as a scalar to be
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23The source of this information is again Barba-Navarretti and Venables (2004, Chapter 2, page 11).
22For a summary on several typologies of FDI according to economic motivation, see the recent, comprehensive
book on multinational enterprises (MNEs) by Barba-Navarretti and Venables (2004).
included in the cross sectional, time series or panel regressions that constitute the backbone of all
these empirical studies.
The aim of this study is to fill the gap between the theoretical and empirical literatures,
by taking seriously the hints that the former has provided on the importance of distinguishing
FDI by type according to the level of technology embodied in it. Our objective is twofold: we
would like to show that the positive effect of FDI on the development of the receiving nation
pertains peculiarly to the type of FDI which has technology embodied in it. In other words, what
we would like to show is that the heterogeneity in the technological content of diverse types of
FDI matters. In the process, we shall also look at the possible determinants of high tech FDI
flows. We would also like to show that such a positive effect, if it exists, will occur if the
receiving country is in the developing world. As a motivation, we argue that, because of the lack
of significant RnD expenditures and consequent innovative activities in developing countries,
transfers of technology through FDI may be a particularly important mode of getting these
countries nearer to the technology frontier.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 briefly reviews recent empirical
literature on FDI and economic growth; Section 2.3 lays out the econometric model to be
estimated and sketches the econometric challenges being faced in the estimation; Section 2.4
details data, data sources and how the crucial variable “share of high tech FDI in total FDI” has
been computed; Section 2.5 illustrates the results of the estimation exercise, and finally Section
2.6 mentions possible extensions and future line of work and draws conclusions.
2.2 A Brief Look at the Existing Empirical Literature
Since the literature that studies FDI is very abundant, we need to define the boundaries of the
area wherein the studies reviewed in this section fall. The criterion we follow is relevance for our
objective. To this end, it is worthwhile repeating that the objective of this chapter is to test what
is the effect that FDI, as a vehicle for technological change, has on the economy of host
countries. Therefore we do not review literature that studies the determinants of firms' choice to
become multinational, the determinants of firms' location decision and the determinants of firms'
choice to employ FDI rather than trade as an instrument for going multinational. All these are
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very interesting issues, but they are not directly related with the objective. Instead, we limit
ourselves to a brief review of the literature which preoccupies itself with the effects of FDI on
growth and development in host countries. This is itself a vast body of literature, hence we
further limit the focus of this review to a recent strand which we feel constitutes an important
precedent for this study. Its focus is on the effect of FDI on growth and development at a
macroeconomic, country-based level, the same as in the present study. Studies which investigate
the topic at a microeconomic level and by using firm-based data are thus excluded from this
review. So too are works that are based on case studies. The particular strand of concern is a
surprisingly small portion of the overall literature on FDI and growth. The rest of this literature
either uses data at firm level or is based on country specific studies (see Barba-Navarretti and
Venables, 2004 for an account). 
The first study to be surveyed is a cross-section study by Borensztein, De Gregorio and
Lee (1998), which is the empirical section of a paper that also features an interesting growth
model . These authors estimate the following basic equation24:
(2.1)g = c0 + c1FDI + c2FDI &H + c3H + c4Y0 + c5A
Where  is the rate of growth of per capita GDP,  is foreign direct investment and isg FDI
measured as a ratio to GDP,  is the stock of human capital,  is initial GDP per capita and isH Y0
meant to capture the role of the “catch-up” effect, and  is a group of control variables that areA
frequently included as determinants of growth in cross-country studies (see for an example,
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, chp.12). The main result of this study is that FDI is an important
determinant of economic growth only when a country has a minimum threshold stock of human
capital. In that case, the contribution to growth by foreign direct investment is found to be bigger
than that of domestic capital.
A similar study, by Alfaro et al. (2004), finds that well developed financial markets put
the positive contribution of FDI to economic growth beyond doubt. This study focuses on the
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24Borenzstein et al gather data over a 20 years time interval, from 1970 to 1989. They use a number of different data
sources. For foreign direct investment, data come from an OECD publication, Geographical Distribution of
Financial Flows to Developing Countries, while other national accounts data, such as the growth rate of income,
initial income and government consumption are all taken from the so called Penn World Tables, by Summers and
Heston. Finally, data on human capital are taken from Barro and Lee (1993), and consist of average years of male
secondary schooling.
issues related to the measurement and handling of financial markets development, which is not
within the scope of our own study, and otherwise follows the same pattern of analysis as
Borenzstein et al. (1998). For this reason, we do not dwell further on it.
De Mello (1999), estimates the impact of foreign direct investment on capital output,
output and total factor productivity (TFP) by using both time series and panel data. The second
part of this study, the relevant one for our purposes, studies the impact of FDI on output and TFP
growth by estimating the following two dynamic panel data equations:
(2.2)xh(t) = 0 + 1FDIh(t) + 2xh(t − 1) + h(t)
or, if unobservable country-specific growth determinants are to be taken into account, the term 
becomes , a time-invariant individual country effect term, to yield the following equation:0 h,0
(2.3)xh(t) = h,0 + 1FDIh(t) + 2xh(t − 1) + h(t)
In both equations, De Mello indexes countries with h, and sets  , where y is output, kx = y, k, TFP
is capital, TFP is total factor productivity, and  is an error term. Because of the likely(t)
correlation between the regressors and the error terms, these equations are not estimated by using
ordinary least squares, but by using instrumental variables. The instruments chosen are the
lagged dependent variables and lagged values of the host country’s per capita income as a share
of the U.S. Per capita income. The study uses a sample of 32 countries that are divided into
OECD and non-OECD countries. The period considered is 1970-90 and the source employed is
the Summers and Heston data set.
The outcome of this analysis is a positive impact of FDI on output growth in all panels,
and there is some evidence of substitutability between FDI and domestic investment. In more
advanced economies, the more efficient technologies embodied in FDI may lead to a higher rate
of technological obsolescence of the capital stock embodying older technologies. For the
technological laggards, complementarity seem to prevail. This degree of complementarity
suggests that those economies are either less efficient in the use of the new technologies
embodied in FDI, or that the latter are not much more modern or productive than the ones
existing in the recipient economy. Such findings call for further investigation of both what
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determines how much of technology is embodied in FDI, and of the effect of the extent of high
tech FDI on the economic performance of the host country, particularly when the latter is a
developing economy.  
Another important paper we want to review is Nair-Reichert and Weinhold (2001). This
study has the merit of highlighting the serious problems that the kind of empirical work
discussed here may suffer if some crucial aspects are not properly handled. In particular, these
authors note that cross-section models, with their inherent lack of dynamic information, due to
the complete absence of the time dimension, run a much increased risk of omitted variable bias.
In other words ordinary least squares estimates can be biased in ways that are increasingly more
difficult to predict, the more variables are included in the regression. Alternative estimation
techniques, such as instrumental variable (IV) are often difficult to implement because of a lack
of suitable instruments. A further problem is that in a cross-sectional regression it may be
difficult to understand which way the causation runs. Taking the case we are studying as an
example, even if an equation that regressed FDI on output growth returned a positive coefficient
for FDI, this fact alone would not imply yet that FDI causes growth, as it could well be the other
way round. This problem is commonly known as endogeneity bias. Both the omitted variable
bias and the endogeneity bias can be ameliorated by taking the time dimension into account, that
is, by making use of panel data. With panel data, the analyst may include lagged dependent
variables which may help to control for both biases. Still, Nair-Reicher and Weinhold argue,
even panel data models may not solve all the issues raised by cross-section analysis, particularly
if the traditional panel data fixed effect estimator is used. The application of this methodology
rests on imposing homogeneity assumptions on the coefficients of the lagged dependent
variables when in fact the dynamics are heterogeneous across the panel. Their suggestion is to
use an alternative method of estimation, which they call Mixed Fixed and Random Model for
causality testing in panel data. Here we do not review the technicalities of this method, as they
are beyond the scope of this review. We prefer to concentrate on describing the data used and the
results obtained. The data comprise a panel of 24 developing countries for the interval 1971 to
1995. The source is World Development Indicators by the World Bank, except from the data on
human capital, which is taken from Nehru et al. (1995) and is average years of schooling. As for
their results, Nair-Reichart and Weinhold (2001) adopt the following strategy: in order to put the
advantages of their methodology in sharp focus, they present results from a non-dynamic panel
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study, from a dynamic panel estimated with the traditional fixed effect estimator, and from a
dynamic panel estimated with their own mixed fixed and random estimator. The latter shows that
while it is possible to speak on the whole of a positive causal relationship between FDI and
growth, it is also true that this effect is quite different across countries. The paper concludes by
stressing the need for future research to concentrate on country specific determinants of this
relationship between investment (both foreign and domestic) and growth. Although with the
caveats that have just been discussed, the three studies reviewed so far share as their common
feature that they find a positive relationship in some shape or form between FDI and economic
growth. By contrast there is another recent work, Carkovic and Levine (2002), whose main
finding is that (to quote from them, on page 3) “there is not a robust, causal link running from
FDI to economic growth”. 
Carkovic and Levine (2002) move the same kind of criticism as Nair-Reichart and
Weinhold (2001) to previous studies of the effect of FDI on the economy of the host country that
had the cross-sectional dimension only. They too claim that those earlier studies cannot properly
address problems such as simultaneity bias or country specific effects. In order to overcome
these problems, and extract consistent and efficient estimates of the impact of FDI on economic
growth, they embrace the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) panel estimator designed by
Arellano and Bond (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1997). Carkovic and Levine (2002) use data
based on 72 countries (both developed and developing) over the period 1960-1995. Unlike
Nair-Reichart and Weinhold (2001) though, they cannot find evidence of a link between FDI and
economic growth. Our suspicion is that, at least in part, this lack of evidence is due to the fact
that Carkovic and Levine (2002) use a pooled sample comprising both developed and developing
countries. We believe that FDI’s impact on the economy of the host country depends on the level
of economic development of that country. In particular, we argue that developing countries move
closer to the technological frontier because they can benefit from the technology transfer that
takes place owing to the occurrence of FDI. By contrast, developed countries achieve
technological progress by performing Research and Development activities. For this reason, the
impact of FDI as a carrier of technology in developed economies may be not so significant.
Because Carkovic and Levine (2002) use a pooled sample with both types of countries, the
positive impact of FDI on growth that stems from enjoying the arrival of new technologies may
go undetected. 
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Other recent work, by de la Potterie and Lichtenberg (2001), independently finds no
evidence of a positive impact of inward FDI on productivity levels of the host country. This
study  uses a sample limited to 13 developed economies (over a time interval of 20 years,
between 1971 and 1990). It  would seem to confirm that FDI’s effect on developed countries’
economies is at best of difficult detection.
The fact is that despite the criticisms directed towards cross sectional studies by some of
these papers, their contradictory findings show that a deeper level of analysis, to account for
(among other things) technological and geographical heterogeneity is called for. Such depth
cannot be accomplished while at the same time pursuing methodological perfection, without
keeping the dataset from shrinking beyond an acceptable threshold. For this reason we stick with
a cross sectional study, whose design is explained  in the next section. 
2.3 The Econometric Framework
As already discussed in Section 2.1, we want to contribute to the literature just reviewed, by
bringing to the fore, as a novel element, the importance of FDI with high technological content
in the economic process. In order to do so, we construct the variable “share of high tech FDI in
total FDI”, which we call   for brevity.HTFDIshare
We run regressions which are centered on ,  and we then contrast theseHTFDIshare
regressions with similar ones where the only change will be that FDI totals replace  .HTFDIshare
The latter regressions will look much like those in the papers reviewed in section 2.2. As a result
of this exercise, we hope to gather enough evidence to be able to unveil a positive relationship
between the share of FDI which embodies high technology, as defined below, and the impact the
latter has on economic performance. As this is a cross-sectional study with no time dimension,
such a positive relationship may not yet be proof of a causal link that runs from the technological
content of FDI to development. However the existence of a positive relationship and its
specificity to the sample of developing countries (as shown in Section 2.5.3 below) is certainly a
first step towards proving that causality.  
The equations to be estimated and the econometric issues that they raise will be discussed
in this section, while we will delay a detailed description of   and the other variablesHTFDIshare
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that appear in the regressions, to the next Section 2.4 concerning the data, because the choices
that we have made as for which variables to include and how to construct them were partly
dictated by data availability (or lack thereof) and will be better understood along with the
description of the data itself.
As a point of departure, in order to derive the first regression, we want to test the claim
made by Glass and Saggi (1998) that among the factors responsible for spurring FDI with high
technological content in a given country, are resource endowments in that country and the
magnitude of the cost disadvantage suffered by multinational firms in that country relative to
domestic firms. Notice that among the many conceivable possible determinants of FDI with high
technological content we knowingly restrict ourselves to those cited by Glass and Saggi (1998)
in order to keep a close correspondence between the theory and our test.
Following Romer (1990) we consider two types of resources. One is labor services,
measured by counts of people, in this case the population of the country concerned. The second
is the stock of human capital, as measured by average years of schooling in that country. As for
the cost disadvantage facing multinational firms, we assume that it can be represented by
macroeconomic uncertainty in the country of interest; we take the inflation rate to be a proxy for
this variable and we measure it  by the GDP deflator. The argument for measuring the cost
disadvantage facing multinational firms with inflation is that expectations on inflation are less
costly to form for local firms than they are for foreign firms. Thus the ensuing regression looks
as follows:
(3.1)HTFDIsharei = 0 + 1 ln popi + 2Hi + 3 ln Infli + 1
Where   is “share of high tech FDI stock in total FDI stock for the secondaryHTFDIshare
sector”, to be accurately defined in section 2.4,  is the log of population,  is average yearslnpop H
of schooling and   is the log of the GDP deflator. The s are coefficients to be estimatedlnInfl 
and is a random error term. The subscript   indexes the number of countries1 i = 1, ..., 29
included in the sample, while time-wise, all the observation refer to 1990, unless otherwise
indicated. 
The second equation we want to estimate serves the purpose of measuring the impact of
FDI on economic performance, the same way as the literature reviewed in section 2.2 above.
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Because we deal with a cross section in a specific year (1990), and because all our data
concerning FDI refer to stock and not flow, we do not employ the growth rate of output (g) as
the dependent variable. The growth rate of output for 1990 does not have a meaningful
relationship with FDI stock in 1990, while, if we were to take an average growth rate over a
period of time, the choice of the time interval would be arbitrary and likely to be detached from
the time interval involving FDI stock data, since it is difficult to gauge precisely the time interval
over which the stock of FDI was formed. We instead employ the log of GDP per capita (in
constant 1995 U.S. $) as the dependent variable. This variable is intended to proxy for a
country’s level of development. Hence the second equation of the model looks as follows:
 (3.2)ln GDPprci = 0 + 1HTFDIsharei + 2 ln popi + 3 ln Infli + 2
Where the s are the coefficients to be estimated and  is a (different) random error term. Notice 2
that besides the high tech FDI share, we control for size, measured by population and
macroeconomic uncertainty, measured by inflation.
As for the estimation technique to be used, if OLS were to be employed, the estimate of
the coefficient attached to  would not be unbiased, because we assumed 1 HTFDIshare
 to depend on the regressors of the first equation, population, average years ofHTFDIshare
schooling and inflation, two of which are also thought to have an effect on GDP per capita. As a
result, one of the crucial assumptions for unbiased OLS estimation, that the regressor 
 and the error term  be uncorrelated, would no longer hold. In order to overcomeHTFDIshare 2
this potential flaw, we employ 2SLS estimation instead, and use  (average years of schooling)H
as the instrument in the IV estimation process. Therefore,  regression (3.1) as reported above
constitutes the first step in the 2SLS estimation procedure, while equation (3.2) is the second
step. Notwithstanding the endogeneity problem mentioned, we also perform OLS estimation on
the same equations, so to have a yardstick for comparing results and checking for their
robustness.
It is a well known fact that when implementing instrumental variable estimation, the
choice of instruments determines whether the estimates so obtained are efficient and consistent.
A valid instrument is highly correlated with the variable to be instrumented, but shows no
correlation with the other endogenous variable(s) in the system. A weak instrument, one that is
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only weakly correlated to the endogenous variable to be instrumented, decreases the efficiency
of the estimate, by yielding much higher standard errors than it would be the case with valid
instruments. In section 2.5 we will argue that  is a valid instrument, since results therein pointHi
to the lack of a significant relationship with gdp per capita, and to a strong relationship to the
instrumented variable  . HTFDIshare
At this point, we have to recall the twofold nature of our aim, which is firstly to gather
evidence for the economy-fostering role played by the quality of technology embodied in FDI
rather than the absolute level of FDI per se, and secondly, to show that this role is peculiar to
developing countries. To achieve the first end, the second step in our strategy is to go through
the same estimation procedure as just explained, but to replace the variable  withHTFDIshare
FDI stock total throughout the two equations (3.1) and (3.2). 
Such a strategy should shed light on any difference that might exist between HTFDIshare
and FDI stock total, when everything else in the regressions is held constant. We thus estimate
the following two equations:
 (3.3)lnFDItoti = 0 + 1 lnpopi + 2Hi + 3 ln Infli + u1
(3.4)lnGDPprci = 0 + 1 lnpopi + 2 ln Infli + 3 lnFDItoti + u2
Where all the variables are as in equations (3.1) and (3.2), except that now , standing forlnFDItot
FDI stock total in secondary sector (in logs), has replaced the variable . TheHTFDIshare
subscript  still indexes countries, while the reference year, unless otherwise indicated, is stilli
1990. To show the peculiarity of our results to developing countries, the same regressions are
repeated for a different set of OECD “developed” countries. 
The next section, Section 2.4, provides an ample and detailed description of the variables
included in the regressions and of the data and data sources employed. Regression results will be
illustrated in Section 2.5. 
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2.4 Description of Variables and Data
Starting with (3.1), the dependent variable in that equation is “share of high tech FDI in total
FDI”, in short  . The variable  can be thought of as the ratio “high techHTFDIshare HTFDIshare
FDI / total FDI”. In order to compute the numerator of this ratio, we needed to find FDI data
classified by sector in a way that would enable us to decide which sector is high tech and which
one is not. The only source of FDI data that came close to satisfying such a requirement was the
series World Investment Directory published by UNCTC (an arm of the United Nations).
Therefore we have relied heavily on this source for getting FDI data. A drawback of this strategy
is that, for the most crucial variable of this study, matters such as sample size, which countries to
include in the sample, which year to take as reference year, have all been determined by the
availability of suitable data in this single data source. 
The World Investment Directory (henceforth W.I.D.) classifies FDI data according to the
U.N. International Standard Classification (ISIC) Revision 3. This is a very detailed and accurate
classification of economic activities, which makes the task of selecting the high tech sectors, to
be included in the numerator of  , far easier. To illustrate, under the itemHTFDIshare
“Manufacturing” (item D in ISIC Rev. 3) the reader can find the whole array of manufacturing
sectors, apparently put in ascending order of technological content, starting with item 15,
“manufacture of food products and beverages”, all the way down to end with such items as item
32, ”manufacture of radio television and communication apparatus”, item 33, “manufacture of
medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks”, item 34, “manufacture of motor
vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers”, item 35, “manufacture of other transport equipment”, and
item 36, “other manufacturing”. In choosing the criterion for picking high tech investments, we
were unable to find any guideline in previous studies. Therefore we adopted the following
simple approach. Since the sectors in ISIC Rev. 3 are classified in ascending order of
technological content, the only issue remained where to put the boundary between what is high
tech and what is not. We decided to classify as high tech, investments located under item 29,
“manufacture of machinery and equipment”, to item 36, “other manufacturing”, inclusive. We
have also added the subcategory “pharmaceuticals, medical chemicals etc.” (item 2423 in ISIC
Rev. 3) which fell on the wrong side of the boundary, because we felt it was a sector requiring a
sufficiently sophisticated know-how, to warrant a move to the high tech group. 
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Thus far we have discussed the ISIC Rev. 3 and the W.I.D. Classifications
interchangeably. In fact the latter identifies the sectors of economic activity with a terminology
that draws very heavily from ISIC Rev. 3, but nevertheless differs slightly from it. For our
purposes it is sufficient to note that item D, “Manufacturing” of ISIC Rev. 3 is referred to as
“Secondary sector” by W.I.D. All the sectors that precede this item are collected by W.I.D. under
the term “Primary sector”, while the sectors that follow item D, are grouped by W.I.D. under the
term “Tertiary sector”. This study sticks with the classifications and regroupings made by the
W.I.D. Furthermore, since data for the primary and tertiary sector were not always available, we
decided to base the computations on the figures from the secondary sector only. Hence, while the
numerator of   , “high tech FDI”, is computed with the criterion discussed above, theHTFDIshare
denominator, “total FDI”, consists of the sum of FDI totals for the secondary sector.
Other important features concerning the variable    are as follows: the sampleHTFDIshare
includes 29 developing countries from three main regions: Latin America, East Asia and Eastern
Europe. In the sample there are no countries from Africa or the Middle East, as we were not able
to find any satisfactory data for those regions. Given the cross sectional nature of this study, we
decided to work with FDI stock rather than flow, as the former gives a more accurate picture of
past history for every given country. The data are mostly from 1990, the last year for which FDI
stock for Latin America were available, so that the sample can include as many countries as
possible.  Where 1990 data were not available, we considered the  year immediately preceding or
following 1990. FDI stock data are often given as “approved FDI stock” and/or “actual FDI
stock”. The two sets of figures differ considerably. Because approved FDI data were more
widely available than the actual data, we have chosen to use approved figures as much as
possible, and resort to actual figures only when the former was not available. 
The only countries for which we could find data for FDI stock both on an approved and
actual basis, from the same source, were as follows:
y Indonesia (secondary sector total 1994, in million U.S $): 65 (approved), 19 (actual)
y Malaysia (secondary sector total 1990, in million ringgit): 35 (approved), 15 (actual)
The discrepancy between approved and actual figures does exist, as aknowledged also in
the U.N. World Investment Directory (Vol. VII, Asia and the Pacific, page 53): 
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“Many countries have a variety of sources for FDI data, including those collected by the
central bank for balance-of-payment purposes and those collected by the board of
investment or a similar institution for monitoring and investment promotion purposes…A
typical occurrence is that data provided by those institutions are on approved FDI
investments rather than on the investments actually implemented…In such cases, data on
approved investments provide crucial information, but their limitations must be
aknowledged. Normally, approved investments are larger than those actually
implemented.” 
While we are ready to acknowledge the problems involved in using both approved and
actual FDI data, we do know that this is the only way to keep the sample size from shrinking in a
way that would make this study unfeasible.
For a few countries (China, Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey), we could only find FDI totals
for the secondary sector without the desired breakdown. In order to obtain a share, for these
cases we employed as numerator data on “high tech manufacturing exports”, from the World
Bank25. Under the assumption that these are developing countries wherein not much high tech
production originates from domestic capital, the difference between high tech manufacturing
FDI and high tech manufacturing exports ought, in theory, not to be large26. 
As for the other variables included in 3.1 and 3.2, data on population, inflation, and GDP
per capita (the latter in 1995 constant U.S. $) all come from the source World Development
Indicators Online (various issues, but especially 2001) published by the World Bank. Finally the
variable H, “average years of schooling”, comes from the dataset on education to be found in
Barro and Lee (1997).
As for the sample of OECD economies, the sample consists of 19 countries (those that
were current OECD members in 1990 for which the data were complete). While the variables are
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26 We made a check by comparing  by using both high tech manufacturing exports and W.I.D. HighHTFDIshare
tech FDI data. Although the results are not fully satisfactory (the difference exists indeed), we still do it this way,
both because without those countries the sample would be too small, and because this difference can be ascribed
more to the fact that FDI flow figures used here are actual flows, while the FDI stock figures used to compute 
 using the W.D.I. Source are often approved figures, than to high tech exports not being a goodHTFDIshare
proxy for high tech FDI in developing countries. Put simply, the discrepancy is due more to denominator than to
numerator differences.  
25 Since the high tech exports figure is a flow, the variable   is computed by using FDI flow dataHTFDIshare
(from the World Bank) as denominator.
constructed in the same way as for the sample of developing countries, the source that has been
employed for the FDI data was the OECD own FDI dataset. Sources of data for the remaining
variables were the same as for the set of developing countries. More details on variables, data
and data sources, along with descriptive statistics, is provided in the appendix to this chapter.
2.5 Regression Results
For the reasons discussed in Section 2.3, we perform 2SLS estimation on equations (3.1) and
(3.2), where (3.1) is the first stage of the estimation procedure, which goes on to feed (3.2) for
the second stage. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 report the regression results. The output for (3.1) (first stage
regression), from Table 2.1, is entirely as expected. All the coefficients attached to the three
regressors are statistically significant at the 5% level, and all carry the signs predicted by the
theory. So the resources population and human capital have a positive impact on the share of
high tech FDI, while , which is a measure of macroeconomic instability, has a negativelnInfl
impact on  .HTFDIshare
In Table 2.2, the first three columns show results for the second stage of the 2SLS
estimation procedure. The order condition for identification of the system (3.1, 3.2), dictates that
the number of excluded exogenous variables (instruments) be equal to the number of included
endogenous variables to be instrumented. In order to satisfy this condition, the variable that is
chosen as instrument in each column, is excluded from the regression shown in that column.With
the results from Table 2.2 in hand, we are now in a position to explain and justify the choice of  
 as our preferred instrument and to comment the evidence gathered following this choice.H
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Table 2.1 - First stage results of 2SLS regression of HTFDIshare on selected independent
variables. OLS regression yields same results - 29 observations
7.73***F test of joint significance
0.5Adj. R-square
29No. observations
-0.04 (0.018)**lnInfl
0.045 (0.018)**lnpop
0.06 (0.012) ***H
OLS and 2SLS (first stage)
Dependent Variable:  HTFDIshareIndependent Variable
Table 2.2 - Second stage results of 2SLS and OLS regressions of log GDP per capita on selected
independent variables - 29 observations
6.96***5.84***2.267.73***F test of joint
significance
0.460.27-0.45Adj. R-square
29292929No. Observations
0.14 ( 0.11) --0.21 (0.25) 0.19 ( 0.12)lnInfl
-0.39 (0.11)***-0.23 (0.17)--0.45 ( 0.10)*** lnpop
0.08 (0.09)0.28 (0.2)0.59 (0.25)**-H
2.19 (1.09)* -1.23 (2.9)-6.48 (4.14)3.57 (1.17)***HTFDIshare
OLS2SLS (3)2SLS (2) 2SLS (1) 
Dependent Variable: lnGDPprcIndependent Var.
Note: Tables show coefficient values with standard errors in parentheses. In Table 2.2, (1):
second stage of 2SLS regression where instrument is average years of schooling (  ), (2):H
second stage of 2SLS regression where instrument is log of population (  ), (3): secondlnpop
stage of 2SLS regression where instrument is log of GDP deflator (  ). *= significant atlnInfl
10%; **= significant at 5%; ***= significant at 1%.
We said earlier that valid instruments are strongly correlated with the endogenous
variable to be instrumented (here,  ), but they are exogenous with respect to theHTFDIshare
other endogenous variables of the system (here,  ). It is a property of valid instrumentslnGDPprc
that the stronger the correlation between the instrument and the instrumented endogenous
variable, the smaller the standard error of that endogenous variable in the second stage
regression. Therefore, in order to assess our instruments against this criterion, we look in Table
2.2 at the standard errors attached to   in each of the first three colums. We see thatHTFDIshare
the smallest standard error (1.17) which affects the coefficient attached to   is theHTFDIshare
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one obtained when  is chosen as instrument (under 2SLS (1)). This fact points to a strongerH
relationship of   with    than that enjoyed by the other two candidates asH HTFDIshare
instruments27.
To assess the exogeneity of the instruments with respect to  , we use the OLSlnGDPprc
regression of Table 2.2, column 4. That regression says that   and   have no relationshipH lnInfl
with  , while  appears to have a strong relationship with  . The resultlnGDPprc lnpop lnGDPprc
concerning  and   may seem to be against commonly accepted economic theory, butH lnGDPprc
it actually makes sense for the sample of developing countries gathered here. This sample
includes countries from three main geographic regions: Eastern Europe, the Far East and Latin
America. As such, this sample exhibits the following two traits: first, the countries from the
former Soviet Bloc are characterized by far higher rates of literacy than those of other countries
at a similar stage of development.  Second, the countries of Latin America feature a distribution
of human capital stock that is as heterogeneous as their income distribution, but which does not
always follow the same pattern as the income distribution. For instance, while in terms of income
the ranking of Argentina, Brazil and Chile is as just listed, Chile is far poorer than its two bigger
neighbours. In terms of years of schooling the ranking becomes Argentina (7.77), Chile (7.14)
and Brazil (3.76), with Chile very close to Argentina and Brazil very much behind.
In order to have complete peace of mind on the matter of choosing the right instrument,
as a further check, we compare each 2SLS regression with the OLS regression and see that the
latter confirms the sign and the significance of the 2 SLS regression of column (1), the one
where  is chosen28.  H
If we move on to assess the evidence presented in Table 2.2, column 1, the crucial result
appears to be that the impact of   on the level of per capita income is positive andHTFDIshare
significant. We also notice that population has a negative and significant impact on  ,lnGDPprc
possibly because population itself appears in the denominator of GDP per capita, so that when
total GDP is held constant, a rise in population causes a fall in GDP per capita. Finally, the
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28 Incidentally, it can also be seen that when  is the instrument, the value of the F statistic for jointlnpop
significance is very low.
27 For a quick check, we run a simple regression of   separately on each of the candidate instruments.HTFDIshare
This regression returned coefficient values that were highly significant in the case of  , but failed to pass allH
significance thresholds both in the case of  and of .lnpop lnInfl
coefficient attached to   is positive but not significant, and cannot lead to conclusions inlnInfl
either direction. 
2.5.1 Sensitivity Analysis
Our next step is to check that these results do not change dramatically if we modify some of the
choices that were made in the design of this model. Our sensitivity analysis will consist of
rerunning the regressions (3.1) and (3.2) after making the following three changes. Firstly,
substitute the adopted concept of high tech FDI with a more restrictive one. This will consider as
high tech only FDI falling into categories from “radio TV and communication equipment” to
“other manufacturing” (see Appendix). Call this new share . Such a change willHTFDIshare2
serve the purpose of checking whether our definition of high tech FDI is robust to a different
choice of categories to be included into it. Secondly, exclude from the sample the four countries
for which high tech FDI had been calculated differently, by using high tech exports in the
numerator. Call this one . In this way, we check that those four countries are notHTFDIshare3
responsible for altering the results of the study. Finally, when computing the high tech FDI
share, use the value of high tech exports in place of high tech FDI  for the whole sample, instead
of just the four countries for which detailed FDI data were not available. We let this share be 
. This procedure provides a check on the robustness of using alternative criteriaHTFDIshare4
when detailed FDI data are not available.
A glance at the first stage regressions confirms signs and significance of coefficients in
most cases. The exceptions are the coefficients of   in (4) and of   in (2). It islnpop lnInfl
especially important that the results regarding positivity and significance of coefficient go
through for the human capital regressor represented by average years of schooling. The second
stage instrumental variable regression confirms positivity and significance of the coefficient
attached to the share of high tech FDI, measured in four different ways. The sole instance in
which significance is not as strong concerns the relationship between a restricted version of 
 and  (column denoted  (2)). Even there, the amount by whichHTFDIshare lnGDPprc lnGDPprc
the 5% threshold is missed (p-value = 0.051) does not seem to indicate a lack of robustness of
our results to alternative definitions of the variable  .HTFDIshare
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Table 2.3 - Sensitivity analysis- first stage regressions
0.160.580.460.5Adj R-squared
2.66 *12.17 ***8.11***10.32 ***F (Prob > F)
26252629Number of obs
1.04
(0.47)**
0.05
(0.01)***
0.02
(0.00)***
0.06
(0.012)***
H
-1.10
(0.62)*
-0.05
(0.02)***
0.00
(0.01)
-0.04
(-0.018)**
lnInfl
0.25
(0.6)
0.07
(0.02)***
0.047
(0.01)***
0.045
(0.018)**
lnpop
HTFDIshare4
26 obs
HTFDIshare3
25 obs
HTFDIshare2
26 obs
HTFDIshare
29 obs
Dependent variableIndependent
Variable
Table 2.4 - Sensitivity analysis - Instrumental variables (2SLS) regressions
00.44-0.45Adj R-squared
4.30 **6.06 **2.82*7.73***F (Prob > F)
26252629Number of obs
0.26
(0.19)
0.218
(0.13)*
-0.065
(0.16)
0.19
(0.12)
lnInfl
-0.38
(0.14)**
-0.56
(0.14)***
-0.72
(0.25)***
-0.45
(0.1)***
lnpop
0.24
(0.10)**
4.15
(1.31)***
9.51
(4.60)*
3.57
(1.17)***
HTFDIshare
 (4)lnGDPprc (3)lnGDPprc (2)lnGDPprc (1)lnGDPprc
Dependent variableIndependent
Variable
Notes: Tables show coefficient values with standard errors in parentheses. The four regressions
are one for each different  :  (1) = from the basic model, (2) =  , (3) =  HTFDIshare HTFDIshare2
 ,  (4) =  , as explained in the text. No. of observations same as inHTFDIshare3 HTFDIshare4
first stage regression (see table 3). *=significant at 10%; **=significant at 5%; ***=significant
at 1% level.
This result, along with the one relative to human capital, confirms robustness of the
double positive  relationship from human capital to high tech FDI and from the latter to the level
of GDP per capita that had been found in the basic model. Although such a positive relationship
is not yet proof of a causal link that runs from the technological content of FDI to development,
because of the lack of a dynamic dimension ineherent in such cross-sectional studies, its
existence and specificity to the sample of developing countries (also see Section 3 below) may
be considered as a significant contribution towards proving that causality.
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2.5.2 Results When Using FDI Total Instead of High Tech FDI Share
The next step is to run regressions (3.3) and (3.4) and compare the output from that set of
regressions with the results obtained for regressions (3.1) and (3.2).  In Tables 2.5 and 2.6 below,
we report the regression output for (3.3) and (3.4) together with the regression output for
regressions (3.1) and (3.2), in order to facilitate comparison.
This result is completely different from the previous one. In the first stage regression,
among the three regressors, population is the only one that retains its positive and significant
impact, while the coefficients attached to human capital and inflation are no longer significant at
any level. Even more importantly, in the second stage regression none of the regressors has any
significant impact on the level of GDP per capita, least of all the total FDI stock of the secondary
sector. The message is at the same time startling and clear: the double positive relationship that
feeds from resources endowments (particularly human capital) and macroeconomic stability into
foreign direct investment and from the latter into the level of per capita income is by no means a
foregone conclusion. On the contrary, it surfaces only when we put the share of high technology
FDI in the middle of this chain, while it disappears if the FDI total is considered instead.  The
conclusion just drawn, while startling, should not surprise those that have followed
developments in the theory of economic growth over the last decade. The latter has long
identified  technological change as the root cause of long run economic growth. In developing
countries, the sole engine of technological change are the technology transfers from the
developed regions, given the almost total lack of any significant local RnD activity. Most likely,
the vehicle that permits these technology transfers is foreign direct investment, which in turn is
attracted to a developing country if the latter is well endowed with resources and can provide a
stable environment. It is important to notice that the findings of this section in some sense can
reconcile the contrasting evidence reached by the works reviewed in Section 2.2, by putting
those contradictions down to their failure to account for the technological heterogeneity of FDI.
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Table 2.5 - First stage regressions - 29 observations
0.10.5Adj R-squared
2.0310.32 ***F (Prob > F)
2929Number of obs
0.08
(0.20)
0.06
(0.012)***
H
-0.15
(0.29)
-0.04
(0.018)**
lnInfl
0.69
(0.29)**
0.045
(0.018)**
lnpop
 (3.3)lnFDItot (3.1)HTFDIshare
Dependent VariableIndependent Variable
Table 2.6 - Instrumental variables (2SLS) regressions - 29 observations
-0.45Adj R-squared
0.187.73 ***F (Prob>F)
2929Number of obs
0.43
(1.11)
0.19
(0.12)*
lnInfl
-2.05
(3.72)
-0.45
(0.10)***
lnpop
2.52
(5.49)
3.57
(1.17)***
 (LnFDItot)HTFDIshare
 (3.4)lnGDPprc (3.2)lnGDPprc
Dependent VariableIndependent Variable
Notes: in regressions (3.1) and (3.2) (central column) instrumented is   , InstrumentsHTFDIshare
are:    , ,  ; in regressions (3.3) and (3.4) (right column) instrumented is  ,lnpop lnInfl H lnFDItot
instruments are  ,  ,  . Information regarding coefficient values, standard errors andlnpop lnInfl H
significance levels is provided the same way as in the sensitivity analysis Tables 2.3 and 2.4.
2.5.3 Results When Using OECD Dataset Instead of Developing Countries Dataset
As a final check for the relevance of our results, we run the same regressions (3.1) and (3.2) for a
data set of OECD countries, leaving the investigation design unchanged, with the same variables
and the same 2SLS procedure. Failure to obtain evidence in favor of the double positive
relationship from resource endowments to the share of high tech FDI, and from the latter to the
level of GDP per capita, would mean that the opposite results which the developing countries
regressions produced may have indeed been due to the reasons peculiar to those developing
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countries that were outlined above. The results from the OECD regressions were as shown in
Tables 2.7 and 2.8.
Even though the regression equation (3.1) is jointly significant at the 5% level, as shown  
by the value achieved by the F statistic, of the coefficients associated with the independent
variables, only that of log population was statistically significant (at 10%). Its negative sign may
be explained by the fact that for OECD countries, the larger the country, the stronger will be any
domestic competition, which might scare FDI from flowing into the country concerned. In the
second stage (regression 3.2), the test for overall statistical significance also failed. Furthermore,
all the individual coefficients of the regressors,did not return statistically significant values. This
evidence from regression (3.2) is most interesting if contrasted with that from regression (3.2)
for the cross-section of developing countries (see Table 2.8). There, individual coefficients with
respect to the share of high tech FDI and   were highly significant, the former with alnpop
positive sign and the latter with a negative sign. The coefficient attached to    had a positivelnInfl
sign, but it was significant only at the 10% level. The contrasting findings relative to the effect
that a higher share of technology embodied into FDI may have on development, as measured by 
, depending on whether the sample employed is of developing or of OECD countries,lnGDPprc
is a further, clear indication that developing countries are rather peculiar with respect to the way
technological change comes about. Failure to account for this geographical heterogeneity, may
be one further reason that leads to the contradictory results underscored in Section 2.2
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Table 2.7 - First stage regressions - 19 observations
0.370.5Adj R-squared
4.50**10.32 ***F (Prob > F)
1929Number of obs
-0.02
(0.02)
0.06
(0.012)***
H
0.093
(0.06)
-0.04
(0.018)**
lnInfl
-0.05
(0.03)*
0.045
(0.018)**
lnpop
 (3.1 OECD)HTFDIshare (3.1)HTFDIshare
Dependent VariableIndependent Variable
Table 2.8 - Instrumental variables (2SLS) regressions - 19 observations
-0.45Adj R-squared
2.377.73 ***F (Prob>F)
1929Number of obs
-0.10
(0.5)
0.19
(0.12)*
lnInfl
-0.10
(0.2)
-0.45
(0.10)***
lnpop
-3.10
(3.81)
3.57
(1.17)***
 (HTFDIshare HTFDIshare
OECD )
 (OECD)lnGDPprc (3.2)lnGDPprc
Dependent VariableIndependent Variable
Notes: in regressions (3.1) and (3.2) (central column) instrumented is   , InstrumentsHTFDIshare
are:    , ,  ; in regressions (3.3) and (3.4) (right column) instrumented is lnpop lnInfl H
 OECD, instruments are  ,  ,  . Information regarding coefficient values,HTFDIshare lnpop lnInfl H
standard errors etc. and significance levels is provided the same way as in the sensitivity
analysis Tables 2.3 and 2.4.
2.6 Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Work
This chapter attempted to gather evidence in favour of the positive impact of FDI on economic
development. We found that the technological intensity of FDI has a positive impact on the
development of those countries that we call developing. The two important qualifications here
are that FDI is heterogeneous with respect to the technology embodied in it, and that FDI can
have a different impact if the receiving nations are at different stages of their development. In
particular we argued that the positive role played by FDI depends on its acting as a vehicle for
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technology transfers. It follows that this role is best fulfilled when the technological intensity of
FDI is higher, and when the receiving nation’s main mode of achieving technical progress is the
technology that it receives from overseas. Developing countries fit this description much more
closely than rich countries, for whom the main mode of achieving technical progress are research
and development activities. 
We also found that a good way to attract high tech FDI is to grow a good stock of human
capital and to make sure that the macroeconomic context is as stable as possible. The caveat is
that this is a cross sectional study, and as such it may suffer from all the problems noted by
Nair-Reicher and Weinhold (2001 and by Carkovic and Levine (2002). However, these problems
should be ameliorated, if not eliminated, by the fact that, in our two stages least squares
estimation, we instrument the crucial variable    with average years of schooling. HTFDIshare
Future work may advance knowledge on this topic in several ways. An obvious one
would be to remake the analysis carried out here, but with improved data, as they become
available. The time dimension could be introduced, by considering FDI flow data for an interval
of time, for those countries that have them. If not enough countries have these data, one might
restrict the study to one of the three regions considered here, East Asia for instance. The addition
of the time dimension may well shed some further light even with the restriction to one region
only. Another possible extension might involve replacing GDP as the dependent variable with
others such as domestic investment or employment, in order to explore the effect of high tech
FDI on these important quantities.
Yet another possibility, as a follow-up to Section 2.5.3 above, is, for the OECD dataset,
to base all the regressions discussed thus far on RnD activities, rather than high tech FDI. The
expected result here would be that in OECD countries, as FDI is not the sole or even the main
carrier of technological change, RnD activities, in close parallel  to the role played by high tech
FDI in developing countries, have a positive effect on the economic performance of rich
countries. The extensions suggested here should keep researchers keen on this topic for a long
time, so that enough research output can be produced to aid policy makers in their quest for a
more wealthy future for their countries.
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Appendix A.2
The 29 countries included in the developing world sample are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Dominican Rep., El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Bangladesh, China, Honk Hong, India, Indonesia (93), Malaysia, Philippines, Rep. of
 Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland.
Table A.2.1 shows summary statistics for all the variables included in regressions 3.1 to
3.4 when using the developing world sample.
Table A.2.1 - Descriptive Statistics for the variables used in regressions 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4,
pertaining the sample of 29 developing countries
5.970.591.462.9429lnInfl
391.11.8104.7758.5429infl (% annual growth)
10.352.192.25.8829H (years)
20.8514.931.5217.0729lnpop
1,140,000,0003,047,000254,000,000103,000,00029pop (units)
10.620.262.396.8429lnFDItot
40,897.301.309,936.705,837.7829FDItot (U.S.$ millions)
21.1504.992.4626HTFDIshare4
0.7500.20.3325HTFDIshare3
0.32-0.020.10.1126HTFDIshare2
0.7500.20.3229HTFDIshare
9.845.631.057.6729 lnGDPprc
18,8132774,4723,62629GDPprc (1995 U.S. $)
MaxMin Std. Dev.MeanObsVariable
The variable   is the log of GDP per capita measured in 1990, in constant 1995lnGDPprc
U.S. $. The data source is the World Development Indicators Online (various issues, but
especially 2001) published by the World Bank
The variable  has been computed as described in the main text (Section 4),HTFDIshare
by using the following Classification of Economic Activities found in U.N. World Investment
Directory FDI data:
PRIMARY SECTOR
Agriculture
Mining and quarrying
Petroleum
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SECONDARY SECTOR
Food, beverages and tobacco
Textiles,  leather and clothing 
Paper
Chemicals
Basic chemicals
Pharmaceuticals, medic. chem. etc.
Coal and petroleum products
Rubber products
Non-metallic mineral products
Metals
Mechanical equipment
Electrical equipment
Radio, tv and communication equip.
Medical, precision and optical instr.
Motor vehicles
Other transport equipment
Other manufacturing
TERTIARY SECTOR
Electricity, gas and water supply
Construction
Distributive trade
Hotels and restaurants
Transport and storage
Communication
Finance and insurance
Real estate
Other services
Other unspecified
The remaining high tech FDI shares have been calculated as explained in Section 5.1 of
the main text. Because of missing or incomplete data, the following countries could not be
included in the sample: Mexico, China and Turkey when computing ; Mexico,HTFDIshare2
China, Indonesia and Turkey when computing ; Dominican Republic, Bulgaria andHTFDIshare3
Chechoslovakia when computing  .HTFDIshare4
The variable   is the logged total FDI stock in the secondary sector for the yearlnFDItot
1990. The source for these data are various issues of the World Investment Directory series,
published by the UNCTAD. The datum on total FDI stock in the secondary sector for China was
not available directly and was therefore computed as follows: Total FDI stock in 1990 * share of
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secondary sector FDI in total FDI in 1990 for developing countries (Source: UNCTAD, Press
Release 2003).
The variable   is the logged gdp implicit deflator calculated as an average annual %lnInfl
growth over the 10 years interval 1980-1990. The data source is the same as for the variable 
.lnGDPprc
The variable H, "average years of schooling", is the average number of years spent in
school (including first level, second level and post-secondary) by the population aged 25 years
and over, for the year 1990.  The data source is the Barro and Lee dataset on education (see
Barro and Lee, 1997). The datum on China comes from the Summary Education Profile on
China of the World Bank, available at the following web address:
http://devdata.worldbank.org/edstats/SummaryEducationProfiles/CountryData/GetShowData.asp
?sCtry=CHN,China.
Finally, the variable   is the logged population total for the year 1990 in each of thelnpop
29 countries sampled. The source of the data is the World Development Indicators Online
(various issues, but especially 2001) published by the World Bank.
The 19 OECD countries considered were: Australia, Austria (91), Canada, Denmark,
Finland (94), France, Germany, Greece (99), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands (93), Norway,
Portugal (95), Spain (00), Sweden (96), Switzerland (93), United Kingdom (94), United States.
In order to avoid overlapping with the sample of developing countries, the criterion
followed was to include all those countries that were OECD members in 1990 for which data
were available. FDI stock data refer to 1990 unless otherwise indicated in parentheses for the
countries concerned. In the case of Greece and Spain, FDI stock data by sectors of industry were
not available, so the variable  was calculated as the ratio of the sales obtained by theHTFDIshare
largest affiliates of foreign Trans National Corporations (TNC) in high tech sectors, to the total
sales of the largest affiliates of foreign TNC in manufacturing. Table A.2.2 shows descriptive
statistics for the sample of 19 OECD countries.
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Table A.2.2 - Descriptive Statistics for the variables used in regressions 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4,
pertaining the sample of 19 OECD countries
2.960.470.671.719lnInfl
19.31.64.796.7419Infl (% annual growth)
124.541.98.9319H (years)
19.3315.071.2516.7719lnpop
249,000,0003,505,80059,900,00041,300,00019pop (units)
0.7300.180.419HTFDIshare
10.699.280.3910.0219lnGDPprc
43,831.3410,691.838,835.6523,987.4519GDPprc (1995 U.S.$)
MaxMinStd. Dev.Mean   ObsVariable
The source for the FDI data was the OECD own FDI dataset, while for the remaining
variables the sources were the same as for the set of developing countries.
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Chapter 3 An Endogenous Growth Model with Quality
Ladders and Consumers’ Heterogeneity
3.1 Introduction
The endogenous growth literature can by now be defined as abundant. More than a decade has
passed since the seminal works of Romer, in which for the first time those who engaged in
innovative activities with the goal of fostering technological change, were formally modeled
(informally, Schumpeter had talked about this long before), as enjoying a degree of market
power (Romer, 1990). Thereby, technological change and growth could be determined
endogenously as the result of rational decisions taken by economic agents in pursuit of profit
incentives.
In the years that followed there were other important contributions, the two most seminal
probably being Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), henceforth G.H.
and A.H. respectively. These studies split the field of endogenous growth into two branches,
with one preoccupying itself with introducing technological change through growth in the
number of goods produced (horizontal differentiation), and another which preferred to introduce
technological change through quality improvements in production (vertical differentiation, also
known as quality ladders). Even the latter stream soon became quite abundant, as the initial
studies by G.H. And A.H. were followed by many others that tried to use the conceptual
framework provided by the quality ladder models to broaden their scope to the study of open
economies, trade, foreign direct investment, developed versus developing countries and so on
(see Aghion and Howitt, 1998 for an account). The mainstream models with quality ladders all
predicted total obsolescence, or, in the parlance first introduced by Schumpeter, total creative
destruction. Put simply, these models predicted that an innovation in the quality goods sector
would force lower quality goods out of the market by bringing their sales down to zero. As a
result, in these models, the quality goods sector featured a monopoly of the good that embodied
the highest quality on the ladder. 
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However, in the real world there are many examples of markets for quality goods with
duopolistic or oligopolistic market structure. Examples include video and radio cassettes vs.
digital video disks and compact disks, various generations of computer processors (Pentium II,
III, IV, Celeron, etc.) and so on. Perhaps the most telling example is a comparison of the car
market in developed vs. developing countries. The former is typically characterized by a
monopoly of the latest models, while in the latter one can often see several generations of cars
being produced alongside each other and all making a profit. A well known example is the
Volkswagen Beetle. While production of this model ceased many years ago in most developed
countries, it continued being produced in several developing economies. For instance, production
of the Beetle has been continued until very recently in Mexico, and in any case for much longer
than in Europe or the U.S. A possible explanation for these phenomena may lie in the different
way income is distributed across markets or countries. The main stream models by G.H. and
A.H. cannot account for income distribution differences.
In A.H., the consumption good is produced by inputting intermediate goods according to
the Cobb Douglas production function: . This is a homothetic specification whichY = Ax, < 1
implies that the rate of substitution between inputs does not change with income.
In G.H., household utility is of the form  , where  is a consumptionlnDt = ln m qmxm D
index, and  is an index for quality. Thus products along the quality ladder are perfect substitutesq
and there is positive demand only for the product that carries the lowest price per unit of quality,
which is the highest product on the quality ladder. Again, that occurs regardless of the level of
income. A more complete review of both G.H. and A.H. was provided in Chapter 1 (Sections
1.5.2 and 1.5.3).
In order to introduce differences in income distributions into the quality ladder
framework, we employ the conceptual apparatus produced by that particular branch of industrial
organization known as vertical quality differentiation literature. Among the most important
contributions to this literature, we cite Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), and Shaked and Sutton
(1982).  These studies model preferences as follows: , where I is income, qi isu(I, qi) = qi(I − pi)
a quality index, and pi is the price of a good of quality i. Thus consumers problem is not how
much to buy of some good (as in A.H. and G.H.) But whether to buy one unit of the good, and
which quality to buy.
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Consumer preferences such as those just described above, have been employed in the
context of a quality ladder model in two other papers, Li (1998) and Zweimuller and Brunner
(1998). In the quality ladder literature these are the studies that come closest to the model
developed here, but there are some important differences too that differentiate them from the
present study. 
In Li (1998, 2003), income inequality is introduced through assuming that labor income
has a uniform distribution with mean preserving spread. This assumption simplifies somewhat
the analysis, but it does not allow for a comparison of countries that feature very different mean
incomes. Hence, it does not allow for a comparison of the developed world vs. the developing
world. 
In Zweimuller and Brunner (1998), labor income is assumed to be the same across
individuals, while income inequality is introduced through heterogeneity in “other wealth”,
which is endogenous, and whose source is the stake that each individual owns in the firms that
produce the quality goods. Here too a simplifying assumption is made, so that the other wealth is
not uniformly distributed, as in Li (1998) and in previous vertical quality differentiation
literature, but consumers are divided into two categories, the rich and the poor, according to a
discrete distribution.
While we accept that a uniform distribution may fail to give an accurate distribution of
income in the real world, we nevertheless feel that it is worthwhile to maintain this assumption,
in order not to lose the rich framework provided by the vertical quality differentiation literature.
Therefore, in this study, income inequality is introduced through other wealth which originates
from having a stake in the firms that produce the quality goods, like in Zweimuller and Brunner.
This other wealth is assumed to be uniformly distributed, but without the restrictive mean
preserving spread assumption.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 lays down the model,
introduces income heterogeneity and describes the features of the market structures of monopoly
and duopoly. Sections 3.3 to 3.5 introduce the remaining main building blocks of this model,
namely the research and development sector (in short RnD), the labor markets, and how the
growth rate of the economy is being computed. Sections 3.6 and 3.7 perform steady state
equilibrium analysis in monopoly and duopoly respectively. Section 3.8 carries out some further
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and interesting comparative statics, while Section 3.9 comprises the conclusion and some
directions for future research. The Appendix has all the remaining mathematical details.
3.2 The Model
The economy is populated by L individuals, whose life-span is infinite. The representative
individual consumes two types of goods each period. The first type is a good that is subject to
quality innovation over time. Each individual consumes at most one unit per period of these
goods. The quality good is denoted as  where t indexes time, and i=1,2 indexes quality, inqit
ascending order. An innovation raises the quality of good  by a constant factor .qit  > 1
Therefore  denotes the product that sits second from top on the quality ladder, and q1 = 
 denotes the good that occupies the highest position on the ladder. The second typeq2 = q1 = 2
of good is a homogeneous product, that can be thought of as a composite commodity that
comprises all other purchases made beyond the quality goods sector. Let this homogeneous good
be denoted by  (again t indexes time). In any period t, the utility achieved by the representativeht
individual is given by:
(2.1)ut = qitht
 
In words,  this utility function says that the representative individual can buy only one
unit of the quality good and an amount  of the homogeneous good. This individual’s choiceh
concerns which quality to buy, as represented by the quality index  , and how much to have ofqit
the homogeneous good. We take advantage of a utility functions’ property by which these are
only defined up to a monotonic transformation, to rewrite the above utility in logs as follows:
(2.2)lnut = lnqit + lnht
The intertemporal utility maximization problem for the representative individual is:
(2.3)Max 
t=0
∞ 1
1 + !
t
ln ut
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where  is the rate of time preference.!
We assume that consumers are endowed with assets k, earn a wage w from supplying one
unit of labor, and make expenditures C on the two types of goods defined above. Over time, in
any given period, assets next period must be equal to the sum of the assets, augmented at the
current interest rate, and the wage income earned from working this period, minus consumption
expenditure this period, according to the following budget constraint:
(2.4)kt+1 = (1 + rt)kt + wt − Ct
Since consumers purchase one unit of the quality good and spend the rest on the
homogeneous good, demand for the latter is given by:
(2.5)ht = Ct − pit
where  is price in period t of one unit of good of quality i = 1,2.pit
Having stated what the representative individual’s intertemporal problem is, we will
restrict our attention to the steady state, utility-maximizing, consumption pattern of such an
individual29, which is:
. (2.6)C = w + !k
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29In order to solve for the steady state, we write down the Bellman equation for this problem:
 , subject to the intertemporal budget constraint:V(kt−1 ) = maxCt,kt ut(Ct) +
1
1 + !V(kt)
 . We recall that  . Substituting from the budgetCt = −kt+1 + (1 + rt)kt + wt ut(Ct) = ln(Ct − pit) + lnqit
constraint into the Bellman equation, we can rewrite the latter as follows:  .V(kt−1 ) = maxkt ut(kt) +
1
1 + !V(kt)
The Euler equation is: . Here: ut
∏ = 11 + ! ut+1
∏ f ∏(kt)
. In steady state we set  and
1 + rt
Ct − pit =
1
1 + !
1 + rt+1
Ct+1 − pit+1 (1 + rt) w
Ct+1 − pit+1
Ct − pit =
1 + rt+1
1 + ! Ct+1 = Ct = C
  to derive:   . Steady state can be arrived at by setting pit+1 = pit = pi 1 = 1 + rt+11 + ! u rt = r = !
  in the budget constraint, to get: . .kt = k, Ct = C, wt = w, rt = ! k = (1 + !)k + w − CwC = w + !k
3.2.1 Introducing Income Heterogeneity
In order to introduce income heterogeneity, we shall assume that w, wage income, is the same
for everybody who supplies one unit of labor and exogenous, whereas assets k, which we will
henceforth refer to as “wealth” (other than wage income), is uniformly distributed on a support 
. [kl, ku]
We further define:   as the mean other wealth (per capita), a measure of thevL =
ku + kl
2
position of the distribution concerning other wealth, and   as a measure of the spreadxL =
ku − kl
2
of the distribution. Given the linear relationship between other wealth and steady state
consumption, the latter is also uniformly distributed on support  . These assumptions[Cl, Cu ]
imply that individuals have same preferences and wage income, but differ in their other wealth
and, as a result, in their levels of consumption. The consumption pattern of individual j c [l, ..., u]
is thus given by  , and the mean consumption pattern, as a case of special interest, isCj = w + !kj
given by: .Cm = w + ! vL
3.2.2 Bertrand Duopoly Game
Each individual on the wealth scale makes a decision regarding the purchase of the quality good,
namely whether to buy it, and which quality to buy. This decision depends on the income of the
individual in question and, again because of the linear relationship between income and
consumption, on the level of consumption that this individual can afford. Let  denote theCeq
consumption level of the individual who is indifferent between purchasing one unit of good 1 at
price  and one unit of good 2 at price . For such an individual, utility derived from these twop1 p2
consumption patterns must be the same:
(2.7)ln u(q1) = ln u(q2) w ln q1 + ln(Ceq − p1) = ln q2 + ln(Ceq − p2)
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Solving for  yields:Ceq
(2.8)Ceq = q2p2 − q1p1q2 − q1 =
p2 − p1
 − 1
The individual with consumption pattern  divides the population into two groups.Ceq
There are individuals  who buy good 1, and individuals   who buyCj c Cl, Ceq Cj c Ceq, Cu
good 2.30
Therefore, demand for goods 1 and 2 is respectively:
(2.9)D1 = LF(Ceq)
(2.10)D2 = L(1 − F(Ceq))
Where  is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of consumption levels, which has densityF($)
 . Under duopoly, firms compete for customers by choosing prices (Bertrand competition).f($)
Their objective is to maximize the following profits:
(2.11)1 = D1(p1 − wc) = LF(Ceq)(p1 − wc)
(2.12)2 = D2(p2 − wc) = L(1 − F(Ceq))(p2 − wc)
where  is profit accruing to firm producing good of quality   and selling it at price  i i = 1, 2 pi
and wc is a cost per unit produced (assumed to be the same for both qualities, and equal to wage
income multiplied by a labor coefficient c<1).
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30 Underlying this statement, there is an assumption that the market is “covered”, that is, everybody buys the quality
good, although some people prefer good 1 and some others buy good 2. Another equilibrium scenario, which is
ruled out here, is when some consumers prefer not to buy the quality good at all. In this instance, we say that the
market is not covered. It is not difficult to show that, in order for the market to be covered, the following condition
must hold: . The following is an interpretation of this condition: The equilibriumCeq [ 2Cl − 1 − 1 wc
household, which is indifferent from buying good 1 at price and good 2 at price , must have consumption thatp1 p2
is less than twice the consumption of the poorest household minus a weighted marginal cost, where the weight 
is a measure of the quality differential between good 1 and good 2.1 − 1
We can use first order conditions for profit maximization ( ) to derive theØi
Øpi = 0
following two equilibrium conditions:
(2.13)1 − 2F(Ceq) = f(Ceq)(Ceq − wc)
(2.14)f(Ceq) Beq − wc( + 1) − 1 = 1
where we define   . Further manipulations yield the equilibrium prices:Beq = p2 + p1 − 1
(2.15)
p1e = ( − 1) F(Ceq)f(Ceq) + wc
p2e =  − 1
1 − F(Ceq)
f(Ceq) + wc
And equilibrium profits:
(2.16)
1e = ( − 1) L F(Ceq)
2
f(Ceq)
2e =  − 1
L 1 − F(Ceq) 2
f(Ceq)
This formulation of equilibrium relationships offers the advantage of being valid for any
distribution of consumption patterns, not just the uniform case.
This consideration enables us to state the following lemma for any distribution of
consumption levels:
Lemma: In a duopolistic market where everybody buys one of the two quality goods, the
following is always true:
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(2.17)F(Ceq) [ 12 w Ceq [ Cm
Proof: Recall that one of the two equilibrium conditions is:
(2.18)1 − 2F(Ceq) = f(Ceq)(Ceq − wc)
Notice that the RHS of this condition is  by definition, so too must be the LHS. But thism 0
implies:  .F(Ceq) [ 12
From this point onwards, we shall restrict ourselves to the uniform distribution case. For
later use, we rewrite equilibrium profits as a function of mean other wealth v and spread x, as
follows:
. (2.19)
1e(v) = ( − 1)!
x − v3 −
wL(1 − c)
3!
2
2x
2e(v) =  − 1 !
x + v3 +
wL(1 − c)
3!
2
2x
3.2.3 Monopoly
Here we want to describe the conditions that in equilibrium yield a monopoly, that is that market
structure, where the quality good sector is characterized by everybody buying the
state-of-the-art. Moreover, just as we did when discussing duopoly, we want to determine the
monopoly equilibrium price and profit that accrues to the firm which produces the
state-of-the-art.
We start by writing the demand schedule facing the firm selling good 2:
(2.20)D2 = L ¶Ceq
Cu f(C)dC = LCu − CL (Cu − Ceq) =
L
Cu − Cl Cu −

 − 1 p2 + 1 − 1 p1
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If both firm producing good 1 and firm producing good 2 were to adopt marginal cost
pricing ( so that p1 = wc and p2 = wc), output would be:   . A monopolist facingLCu−Cl (Cu − wc)
the above mentioned demand schedule, which is linear in p2, would therefore choose output that
is half of that chosen when both firms adopt marginal cost pricing:   . BecauseLCu−Cl (Cu − wc)÷2
every individual buys at most one unit of the quality good, monopoly occurs whenever the size
of the population is not greater than the number of units produced by a profit-maximizing
monopolist, or in symbols:
(2.21)L [ LCu−Cl (Cu − wc)÷2wCu [ 2Cl − wc
We can rewrite the above condition in terms of mean other wealth v and spread x, as
follows:
(2.22)x [ 13 v + wL(1 − c)!
.
The economic interpretation of this condition is that for monopoly to obtain in
equilibrium, the spread in the distribution of other wealth, cannot exceed one third of the
expression in brackets. The latter is the sum of wealth v and the discounted flow (discounted at
the rate of time preference ρ ) of the total amount of salaries wL earned in sectors other than
manufacturing of the quality good (this exclusion is obtained by multiplying wL by the
coefficient 1-c). Salaries in the manufacturing of quality goods sector are excluded because they
also represent a cost for households/entrepreneurs. The condition for monopoly can therefore be
restated in words as: “the spread in wealth must be at most equal to one third of the total wealth
in the system”31. Under these circumstances the market for the quality good is a monopoly. The
profit accruing to the monopolist is: . In order to maximize this profit, theM = L(pM − wc)
monopolist will set the maximum price compatible with a monopolist market structure. This
amounts to setting the highest price such that  . Recall that under monopoly, the firmCeq [ Cl
producing the inferior good is assumed to set a price equal to marginal cost,    whichp1 = wc
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31 Obviously, the condition for duopoly is the complement of this and reads “duopoly obtains as soon as the spread
in other wealth is larger than one third of the total wealth in the system”.
yields no profit so that the firm does not start production in the first place. As a result, the above
inequality may be rewritten as:   .  To get the price that maximizes monopoly
pm − wc
 − 1 [ Cl
profits, notice that the above constraint is binding and solve for  to obtain:pM
 (2.23)pMe =  − 1 Cl + wc
Putting this price back into the expression for profit, yields equilibrium profit under
monopoly:
 (2.24)Me = L  − 1 (Cl − wc)
Both monopoly equilibrium price and profit depend on  only. Thus these relationshipsCl
are valid for any distribution of consumption patterns. Nevertheless, in order to maintain a
parallel with the duopoly case, we shall restrict our analysis to the uniform distribution case. 
For later use, we rewrite monopoly price and profit as function of mean other wealth v and
spread x:
(2.25)
pMe =  − 1 w + !( vL − xL ) + wc
Me =  − 1 [!(v − x) + wL(1 − c)]
3.3 The RnD Sector
In order to close the model, and before passing to the description of steady states with associated
equilibrium analyses, we need to introduce two more elements. 
In this section we describe the RnD sector, while the next section is dedicated to the labor
markets. Both these sectors are crucial building blocks of this model, but, because here nothing
novel is added to them that did not appear in the previous quality ladders literature, we provide a
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concise account of them, and refer the interested reader to that literature  (e.g. Grossman and
Helpman, 1991) for a more detailed description.
We assume that innovations are random and arrive according to a Poisson arrival rate µ.
µdt describes the probability that the next innovation occurs within dt from now, when the
innovator research effort is µ. In steady state, the value of an innovation V will be such that the
following arbitrage equation holds:
(3.1)!V = 2 − V + Vn
In turn:
(3.2)!Vn = 1 − Vn
where  is the value of the innovation next period, after it has become second best due to theVn
arrival on the market of a better product (i.e. after it has been pushed one step lower on the
quality ladder);  is profit for the firm producing good of quality , and  is the rate ofi i = 1, 2 !
time preference.
After substitution, we get the asset arbitrage equation:
(3.3)V = 2! +  + 1(! + )2
Free entry in RnD implies zero profit for the innovator, or:
 (3.4)V −wa = 0
where  is the cost of doing research, whose components are the intensity of research , wagewa 
income w, and a labor coefficient a. We can and rewrite this free entry condition as follows:
(3.5)(V − wa) = 0
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and conclude that positive but finite research investments can take place only when V = wa. In
symbols:
 
(3.6)V = wa, > 0
V < wa, = 0
Putting together the asset arbitrage and free entry conditions yield the following
equilibrium relationship for the RnD sector:
(3.7)wa = 2! +  + 1(! + )2
When wealth and consumption distributions are such that, in equilibrium, the market
structure is a monopoly, sales of the good of lower quality are zero and . As a result, next1 = 0
period value is  and the RnD condition (3.7) reduces to:Vn = 0
(3.8)wa = m! + 
3.4 The Labor Markets
The final element of this model is the labor market. In this market, total demand is the sum of
demand for labor in each sector. With research intensity µ and a research sector characterized by
a labor coefficient a, demand for labor in research is equal to aµ . In the manufacturing sector,
the demand for labor in manufacturing the quality good is cL. Demand for labor in
manufacturing the homogeneous good is  , and it is obtained as follows: The technology for thehw
homogeneous good is assumed to be such that every individual contributes equally to its
production. Given perfect competitive settings, we equate marginal product of labor   to thehL
going wage w, which, upon solving for L, yields  the demand for labor in manufacturing the
homogeneous good as stated above. The supply of Labor is simply given by L.
Equating labor demand and labor supply, yields the full employment condition:
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 (4.1)a + cL + hw = L
Equation (4.1), as it stands, does not yet have any relationship with the (uniform)
distribution of wealth. In order to have the latter play a role in equation 4.1, several further
arrangements are necessary. We work through the case of monopoly in great detail, and only
sketch the main passages for duopoly, because the calculations involved follow the same logic.
We start by recalling that demand for the homogeneous good h under monopoly is given by 
 , and that    is characterized by a uniform distribution on support  .h = C − pM C [Cl, Cu ]
Therefore, we can express  as follows32:h
(4.2)h = ¶Cl
Cu L
Cu − Cl h(C)dC = ¶Cl
Cu L
Cu − Cl (C − pM)dC = L
Cu + Cl
2 − pM
Replace this expression for  into equation (4.1) and recall that   is theh Cu + Cl2 = Cm
mean consumption, to end up with the following rearranged full employment condition:
(4.3)a + LCmw + cL − LpMw = L
The next step is to replace  with (2.23) to get :pm
(4.4)a + LCmw + cL −
L
 − 1
 Cl + wc
w = L
Further algebra yields the following:
(4.5)a + LCmw −
L
 − 1
 (Cl − wc)
w = L
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32The further passages that were omitted in the main text are as follows:
  ; h = ¶ClCu LCu−Cl (C − pM )dC = LCu−Cl ¶ClCu CdC − pM ¶ClCu dC = LCu−Cl
Cu2−Cl2
2 − pM(Cu − Cl )
Then, canceling terms yields the result of the main text.
Finally, recognition that  is nothing but (2.24), enables us toL
 − 1
 (Cl − wc) = M
express the full employment condition as a function of monopoly profits, as follows:
(4.6)a + LCmw − Mw = L
In the duopoly case, the relationship between  and  must account for the fact that nowh C
the uniform distribution of  is split into two portions by the indifferent consumer, characterizedC
by consumption pattern . Hence, we can derive the following expression for h:Ceq
(4.7)
h = ¶Cl
Ceq L
Cu − Cl h(C)dC + ¶Ceq
Cu L
Cu − Cl h(C)dC
h = ¶Cl
Ceq L
Cu − Cl (C − p1 )dC + ¶Ceq
Cu L
Cu − Cl (C − p2 )dC
After following the same procedure as for monopoly, replace the above in the full
employment condition, so that the latter can be rewritten in terms of firms’ profits:
(4.8)a + LCmw − 2w − 1w = L
3.5 Growth Rate
The steady state growth rate of this economy stems from the quality upgrading process in the
quality goods sector. As in the earlier quality ladders literature, we recall that innovations arrive
at Poisson rate µ, and when they do arrive, the size of the jump up the quality ladder is    , toln
derive the following expression for the steady state growth rate:
(5.1)g =  ln
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3.6 Steady State Analysis - Monopoly
In steady state equilibrium, the model is fully described by the research equation (3.7) and the
full employment condition (4.1). Under monopoly,  these equations take the following form:
(6.1)wa = M(v)! + 
(6.2)wa = M(v) − !v
Monopoly profit, as a function of wealth v, has in turn been found to be:
(6.3)m(v) =  − 1 [!(v − x) + wL(1 − c)]
After plugging the profit equation into (6.1) and (6.2), we get a system of two equations
in two unknowns (v, µ) that is amenable to analysis. We state the following:
Proposition 1: If the market structure in the quality goods sector is a monopoly, there exists a
unique steady state equilibrium characterized by positive wealth level v, research intensity µ and
positive growth rate g. (Proof in the Appendix).
Proposition 2: An increase in the degree of inequality, as measured by an increase in the spread
x, is harmful for innovative activity µ and the economy growth rate g. (Proof in the Appendix).
Proposition 1 says that under a monopolistic structure in the market for quality goods, a
unique steady state equilibrium can be reached (provided the condition given in the appendix is
satisfied) which is characterized by positive rates of innovative research and growth. The
graphical representation of proposition 1 is given in Figure 3.1. In the latter, the line termed (A')
represents the locus of points (v, µ) such that the expected value of an innovation is equal to its
Chapter 3
134
costs (equation (6.1)). To understand why this line has a positive slope, notice that higher values
of research intensity µ shorten the useful duration of a quality product as innovations occur at a
faster pace. On the other hand, a larger wealth v guarantees a higher profitability for a product of
top quality because it increases consumers' willingness to pay for higher quality. Therefore, for
equation (6.1) to remain in equilibrium, higher values of µ must be matched by higher values of
v, so that the loss of profit due to a shorter useful life is offset by the higher profitability
guaranteed by a higher v. The line termed (L') represents the locus of points (v, µ) such that the
labor markets clear (equation (6.2)). This line has a negative slope because higher innovative
activity µ results in more demand for labor in the research sector. Since labor supply is fixed at
L, for labor markets to clear this increase in labor demand must be offset by a drop in labor
demand in the manufacturing sector, either for producing the quality good or the homogeneous
good. Since labor demand for the quality good is fixed at cL, labor demand for producing the
homogeneous good must come down. The latter can occur if less of the homogeneous good is
consumed, which is ensured by lower values of wealth v. Proposition 2 is a comparative statics
result: it looks at the effect of an exogenous increase in the degree of inequality x on the rate of
research  and the rate of growth g. Both effects are found to be negative. The intuition that lies
behind this result is that, as inequality increases, the monopolist of the highest quality starts
being under more pressure which stems from threat of a new entry in the market for quality
goods by a product of lower quality. This pressure can be thought of as stronger potential
competition which translates into decreasing expected returns for future incumbent monopolists
and reduced incentives to conduct innovative research. A drop in the latter also results in a fall in
the economic growth rate, as it can be seen with a glance at equation (5.1). Proposition 2 is
pictorially explained in the graph of Figure (3.2).  Notice that an increase in the degree of
inequality x causes both line (A') and line (L') to shift to their left. The shift is such that at the
new equilibrium, the level of wealth v is unchanged while innovative activity µ drops.
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Figure 3.1 - Monopoly Equilibrium
Figure 3.2 - Monopoly, Comparative Statics: Increase in Wealth Inequality
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3.7 Steady State Analysis - Duopoly
In equilibrium, the two equations that define the model under duopoly are33:
     (7.1)wa = 2(v)! +  + 1(v)(! + )2
(7.2)wa = 2(v) + 1(v) − !v
Where the two expressions for profits are as follows:
(7.3)
1e(v) = ( − 1)!
x − v3 −
wL(1 − c)
3!
2
2x
2e(v) =  − 1 !
x + v3 +
wL(1 − c)
3!
2
2x
In the above, the two endogenous variables are µ, which denotes intensity of research,
and v, which measures the total value of wealth (other than wage income w). Of great importance
in our analysis will also be x, a measure of the spread of the distribution of v. The equilibrium
analysis is at first carried out for fixed spread x. Later we shall let it vary and measure the impact
of such variation on the endogenous pair (µ, v) in the new steady state equilibrium.
Proposition 3: If the market structure in the quality goods sector is a duopoly, there exists a
unique steady state equilibrium characterized by positive wealth level v, research intensity µ and
positive growth rate g, provided that parameter values are such that the functions  and v = vA()
 implicitly defined by the schedules (7.1) and (7.2) satisfy the condition .v = vL() vA() < vL()
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33 Equation (7.1) is exactly as derived in the RnD section, whereas equation (7.2) is as derived from the labor
markets section, with , and after multiplying through by w.Cm = w + ! vL
We sketch the proof of proposition 3 here, while the entire proof can be found in the
appendix.
Proof: this follows the same methodology that we used to prove proposition 1 regarding
monopoly. We note that both (7.1) and (7.2) implicitly define functions  and .v = vA() v = vL()
Our proof is in three steps: 1) prove that the function has positive slope for all , v = vA()  m 0
.v m 0
2) prove that the function  has negative slope for all , . This condition  holds,v = vL()  m 0 v m 0
provided that the leap in quality brought about by the latest innovation, as measured by γ, is
sufficiently small (in particular, the slope is negative for  ). 1 <  < 2
3) Compute  and and notice that a unique equilibrium exists if and only if vA() x=0 vL() x=0
. In words, this latest step consists of showing that the vertical interceptvA() x=0 < vL() x=0
of the function defined by the (7.1) schedule occurs at a lower point than the vertical intercept of
the function defined by the (7.2) schedule. This fact, together with steps 1 and 2 ensures that the
two schedules meet only once in the positive quadrant of the (µ, v) plane and thereby determine  
a unique and positive pair (µ, v).
The unique equilibrium of proposition 3 can be represented in a graph that looks like that
of Figure 3.1. This is done in Figure 3.3. In this graph, line A shows the set of paired values (µ,
v) for which, under duopoly, the expected value of innovation is equal to its cost. The economic
reasoning for the positive slope of A is very similar to that of the positive slope of line A' in
Figure 3.1 and it is not repeated here.
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Figure 3.3 - Duopoly Equilibrium
Similarly, the reasoning behind the downward slope of line L, which is the locus of all
paired values (µ, v) so that the labor markets clear under duopoly, is the same as that provided to
justify the negative slope of line L' in figure 3.1. Finally, you will notice that Figure 3.3, unlike
Figure 3.1, does not feature linear schedules, since the slopes of the lines in Figure 3.1 are
constant, while those of the lines of Figure 3.3 are not (see the calculations in the Appendix).
In order to obtain further insight and an easy way to perform comparative statics with
respect to inequality, we merge equations (7.1) and (7.2). Such a calculation yields the following
relationship between µ and v:
(7.4) = 1(v) = 2(v) − aw!2aw − v
Notice that, upon dividing equation (7.2) through by aw, the latter also provides a direct
relationship between µ and v:
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µ
v
A
L
(7.5) = 2(v) = 2(v) + 1(v) − !vaw
Equations (7.4) and (7.5) are shown in Figure 3.4 as lines (*) and (**), which yield
another way of looking at the steady state equilibrium under duopoly. We have already seen,
earlier on in the text, that under monopoly, the value of wealth is given by  Underv = wa
duopoly, the remaining value of the good that is second best must be added to the value of the
latest innovation, so that the value of wealth falls in the range . Therefore, we wantwa < v < 2aw
to study the behavior (7.4) and (7.5) for values of v falling into this range. Starting with (7.4),
notice that the latter has a vertical asymptote at v = 2aw. For v < 2aw, µ approaches +∞ as v
approaches 2aw from below, provided that . The latter can be ensured for2(v) − aw! > 0
example by taking L to be sufficiently large. For , µ is a monotonically increasingaw [ v < 2aw
function of v, because   in the numerator is monotonically increasing in v, and the2(v)
denominator goes down as v rises. Figure 3.4 illustrates the case described. As for line (**),
corresponding  to equation (7.5), its slope is given by the sign of the expression   .Ø2
Øv +
Ø1
Øv − !
In the proof of proposition 3, to be found in the appendix, it is shown that a sufficient condition
for    and for (7.5) to have a negative slope, is that   . The two curvesØ2
Øv +
Ø1
Øv − ! < 0 1 <  < 2
will meet once if and only if :
    (7.6)1(aw) = 2(aw) − aw!aw < 2(aw) = 2(aw) + 1(aw) − aw!aw w 1(aw)aw > 0
Further, in order to ensure that at the point of intersection , we need that either  > 0
 on the schedule (7.4), or that  on the schedule (7.5).2(aw) − aw! > 0 2(aw) +1(aw) − !v > 0
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Figure 3.4 - Duopoly Equilibrium, Alternative Representation
The curves (7.4) and (7.5) are also a useful and very simple tool to study how the
endogenous variable µ, and thereby the growth rate g, respond to changes in the degree of
inequality x.  
Proposition 4: Under duopoly, an increase in the degree of inequality x raises the intensity of
research µ and thereby the growth rate g. 
Proof: Since both in (7.4) and in (7.5) inequality x only enters the two profit functions, which in
turn enter  and  with a positive sign, it is sufficient to show that  and  .1(v) 2(v) Ø1Øx > 0
Ø2
Øx > 0
We find   andØ1
Øx = ( − 1)!
x − v3 −
wL(1 − c)
3! x + v3 +
wL(1 − c)
3!
2x2
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v
µ
2 a waw
(*)
( * * )
. Both   and    followØ2
Øx =
 − 1
 !
x + v3 +
wL(1 − c)
3! x −
v
3 −
wL(1 − c)
3!
2x2
Ø1
Øx > 0
Ø2
Øx > 0
from the fact that x, under duopoly, must satisfy the condition  .x > v3 +
wL(1 − c)
3!
Proposition 4 tells us that duopoly yields a result with respect to changes in income
inequality that is the opposite of that obtained under monopoly (see proposition 2). The
economic argument is that when the market for quality goods is segmented, rising inequality in
wealth weakens competition among qualities, as the incumbent in each segment is able to
command a higher price because of the lower threat that consumers in the tails of each segment
might turn to the other quality. In the next section we take another look at how inequality in
wealth and the number of qualities in the market for quality goods interact. 
3.8 Comparative statics on the number of qualities as a function of inequality,
given low or high wages, and as a function of wages, given low or high inequality.
In this section we perform a comparative statics exercise in order to study how the number of
qualities in the product markets and hence the structure of the product markets react to changes
in wealth inequality x, and to changes in labour income, w. In order to study the behaviour of the
threshold levels of inequality and wages that determine the switch from monopoly to duopoly
(from one quality to two qualities), the relevant regime to look at is monopoly (this of course
implies that duopoly would be the relevant regime if we were to study the threshold between two
and three qualities). This observation enables us to use the following feature of the monopoly
regime and greatly simplify the analysis: under monopoly, other wealth v is equal to the value of
the current innovation, V. In order to understand why this should be so, recall that wealth other
than wage income stems solely from holding shares in innovating firms. Since innovators’ tenure
under monopoly lasts for the current period only, the value of such firms coincides with the
value of the current innovation V. This in turn is equal to wa because of the free entry into RnD
condition (see equation 3.6). Therefore we can write: v = wa. Notice that the equilibrium v in
monopoly depends positively on wages, but does not depend on inequality x. We recall (see
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equation 2.22) that the threshold level of inequality that determines the passage from a monopoly
of the highest quality to a duopoly of two qualities is34:
 (8.1)x& [ 13 v(w) +
wL(1 − c)
!
We can see that:
 (8.2)x&(wL) < x&(wH)
Where  and  are low wages and high wages, respectively. This situation is represented inwL wH
Figure 3.5. We can see that for low wages, the switch occurs at a lower level of inequality. When
wages are high, monopoly can persist even for relatively high level of inequality.
In terms of wages, the threshold level is obtained simply by rearranging equation (8.1) to
get:
  (8.3)w& m !L(1 − c) (3x − v(w& )) w w& m
3!x
L(1 − c) + a!
Here, as x increases, there is only a direct effect on w*, because the equilibrium v does not
depend on x in monopoly. Thus we have:
 (8.4)w&(xL) < w&(xH)
This situation is shown in Figure 3.6.
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34 In this section, the superscript “*” indicates equilibrium values of the variable concerned, while the subscripts
“L” and “H” stand for “low” and “high”.
Figure 3.5 - n = f(x/w) - Extension of Tenure by n = 1 Due to a Higher w
Figure 3.6 - n=f(w/x) Extension of Tenure by n = 2 Due to a Higher x
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n=2
n=1
n
x
n=1
n=2
n
w
We see there that, when inequality is low, an exogenous rise in wages produces the
switch from two qualities to one. When inequality is high, a larger rise in wages is needed for a
switch from two qualities to one to take place. 
This model would explain why countries were inequality is rather high, but so too are
wages (like the U.S.) are characterized by a monopoly of the quality good markets, while some
less unequal societies, which also have a lower wage, have duopoly in the markets for quality
goods (we may think of Eastern Europe or China). 
3.9 The Case of Duopoly in the Market for Quality Goods: a Numerical Example
At this point we construe a numerical example based on the system of equations (7.4) and (7.5)
which are repeated below for convenience:
(7.4) = 1(v) = 2(v) − aw!2aw − v
(7.5) = 2(v) = 2(v) + 1(v) − !vaw
This example may be of interest per se and it may contribute to giving a clearer
illustration of the workings of the model. First, we need to calibrate the set of exogenous
parameters {w, a, ρ, c, L, γ, x}. Although most of these parameters have been explained when
they were first introduced, as a matter of convenience, they will be defined again here as they are
assigned the calibrated values. The first parameter to be calibrated is the income from labor, w,
which, as you may recall, had been assumed to be equal for everybody. For simplicity, we set w
= 1. Then we have the labor coefficient in the research sector, a. There is not an immediately
available criterion upon which to base the calibration of this parameter. It should be said,
however, that in duopoly the product aw constitutes  the lower bound for the value of total other
wealth v, hence, given the value assigned to w, it seems reasonable to assign a value greater than
1 to the research labor coefficient a. We settle for a = 10. As for the next parameter, the rate of
time preference, ρ, it is generally believed to be the same as the long term real interest rate. We
think that a reasonable figure for the latter is  ρ = 0.03. Table 9.1 below and Fig. 9.1 are
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constructed on the basis of this value for ρ. In Fig. 9.2, the entire numerical example is re-run
after setting ρ = 0.05. This is done in order to check that the graphical output in its substance is
not sensitive to small changes in the value of . The case with  has the additional! ! = 0.05
advantage of yielding graphs that are more clearcut. Another parameter to be calibrated is c, the
labor coefficient in manufacturing the quality good, which should be assigned a value less than
1. This is in order to avoid that the labor coefficient in all sectors other than manufacturing the
quality good, 1-c, turns negative, which would make no sense. Among all the possible values in
the interval [0,1], we decided to pick c = 0.7. We now come to L, the labor force. Perhaps for this
parameter, more than for any other, just any value would do. Here we take into account the fact
that the product wL, the total wage that the population L is able to earn from labor, should not
have a very different order of magnitude than the value of total wealth other than wage income v.
The product wa can be thought of as a first approximation for v, since it constitutes its lower
bound. In order to have the two quantities v and wL not to be of very different scales, we set L =
10. 
Having calibrated the subset of exogenous parameters {w, a, ρ, c, L}, our strategy is to
use the remaining two exogenous variables γ and x to study how the model responds to
exogenous shocks. 
The choice of γ, which measures the size of the technological leap that occurs with the
arrival of a new higher quality product, is motivated by the fact that γ represents the size of the
technological advantage that the technological leader has on her closest rival. As such, γ is a very
important parameter in determining the incentive to innovate. It is reasonable to expect that,
when everything else is held constant, the bigger the technological advantage, the higher will be
the rate of innovative activity µ in equilibrium. We imagine two different settings: the first,
termed "economy with small technological leaps" is characterized by a  . The second, = 1.3
which we call "economy with big technological leaps" is characterized by a  . Finally, we = 2
need to calibrate x, the inequality parameter, in such a way that enables us to study the behavior
of the economy as x changes exogenously, in a meaningful way. In order to do so, we have to
recall that our aim with the present numerical example is to illustrate how the model works under
duopoly. For duopoly to obtain in equilibrium, we must choose a value of x that satisfies the
complement to condition (2.22), as stated in footnote 3, as reported below:
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(9.1)x > 13 v +
wL(1 − c)
!
Given the values assigned to the parameters so far, this is equivalent to ensuring that 
. Furthermore, to ensure that equation (7.4) is positivelyx > 13 10 +
10(1 − 0.7)
0.05 w x > 23.33
sloped, the numerator of the right hand side of that equation must be positive, which occurs if  
. We consider two different scenarios. In the first, which we call "low inequalityx > 60
economy", we set x = 70. In the second, termed "high inequality economy", we set x = 100. To
recap, given the way we have also classified the possibilities according to different values of γ,
we end up with four different possible scenarios: a small leap, low inequality economy; a small
leap, high inequality economy; a big leap, low inequality economy; and a big leap, high
inequality economy. The following table describes the equilibrium values of the variables
"wealth other than wage income", v, and "rate of innovative activity", µ, in these four different
situations:
Table 3.1 - Equilibrium values of v and µ in the four states of the economy, given the following
values for the remaining exogenous parameters:: w = 1; a = 10, ρ = 0.03; c = 0.7;   L =10  
1.421.230.650.57π2(v)
0.580.230.180.07π1(v)
0.1610.1110.0650.03µ
1311.6112.3211.15v
big leap high
inequality
γ=2, x=100
big leap low
inequality
γ=2, x=70
small leap high
inequality 
γ=1.3, x=100
small leap, low
inequality
 γ=1.3, x=70
The four possible states of the economy
The same results can also be viewed in the four panels of Figures 3.7 and 3.8, for the two
cases that  and , respectively. As expected and as predicted by the theory, as! = 0.3 ! = 0.5
inequality increases, in duopoly we observe a rise in the rate of research intensity µ (this is
proposition 4 of Section 3.7). The latter also increases when the technological advantage held by
the top-quality is bigger (i.e., when the distance γ between steps on the quality ladder is larger).
The economic argument on which proposition 4 rests is that in a segmented, duopolistic market
for quality goods, rising income inequality segments that market even further in such a way that
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the incumbents in the respective segments can enjoy more market power, because of weaker
competition from the other segment. There derives an ability to extract higher rents which
motivates people who work in the research lab to increase their innovation effort. Such larger
innovation intensity results in faster technical progress and higher rates of growth for the
economy. As for the fact that innovation intensity µ and growth rate g are also increasing in the
distance between steps on the quality ladder, γ, this depends on the fact that the profit function
for the producer of the top quality good increases in γ. The higher profitability of the top quality
product results in a higher µ through the usual incentive mechanism. It is interesting to notice
that, given the structure of the growth equation (5.1), an increase in γ raises g both directly,
because it explicitly appears in (5.1), and indirectly, through the increase in the innovation  
intensity µ.
Given the relationship between the rate of research intensity µ and the rate of economic
growth g, as described in equation (5.1), it is possible to conclude that, as shown by this
numerical example and in line with proposition 4, as the degree of income inequality increases,
the rate of growth of such an economy should rise.
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Figure 3.7 - A Numerical Example with Duopoly in the Market for Quality Goods. The Case with
! = 0.3
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Figure 3.8 - A Numerical Example with Duopoly in the Market for Quality Goods. The Case with
! = 0.5
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3.10 Conclusion
This chapter has developed a quality ladder model characterized by non homothetic consumer
preferences, in line with the vertical quality differentiation literature. Such modeling of
consumer preferences in the context of a quality ladder model is the novel element of this study,
and it is an attempt to explain real world phenomena like the survival of older generations of
goods along with the state-of-the-art, something which was not accounted for in the mainstream
quality ladder models of G.H. And A.H.
The next step in this line of research might be to introduce such preferences in open
economy quality ladder models, such as that of Grossman and Helpman (1991, chp.12). Indeed,
in an open economy framework, the possibility of having monopoly of the best quality in a richer
North with a higher and less unequal distribution of wealth, and duopoly in a poorer South with a
lower and more widespread distribution of wealth, might be obtained as an endogenous outcome
of the model. 
Such a model would then make it possible to study equilibrium outcomes and
comparative statics involving changes in the spread of the wealth distribution, much like has
been done in the closed economy model developed in the present chapter.
Appendix A.3.1
Proof of proposition 1:
We plug monopoly profits into equations (6.1) and (6.2) so to have them in explicit form:
(6.1)wa =
 − 1
 [!(v − x) + wL(1 − c)]
! + 
(6.2)wa =  − 1 [!(v − x) + wL(1 − c)] − !v
It is useful to rewrite (6.1) and (6.2) as follows:
An Endogenous Growth Model with Quality Ladders and Consumers’ Heterogeneity
151
(A.3.1.1)
A∏(, v) = 0 w  − 1 [!(v − x) + wL(1 − c)] − wa(! + ) = 0
L∏(, v) = 0 w  − 1 [!(v − x) + wL(1 − c)] − !v − wa = 0
Proof of proposition 1 will be done in three steps:
Step 1: we shall prove that   ,dvd xA∏ > 0
Step 2: we shall prove that   ,dvd xL∏ < 0
Step 3: we shall write down the condition under which  .vA∏() x=0 < vL∏() x=0
In step 1:
 (A.3.1.2)dvd xA∏ = −
−wa
 − 1
 !
> 0
In step 2:
  (A.3.1.3)dvd xL∏ = − −wa− 1 !
< 0
In step 3: to compute we set  in (A.1) and solve for v:vA∏() x=0  = 0
(A.3.1.4)
 − 1
 [!(v − x) + wL(1 − c)] − wa! = 0 w vA∏() x=0 = x +  − 1 wa −
wL(1 − c)
!
We compute in the same way: vL∏() x=0
(A.3.1.5)
 − 1
 [!(v − x) + wL(1 − c)] − !v = 0 w vL∏() x=0 = ( − 1) wL(1 − c)! − x
A unique equilibrium with a positive pair (v, µ) exists if and only if:
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. (A.3.1.6)x +  − 1 wa −
wL(1 − c)
! < ( − 1) wL(1 − c)! − x w x < wL(1 − c)! − 1 − 1 wa
Proof of Proposition 2:  This proposition can be proved in two ways. 
Proof 1: an increase in inequality x, as measured by:   , and by: 
Ø
Øx xA∏ = −
−  − 1 !−wa < 0
 , moves to the left both the (6.1) and the (6.2) schedule. As a result, we
Ø
Øx xL∏ = −
−  − 1 !−wa < 0
have a new equilibrium with less research intensity µ and growth g (recall that  ).g =  ln
Furthermore, since the effect of an increase in x on both schedules is of the same magnitude, at
the new equilibrium, the level of other wealth v is unchanged.
Proof 2: In a monopoly equilibrium, the value of other wealth v is determined by the value of the
most recent innovation. As shown in the text, the latter is equal to the costs faced by the most
recent innovator: v = wa . We plug this result into (6.1) and (6.2), to get the same relationship:
(6.1, 6.2)
 − 1
 [!(wa − x) + wL(1 − c)] − wa(! + ) = 0
We then solve for µ to get:
(A.3.1.7) =  − 1 L(1 − c)a − !xwa − 1 !
From the above it is obvious that µ decreases in x.
Proof of Proposition 3: 
The proof is done in three steps. Schedules (7.1) and (7.2) implicitly define functions  v = vA()
and  .v = vL()
Step 1: prove that   .dvd xA > 0
Rewrite (7.1) as follows:
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(A.3.1.8)G(, v) = 0 w −wa + 2(v)! +  + 1(v)(! + )2 = 0
Then, by the implicit function theorem: 
 (A.3.1.9) dvd xA = −
ØG
Ø
ØG
Øv
 
We find that 
 (A.3.1.10) ØG
Ø = −
2
(! + )2 −
1(! − )
(! + )3
We set  and solve for µ to get   . Notice that, in duopoly,   since  ØG
Ø = 0  = !
1 − 21 + 2  < 0
 . 1 < 2
As   for  and as we are only interested in non-negative values of µ, we conclude thatØG
Ø < 0  > 
 in the relevant range. ØG
Ø < 0
Next, we compute
 (A.3.1.11) ØG
Øv =
Ø2
Øv! +  +
 Ø1
Øv
(! + )2 =
1! +  Ø2Øv +
 Ø1
Øv! + 
which takes the sign of  Ø2
Øv +
 Ø1
Øv! + 
We find that 
(A.3.1.12) Ø2
Øv =
 − 1
 !
x + v3 +
wL(1 − c)
3!
3x > 0
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and
 (A.3.1.13)Ø1
Øv = ( − 1)!
x − v3 −
wL(1 − c)
3!
x − 13 < 0
However
 (A.3.1.14)   Ø2
Øv +
Ø1
Øv = x +
v
3 +
wL(1 − c)
3! +  x −
v
3 −
wL(1 − c)
3! > 0
in duopoly, as the expression in brackets is guaranteed to be positive with such a market
structure. 
 follows from   Hence  . The latter enables us to conclude that Ø2
Øv +
 Ø1
Øv! +  > 0 ! +  < 1 ØGØv > 0
(A.3.1.15)dvd xA = −
ØG
Ø < 0
ØG
Øv > 0
> 0
 
Step 2: prove that   dvd xL < 0
Rewrite (7.2) as 
 (A.3.1.16)H(, v) = 0 w 2(v) + 1(v) − !v − wa = 0
By the implicit function theorem:    dvd xL = −
ØH
Ø
ØH
Øv
First, we compute   ØH
Ø = −
2(v) + 1(v) − !v
2
  follows from   (see (7.2)). ØH
Ø < 0 2(v) + 1(v) − !v = wa > 0
An Endogenous Growth Model with Quality Ladders and Consumers’ Heterogeneity
155
Next, we compute  ØH
Øv =
Ø2
Øv +
Ø1
Øv − !
We need to determine the sign of    Ø2
Øv +
Ø1
Øv − !
A few calculations reveal that
(A.3.1.17)Ø2
Øv +
Ø1
Øv − ! < 0
provided that
 (A.3.1.18)x > 1 − 2 −  v3 +
wL(1 − c)
3!
Since x is always positive, this condition certainly holds if its RHS is negative. That is indeed the
case if  . 1 <  < 2
Then we have that   . ØH
Øv < 0
Therefore, we conclude that for  ,1 <  < 2
 (A.3.1.19)dvd xL = −
ØH
Ø < 0
ØH
Øv < 0
< 0
Step 3: a unique equilibrium with a positive pair (µ, v) and a positive growth rate g exists if and
only if 
(A.3.1.20)vA() x=0 < vL() x=0
Where
 (A.3.1.21)vA() x=0 = 3 wa  − 1 2x
1
2 − 3x − wL(1 − c)!
Chapter 3
156
and  is implicitly determined in (7.2) with vL() x=0  = 0
Appendix A.3.2 - List of symbols for Chapter 3
 = outputY
 = technologyA
 = intermediate input to production (quantity)x
 = consumption indexD
 = quality goodq
 = quality indexi = {1, 2}
 = incomeI
 = price of a good of quality pi i
 = populationL
 = distance between two steps on the quality ladder
 = homogeneous, composite goodh
 = utility in period ut t
 = interest rate at time trt
 = rate of time preference!
 = assetsk
 = wagew
 = consumptionC
 = index of consumption patterns, where l is poorest, eq is equilibrium, m isj = {l, .., eq, .., m, .., u}
mean, and u is richest consumption pattern respectively
 = total wealth, defined as  v ku+kl2 L
 = spread in wealth, defined as  x ku−kl2 L
 = demand for good of quality iDi
 = cumulative distribution function of consumption patternsF($)
 = density function of consumption patternsf($)
 = profit accruing to firm producing good of quality ii
= labor coefficient in manufacturing sectorc
 (superscript) = indicates an equilibrium quantitye
 (subscript) = indicates monopolyM
 (superscript) = indicates next periodn
 = arrival rate of innovations, innovation intensity
 = value of an innovationV
 = labor coefficient in the research sectora
 (subscript) = indicates that subscripted symbol refers to the research sectorA
In section 3.8:
 = number of qualitiesn
 (subscript) = low qualityL
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 (subscript) = high qualityH
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Chapter 4 An Open Economy Model with Quality Ladders and
Consumers’ Heterogeneity
4.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on an open economy characterized by two big regions, the “North” and the
“South”. The model presented here features two regions which are meant to reproduce the
elements of a real world with two big economic blocs: the developed world and the developing
world. Therefore, the main characteristics of the two blocs in the model are the same as those of
the two big economic regions of the real world: the North is assumed to be both on average
richer than the South and with a wealth distribution that is less dispersed around its mean (less
unequal). 
It is assumed that technological advancement occurs in the North in the shape of
innovative activities that move the technology frontier forward, while the South directs its
technological efforts at imitating the products that have already been invented by the North.
There is uncertainty concerning the arrival of both innovations and imitations, which is described
in both cases by similar Poisson processes. The aim of this chapter is to contribute a theory
capable of explaining how, in such a world, differences in wealth distribution, market structures,
and innovative and imitative activities in the two regions, all play a part to produce an
equilibrium where certain given wealth distributions result in (endogenously determined) market
structures. In turn, the latter determine the incentives of economic agents in both regions to carry
out technology-advancing activities, in the form of innovation in the North and imitation in the
South. To achieve this objective, two strands of literature are brought together. On one hand,
there is the endogenous growth, Schumpeterian literature that explains economic growth through
technological change that comes about endogenously because of the actions of economic agents
seeking monopoly rents Aghion and Howitt (1998) provide a comprehensive and detailed
account of this theory. On the other hand, there is a strand of the industrial organization literature
that models vertical differentiation between goods of different quality by assuming
non-homothetic consumer preferences over indivisible goods (Gabszewicz, Thisse, 1979, and
Shaked, Sutton, 1982). Such non homothetic consumer preferences allow for the study of income
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distributional issues that would not be possible under standard homothetic, Cobb-Douglas like,
consumer preferences. Previous studies that have put together the Schumpeterian endogenous
growth literature and the mentioned I.O. literature are very few and refer to closed economies
only (see Li Chol-Won, 1998, Zweimuller and Brunner, 1998, and Chapter 3 of this book).
Therefore, to my knowledge, this is the first attempt to extend this framework to an open
economy with two blocs. There are two works that precede this one and model an open economy
within a Schumpeterian, so called “quality ladders” world, and these are Grossman, Helpman
(1991) and Glass and Saggi (1998). But neither of them models consumer preferences in the
above explained way and neither of them focuses on addressing the study of the impact of issues
related to the income distribution on  market structures and technological activities in a world
with two blocs. Both of them rather focus entirely on differences in the two blocs concerning
cost structures both in production and in the research lab.
A further, recent branch of the endogenous growth literature (Aghion, Harris, Howitt and  
Vickers, 1998; Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith and Howitt, 2002), investigates the
relationship between innovative activities and product market competition. This literature too is
different from the present study in at least two respects. On one hand, although it allows for
varying degrees of product market competition, it stops short of considering the case where
product market competition changes so much that it changes the structure of the market, turning
it from monopoly to duopoly and vice versa. It cannot do that because that literature models
consumer preferences with a standard CES specification. The second difference is the
assumption that an outside firm cannot technologically leapfrog the current incumbent, but it
must first catch up with it. This assumption introduces two types of markets, those where firms
are leveled on technology and those where firms are not. This type of market dichotomy
somewhat resembles our dichotomy of markets where incumbent firm of second best quality in
the South is a Northern firm and markets where it is a local Southern firm. In the present study
we adhere to the original Schumpeterian setting in which outsider firms can leapfrog the current
incumbent and seize its share of the market when they innovate.
In order to make income distribution play a role in the model, it is assumed that
individuals’ choice problem is not about how much to buy of the quality good (they buy one
unit) but about which quality to buy. Given these preferences, consumers’ wealth distribution is
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assumed uniform on support that varies depending on whether the consumer is a Southern or a
Northern individual.
In the firms’ sector, in the North, equilibrium profits for the monopolist stem from her
applying limit pricing in order to avoid entry of a lower-quality competitor. In the South,
equilibrium profits for the two actors are the result of them engaging in a Bertrand duopoly
game. 
Equilibrium in this model is fully characterized by five steady state relationships. Two
relations describe the research sector in the North and in the South, and are generated by
appropriate asset arbitrage and “free entry in RnD” conditions for all firms involved in both
regions. In the labor market, two clearing conditions that equate labor demand and labor supply
both in the North and in the South, put a constraint on the amount of research and production
that can be performed in each bloc.
In order to understand the fifth condition we need to describe, however shortly, the basic
structure of this economy. Such an economy at any one time may be in one of two stages. Both
these stages feature a common market structure in the North, but they differ with respect to the
actors playing in the Southern bloc. There, either the producer of the second best quality is a
local Southern firm (stage 1) or a foreign Northern firm (stage 2). At any time, a measure n of
markets are in stage 1 and the remaining 1-n markets are in stage 2. Transition from stage 1 to
stage 2 occurs because of successful innovation in the North, at rate , so that  the flow out of
stage 1 is measured by . Transition from stage 2 back to stage 1 occurs because of successfuln
imitation in the South, at rate  , so that the flow into stage 1 is measured by . The fifth (1 − n)
equilibrium condition requires that in steady state these two flows be equal, so that the
proportion n of markets in stage 1 remains constant.
We are able to show that, in harmony with the predictions of the closed economy models,
in a world with two blocs, rising inequality in the Southern bloc raises innovative research
efforts in the North, but has an ambiguous impact on the rate of technology transfers to the
South. An increase in Northern inequality has a contrasting effect on the technological
advancements of the North and the South. It causes a drop in Northern research efforts, while at
the same time promoting an increase in the measure of markets where a Southern firm has
positive market share. 
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The reason we give for these results is a standard “Schumpeterian” explanation. If wealth
inequality increases in a segmented market, it makes it even more segmented and thereby it
lowers competition between the two qualities and raises profit expectations and subsequent
incentives to carry out technological activities.  If wealth inequality increases in a pooled market,
then it makes competition between the existing quality and a potential threat of a lower one
stiffer, thereby lowering profit expectations in those markets and affecting negatively the rate of
research activities carried out by firms that target them. The objective of this study is to provide
a set of results to feed researchers with enough testable predictions to enable them to extend to
the empirical field the exploration of the relationships between two heterogeneous blocs’ wealth
distribution features and their technological and ultimately economic progresses.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 and Subsections 4.2.1 to 4.2.4 present
the main features of the model. Section 4.3 describes the equilibrium and provides an economic
interpretation of the equilibrium conditions; Section 4.4 contains the comparative statics and the
derivation and explanation of the main results; Section 4.5 concludes with some suggestions for
future research.
4.2 The Model
Before descending into the details of the individual components of this model, a flowchart is
presented which conveys at a stroke its main features (see Figure 4.1). In this flowchart, there are
two blocs, the “North” and the “South”. Equilibrium involves two stages. In a first stage, a
Northern based firm (denoted by N1 in the chart) produces and sells goods of the highest quality
in the North, which is a monopoly of such quality. This firm, also exports such goods to the
South, where also a Southern local firm operates (denoted by S in the chart), which produces and
sells goods of the second best type (one step lower on the quality ladder). The Southern market is
therefore a duopoly. We assume that whenever a good is sold in a region different from the one
where it is manufactured, it is costlessly exported to that region by the producing firm. This
assumption enables us to do away with issues concerning cost differences across the two regions,
and concentrate entirely on how a given income distribution yields a certain market structure
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which in turn determines the kind of incentives that individuals face when they go about
undertaking innovation or imitation activities.
Innovation by an outside Northern firm leads to the second stage. Now this innovator
(denoted by N2) replaces the incumbent in the North (the incumbent is forced to exit that market
as shown by the thick rectangle), but it can maintain its market in the South, where the Southern
local firm, which finds itself two steps below the frontier, exits the market (again shown by the
thick rectangle). An innovation may be followed by further innovation or by imitation. In the
former case there is no change in market structure. But when the Southern firm (denoted again
by S for simplicity, but not necessarily the same firm) successfully imitates the production of the
low quality good, it can displace the Northern low tech firm from this segment of the market.
This change in market structure occurs in spite of the fact that after imitation both firms sell the
same product at the same price and incur the same costs. The assumption made here is that
consumers in the South, when faced with a choice between two goods which differ only in that
one is produced by a local firm and the other by a foreign firm, always choose to buy the locally
made product. This assumption is in line with the home country bias, an empirical regularity
which Obsteld and Rogoff (2000) ascribe to the existence of small but non negligible costs of
international trade. With the displacement of the Northern firm we go back to the first stage, but
one step higher on the ladder, and so on. In such settings, at any one time, in equilibrium, there is
a fraction n of markets where quality goods are traded that is in the first of the two stages
described above, and a fraction 1-n that is in the second stage. In both types of market, the profit
of a Northern firm selling the state-of-the-art is the sum of two components: a monopoly profit
from the Northern market and a duopoly profit from a Southern market. In symbols:
 (2.1)H = NMH + SDH
where π   is profits, the superscript H stands for “high”, the subscripts NM stand for “Northern
monopoly” and SD stand for “Southern duopoly”.
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Figure 4.1 - The Model in a Flowchart
The profit that accrues to the firm that sells the second best quality in the South, be it the
Northern based firm that has just been replaced at the technological frontier or the Southern
based firm that has just been successful in imitation, is the duopoly profit that goes to the
producer of the second best product in the South. In symbols:
(2.2)SDNL = SDSL = SDL
where L stands for “low”(so that NL = Northen low and SL = Southern low) and, as before, SD =
Southern duopoly. Hence, in equilibrium, the three profits, or profit components that we shall be
interested in, are: , , and . NMH SDH SDL
In order to obtain equilibrium relationships for these three profits, we need to model
consumer behavior and firm behavior, to which we turn next.
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4.2.1 Consumers' Behavior
Suppose that the economy is populated by a mass of L individuals, whose life-span is infinite.
These individuals live in one of two countries, the more developed North or the developing
South, indexed by g, .g c {N, S}
The representative individual in each country consumes two types of goods each period.
The first type is a good that is subject to quality innovation over time. The notation that will be
used for this good is  , with the indexes having the following meaning: g indicates whetherqgit(j)
the good is produced (and purchased) in the North or in the South; i indexes quality in ascending
order ( ), and t indexes time. Finally j indexes which industry the good belongs to in thei = 1, 2
continuum [0,1]. The assumption behind the quality index i is that, in equilibrium, at most two
quality levels can have positive market share, given consumers’ wealth distribution and firms’
behavior.  Furthermore, we assume, as in Chapter 3, that an innovation raises the quality of a
good by a constant factor . Thus, we may alternatively use or  to indicate the good that > 1 q1 
sits second from top on the ladder, and  or  to indicate the state-of-the-art. Each individualq2 2
consumes at most one unit per period of these goods. 
The second type of good is a homogeneous product, denoted by . In any period t,hgt
instantaneous utility achieved by the representative consumer in country g is given by: 
(2.1.1)logugt = ¶01 logqgit(j)dj + loghgt
Consumers in each country g maximize intertemporal utility, subject to a budget
constraint, by solving the following problem: 
(2.1.2)Max
t=0
∞ 1
1 + !
t
log ugt
Subject to: kg(t+1) = (1 + rt )kgt + wt − Cgt
where  is the rate of time preference,  is assets of an individual in country g at time t ,   is! kgt rt
the interest rate in the capital markets at time t (assumed to be the same in both regions, whence
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the lack of the subscript g),  is the wage rate (also assumed to be the same in both the Northwt
and the South), and  is the consumption level of the representative individual in country g atCgt
time t.
Since consumers purchase one unit of the quality good and spend the rest of their budget
on the homogeneous good, demand for the latter is given by:
(2.1.3)hgt = Cgt − Pit
where  is a price index, and   is price in period t of one unit of good of qualityPit = ¶01 pit(j)dj pit(j)
.i = 1, 2
Solution of the intertemporal maximization utility problem leads to the following steady
state consumption pattern:
(2.1.4)Cg = w + !kg
where suppression of the time subscripts is due to the fact that all the quantities are now steady
state quantities.
At this point we introduce a difference in the description of consumers who live in the
North and, respectively, in the South. Both are assumed to earn the same wage income w, but
they are assumed to differ in that Northern consumers own other assets , whose distribution iskN
assumed uniform on support . By contrast, Southern consumers have other assets which[kNl, kNu ]
are also uniformly distributed, but on a different support . The assumption here is that[kSl, kSu ]
capital, in the shape of these other assets, is not mobile across regions, so that Southern
individuals can only hold stakes of Southern firms, and individuals who live in the North can
only hold stakes of firms which are based in the North. This assumption, along with the
assumption that labor is not mobile across regions35 and the assumption of perfect mobility of
goods as stated in footnote 2 on page 4, serves the purpose of putting the focus of attention on
the role that the distribution of income in each region plays in the goods markets, without letting
other phenomena concerning factor markets interfere.
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35 We do not make the assumption about labor immobility explicit anywhere in the paper because, given that we
assume the same wage w everywhere, the assumption of labor immobility does not alter the results in any way.
Similarly to what we did in Chapter 3, we further define: , as the mean
vg
Lg =
kgl + kgu
2
wealth (other than labor income, per capita) relative to country g, a measure of the position of
the distribution concerning  wealth, and   as a measure of the spread of the
xg
Lg =
kgl − kgu
2
distribution, where, as before, .g c {N, S}
As shown in the flowchart above , we want to restrict ourselves to the case whereby the Northern
market is a monopoly and the Southern market is a duopoly. The two conditions that guarantee
such an outcome in equilibrium are:  , and  xN [ 13 vN + wLN(1 − c)! xS > 13 vS + wLS(1 − c)!
(see Chapter 3 for their derivation and economic interpretation). A sufficient condition for the
two above relationships to hold is that the North be both on average richer than the South and its
wealth distribution be less unequal than that in the South. In symbols, we henceforth shall
require that:   and   . vNLN >
vS
LS
xN
LN <
xS
LS
4.2.2 Firms' Behavior
In the North, production of one unit of the quality good requires c units of labor (where  is ac > 0
labor coefficient) paid at wage w. Therefore, the marginal cost borne by the firm for producing
an additional unit of such good is wc. If that firm is a monopolist that sells the good at price pm ,
then it can earn profits  .m = LN(pm − wc)
To derive the equilibrium price and profit , notice that in the North, in the quality good
market, the competition between goods of different quality is only potential. This is because,
given the distribution of wealth there, the firm that produces the state-of-the-art will find it
optimal to apply limit pricing.
If we let  to indicate the consumption level that can be afforded by the poorestCNl
individual in the Northern distribution, and  to indicate the consumption level that leaves anCeq
individual indifferent between purchasing different qualities at their respective prices36, the limit
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36 Let  denote the consumption level of the individual who is indifferent between purchasing one unit of good 1Ceq
at price  and one unit of good 2 at price . For such an individual, utility derived from these two consumptionp1 p2
patterns must be the same: ln u(q1) = ln u(q2) w ln q1 + ln(Ceq − p1) = ln q2 + ln(Ceq − p2)
Solving for   yields:  .Ceq Ceq = q2p2 − q1p1q2 − q1 =
p2 − p1
 − 1
price applied by the monopolist must satisfy the condition: . In words, the monopolistCeq [ CNl
sets the lowest price so that the consumption level that leaves an individual indifferent between
purchasing different qualities at their respective prices, which is itself a function of the price set
by the monopolist, falls below the consumption level that can be afforded by the poorest
individual in the Northern distribution.
Recall that, when production of the inferior good is only potential, its price is dragged
down to equate marginal cost, . In this occurrence, , and the conditionp1 = wc Ceq = pm − wc − 1
above, which is binding, becomes: . Solving the latter for pm, yields the equilibrium
pm−wc
−1 = CNl
limit price applied by the northern monopolist (denoted  ) as follows:pNMH
  (2.2.1) pNMH =  − 1 CNl + wc
To find the corresponding equilibrium profit, (denoted by  ) simply replace theNMH
equilibrium price in the monopolist profit above, to yield:
  (2.2.2)NMH = LN −1 (CNl − wc)
We shall find it convenient to rewrite these relationships as a function of average wealth 
 and spread  instead:vN xN
(2.2.3)pNMH =  − 1 w + ! vNLN −
xN
LN +
wc
(2.2.4)NMH =  − 1 [!(vN − xN ) + wLN(1 − c)]
In the South, the spread  and location  of the wealth distribution are such that the topxS vS
quality producer cannot apply limit pricing as in the North, since now that price would have to
fall below the producer’s marginal cost to have the consumption level that makes an individual
indifferent between two qualities at their respective prices be below the consumption level of the
poorest individual in the South. In such a context, the top quality producer finds it optimal to
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participate to a Bertrand duopoly game, whose other participant is the firm that produces the
second best quality.
It is assumed that production costs are the same as in the North and the same throughout
the industry. Production of one unit of the quality good costs wc (as before w is wage income and
c is a labor coefficient) regardless of the good’s position on the quality ladder. Profits for the
firms producing both qualities are given by: 
(2.2.5)1 = D1(p1 − wc) = LF(Ceq)(p1 − wc)
(2.2.6)2 = D2(p2 − wc) = L(1 − F(Ceq))(p2 − wc)
where  is profit accruing to firm producing good of quality  at cost wc and selling it ati i = 1, 2
price  ,  is the demand for good of quality , and  is the distribution function of C.pi Di i = 1, 2 F($)
 The resulting equilibrium profits, can be found by using first order conditions for profit
maximization ( ) . The profit that accrues to the top quality producer as a function ofØi
Øpi = 0
wealth level   and spread  , is as follows: vS xS
(2.2.7)SDH =  − 1 !
xS + 13 vS +
wLS(1 − c)!
2
2xS
and the profit that accrues to the second quality producer, be it a Northern or a Southern firm, is:
(2.2.8)SDL = ( − 1)!
xS − 13 vS +
wLS(1 − c)!
2
2xS
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4.2.3 Research Technology and Asset Arbitrage Equations
In order to be profitable, both Northern and Southern firms need to undertake RnD. Northern
firms who have lost their place at the technological frontier need to undertake RnD, in the form
of innovation, in order to regain that place. Hence they strive to design higher quality levels with
innovation intensity , so that  also describes the probability that the next innovation occurs dt
within dt from now.
Southern firms that have lost their market share in the South as a result of the technology
frontier moving one step higher, need to undertake RnD, in the form of imitation, to regain their
place just one step behind the technological leader, and at the expense of the Northern former
leader. Hence they strive to imitate the product that sits second from top on the ladder with
imitation intensity . The probability that they will be successful within dt from now is equal to: 
. dt
In steady state, three types of firms may have positive value. There is the Northern leader
that produces and sells the state-of-the-art both in the North and in the South. Let  denote thevNH
value of such a firm. Then there is the Northern firm that has just been replaced at the top, but
that retains its market share as producer of second best quality in the South. Let  denote thevNL
value of this firm. Finally, there is the Southern local firm that, due to successful imitation,
enjoys a positive market share in the South for the second best quality until a new innovation
occurs. Let  denote the value of this firm. vSL
Efficient capital markets ensure that, in steady state, the annuity flow (at the rate of time
preference ) which accrues to each type of firm as a consequence of its market value, must be!
equal to that firm’s profit flow plus any capital gain and minus any capital loss due to changes of
position of the firm along the quality ladder. The resulting asset arbitrage equations are: 
 (2.3.1)!vNH = H − vNH + vNL
(2.3.2)!vNL = SDL − ( + )vNL
(2.3.3)!vSL = SDL − vSL
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In all three equations the LHS expresses, as mentioned, the annuity flow (at the rate of
time preference ) which accrues to each type of firm as a consequence of its market value. In!
the first equation, the RHS consists of the flow of profits that the top quality producer enjoys
until a new innovation occurs, which, with probability  brings about a capital loss due to the loss
of market at the top and a capital gain due to continued presence as a second-best producer in the
South. The last term expresses the capital loss that occurs with the firm eventual demise in the
South too, due to the arrival of either a successful Southern imitator or a successful Northern
innovator. In the second equation, the RHS is simply made of the profit flow as a producer of
second-best quality in the South minus the capital loss that occurs as a result of successful
innovation or imitation. Finally, in the third equation, the RHS consists of the profit flow that a
Southern firm can enjoy minus the capital loss due to a successful innovation that leaves the
Southern firm too much behind on the quality ladder.
These three relationships can be rearranged to yield:
(2.3.4)vNH = 
H
! +  + SD
L
(! + )(! +  + )
(2.3.5)vNL = SD
L
! +  + 
(2.3.6)vSL = SD
L
! + 
It is assumed that the research sector is characterized by a labor coefficient , that is,ag > 0
one unit of RnD requires  units of labor services, which differs depending on whether RnD isag
performed in the North or the South. Hence, the cost of carrying out  units of innovative
research is . The expected value of a successful Northern innovator can be expressed as .aNw vNH
For firms to undertake positive but finite amounts of research, the following free entry into RnD
condition must hold:
(2.3.7)vNH − aNw [ 0
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which is equivalent to:
 , with equality for (2.3.8)vNH [ aNw  > 0
In a like manner, in the South the cost of carrying out  units of imitative research effort
targeted at the  markets where the incumbent firm is Northern, is equal to . Since the(1 − n) aSw
expected value of a Southern firm can be written as  , the free entry condition there implies:vSL
(2.3.9)vSL − aSw [ 0
Or, upon rearranging,
, with equality for (2.3.10)vSL [ aSw  > 0
As a last step, we can combine together the asset arbitrage equations and the conditions
of free entry into RnD, to get the equilibrium relationships for the research sector in the North
(concerning innovation) and in the South (concerning imitation).
In the North, for positive innovation intensity ( ), we have: > 0
(2.3.11)aNw = H! +  + SD
L
(! + )(! +  + )
In the South, for positive imitation effort ( ), we have: > 0
(2.3.12)aSw = SD
L
! + 
Innovation is relatively more difficult than imitation and requires relatively more
resources: .aN > aS
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4.2.4 Labor Markets
In the labor market, clearing conditions that equate labor demand and labor supply both in the
North and in the South, put a constraint on the amount of research and production that can be
performed in each bloc. 
In the North, total labor supply  must be equal to total labor demand, whose three mainLN
components are: the demand for labor to carry out innovative research, the demand for labor to
produce the quality goods that have already been invented, and the demand for labor to produce
the homogeneous good. 
The demand for innovative research is obtained by multiplying the labor coefficient for
research and the innovation intensity, . The demand for manufacturing quality goods may beaN
broken down into demand for quality goods consumed in the North,   (since each individualcLN
in the North consumes one unit of these goods, whose production requires c units of labor
services), and the demand for quality goods consumed in the South which are produced by
Northern firms. Elements of the latter are the demand for top quality goods consumed in the
South,  and Southern demand for second best quality in those markets wherecLs 1 − F CeqS
such goods are produced by a Northern firm: .(1 − n)cLsF CeqS
To put things together, demand for quality goods consumed in the South but produced by
a Northern firm is given by , and totalcLs 1 − F CeqS + (1 − n)cLsF CeqS = cLs 1 − nF CeqS
demand for manufacturing quality goods in the North is given by  .c LN + LS 1 − nF CeqS
Then we have Northern labor demand for the homogeneous good. This market is
assumed to be perfectly competitive, so demand for the homogeneous good would in general be 
(see also Chapter 3). Furthermore, the division of labor between the North and the South is thehw
same in this market as it is in the quality goods market. We let  denote the demand for thehN
homogeneous good in the North,  denote the demand for the homogeneous good byhSH
individuals who consumed the top quality in the South, and  denote the demand for thehSL
homogeneous good by individuals who consumed the second best quality in the South. Then,
total Northern labor demand for the homogeneous good can be expressed by: 
. 
hN + hSH + (1 − n)hSL
w
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Putting together the three labor demand components, we arrive at the labor market
clearing condition for the North:
(2.4.1)aN + c LN + LS 1 − nF CeqS + hN + hS
H + (1 − n)hSL
w = LN
To express this condition in our preferred form, we need to substitute  and  , ,F(CeqS ) hN hSH
and  with the respective relationships that describe them, and to recall the equilibriumhSL
expressions for profits. The Northern labor market clearing condition is thus obtained as
follows37:
(2.4.2)!vN = NMH + SDH + (1 − n)SDL − aNw
This condition says that, because of the constraints posed by the labor market, the income
generated by wealth ownership in the North (at the rate of time preference) can only be equal to
total profits made by Northern firms minus any cost borne in order to perform innovative
research.
The same type of reasoning yields the following labor market clearing condition in the
South: 
(2.4.3)aS(1 − n) + cLSnF(CeqS ) + nhS
L
w = LS
In the above relationship, the first element in the LHS is labor demand for imitative
research, carried out in the (1-n) markets with no Southern firm, at an imitation rate µ and with a
labor coefficient . The second element is labor demand for the quality good consumed in theaS
South and produced by a Southern firm (such an instance occurs in n of the quality goods
markets). Finally the third element, to mirror and complement what happens in the North, is
labor demand for the homogeneous good by individuals who consumed the second best quality
good that was produced in the South. The RHS is of course Southern labor supply. 
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37 The algebra needed to go from equation (2.4.1) to equation (2.4.2) is the same as in Chapter 3 and it is not
repeated here.
Once again, to arrive at our most preferred format, we substitute  and  with theirF(CeqS ) hSL
respective relationships and recall the equilibrium expression for Southern firms’ profits, to get:
(2.4.4)!vS = nSDL − aS(1 − n)w
This condition says that due to the constraints posed by the Southern labor market,
income generated by wealth ownership in the South can at most be equal to the profits that
accrue in equilibrium to a Southern firm (in the proportion of n to 1), minus any cost borne in
order to perform imitative research.
4.3 Equilibrium Analysis
In steady state, the fraction n of markets where in the South one firm is Southern (stage 1),
remains constant. For that to happen, the rate at which markets switch to that stage must be equal
to the rate at which markets switch to the other stage where both firms are Northern (stage 2). In
symbols, the following constancy of measures (CM) condition must hold: 
(3.1)n = (1 − n)
This condition, along with the two equations that describe the RnD sectors in the two
blocs, (3.4) and (3.5), and the two conditions that describe the labor markets in the two blocs,
(3.6) and (3.7), form a system of five equations with five endogenous variables and a set of
parameters. The five variables are the fraction of markets where the low quality producer is a
Southern firm, n, innovation intensity , imitation intensity , the amount of wealth in the North,  
, and the amount of wealth in the South . All the equilibrium profit relationships that appearvN vS
in the five equations are functions of Northern wealth, Southern wealth and the parameters, as
described in the section on firm behavior. Next, apply the following normalizations: 
, , (3.2)vS = v vN = &v & = vNvS
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, , xS = x xN = )x ) = xNxS
, , LS = L LN = L  = LNLS
, , aS = a aN = a  = aNaS
Notice that, with these normalizations in place, the sufficient condition for monopoly in
the North and duopoly in the South can be expressed as:
 and (3.3.)
&
 > 1
)
 < 1
After the normalizations, the five equations become:
(3.4)aw = H! +  + SD
L
(! + )(! +  + )
(3.5)aw = SD
L
! + 
(3.6)!&v = NMH + SDH + (1 − n)SDL − aw
(3.7)!v = nSDL − a(1 − n)w
(3.8)n = (1 − n)
As it is often the case with this class of models, there are several possible equilibria that
include both situations where no innovation or imitation are carried out, and situations with
positive rates of innovation, imitation and a positive measure of markets where the second best
producer is a Southern firm. Which equilibrium obtains in the long run, is determined by the
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values of the many parameters of the model. For our purposes, we will restrict our attention to
those parameter values that with positive rates of innovation and imitation.
Unfortunately, given the complexity of the system, it is not possible to give a graphical
representation of the equilibrium. Yet, in order to gain more insight on these equilibrium
relationships, we divide equation (3.4) by equation (3.5) and equation (3.6) by equation (3.7), to
get:
(3.9) =
H + SD
L
(! +  + )
SDL
(3.10)& = NM
H + SDH + (1 − n)SDL − aw
nSDL − a(1 − n)w
The relative free RnD condition (3.9) poses a constraint on the profits that the Northern
incumbent will enjoy during her tenure relative to the profits that accrue to the Southern
incumbent for her tenure. Such ratio must be equal to the higher cost of carrying out innovation
relative to imitation, as expressed by the relative labor coefficient α. If Northern incumbents’
relative profits were lower than α, there would be a lack of a sufficient incentive to carry out
innovative research by them. Likewise, were relative Northern profits to be higher than α, then it
would be the Southerners who would not feel enticed to carry out imitation.
As for the relative labor market condition (3.10), it states that at any one time, in
equilibrium the ratio of Northern wealth to Southern wealth, φ, must reflect the relative net
profits that accrue to the North, net of costs for carrying out innovative research in the North,
and imitative research in the South. Notice the difference in the right hand sides of the relative
free RnD condition versus the relative labor market condition. In the former, profits are an
individual incumbents’ profits for her entire tenure, while in the latter profits refer to one
particular moment in time and to the totality of incumbents at that moment.
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4.4 Comparative Statics
Next, we carry out some comparative statics in order to evaluate how the main endogenous
variables of the model react to changes in parameters. The objective is to derive testable
predictions on the relationships between wealth, innovation and imitation or technology transfer
(the endogenous variables), and wealth inequality, respectively in the South, x, and in the North,
xN (exogenous). In principle, comparative statics could also be performed with respect to the
other exogenous parameters, size of the South L,  relative size of the North θ, technology gap γ,
relative cost of innovation α, etc. That analysis is left to the interested reader and not pursued
further here, since this is not the main concern of this thesis.
This section provides the description of the main analytical passages and the underlying
logic, along with the results thereby obtained. A full development of the mathematics involved is
provided in the subsequent appendix. 
Our first step is to notice that the relative wealth of the North, φ, appears in equations 3.4
and 3.6 only.  We can solve these two relationships for φ and equate them, in order to get rid of
φ. We can also replace µ in terms of ι and n as suggested by condition 3.8. We end up with the
following system of three equations in the three unknowns v, ι, n:
(4.1)
(x + V)2
2x +
(x − V)2
2x
(1 − n)
!(1 − n) +  + (1 − n)( − 1) − xN +
wLN(1 − c)! − aNw − 1 1 +

! = 0
(4.2)( − 1)!(x − V)2 − 2awx(! + ) = 0
(4.3)n( − 1)! (x − V)
2
2x − !v − anw = 0
where the notation  has been employed and profits have been replaced byV = 13 v +
wL(1 − c)!
the corresponding equilibrium relationships throughout.
The above system lends itself to convenient abbreviated notation, as follows:
(4.4)F1(v, , n) = 0
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(4.5)F2(v, , n) = 0
(4.6)F3(v, , n) = 0
In order to study this system, we linearize it by taking derivatives with respect to the
exogenous and the endogenous variables. By the implicit function theorem, each function Fi
implicitly defines each endogenous variable as a function of the exogenous variables: v = fi
(exogenous variables), ι = gi (exogenous variables), and n = hi (exogenous variables), if and only
if the coefficient matrix, defined as:  is non singular. A necessaryA =
ØF1
Øv
ØF2
Ø
ØF1
Øn
ØF2
Øv
ØF2
Ø
ØF2
Øn
ØF3
Øv
ØF3
Ø
ØF3
Øn
condition for A to be non singular is that its determinant be non zero. Furthermore, if ,detA ! 0
the system
  (4.7)[A]
Øv
Øexvari
Ø
Øexvari
Øn
Øexvari
=
ØF1
Øexvari
ØF2
Øexvari
ØF3
Øexvari
has a unique solution, and, for each exogenous variable  we can compute:exvari
(4.8)
Øv
Øexvari
Ø
Øexvari
Øn
Øexvari
= [A]−1
ØF1
Øexvari
ØF2
Øexvari
ØF3
Øexvari
In the appendix, we show that a sufficient condition for   is that detA < 0
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   (4.9)aw > 3b3(x − V)
2 n( − 1) x−V3x + 1
2[x + V + b1(x − V)]
Of particular interest may be to investigate the impact of changes in wealth dispersion on
the “technology” variables: ι and n. To this end, we use equation 4.8 to obtain the following:
Proposition 1: An increase in Southern inequality, as measured by x, increases the intensity of
research in the North. An increase in Northern inequality, as measured by xN, decreases the
intensity of research in the North. In symbols: , and . (See the Appendix for theØ
Øx > 0
Ø
ØxN < 0
proof).
This result is not novel: it is an extension to the two blocs economy of the same result
obtained by closed economy - “1-bloc” models. The same competition argument applies here as
then: An increase in wealth inequality in the South segments that market even further into
individuals that buy the top quality and individuals that buy the second best. This lesser
competition between the two groups enables both producers that operate in the South to charge
higher profits. It is the prospect of higher profits that pushes firms to put a greater effort into
their research activities.
By contrast, an increase in Northern inequality raises the likelihood that a thus far only
potential competitor enters the market in the shape of a producer of second-best quality. In the
face of this threat, the Northern monopolist is forced to lower prices, which results in lower
Northern profits. Consequently, research efforts of Northern firms decrease as a reflection of
lower future profitability.
Proposition 2: An increase in Southern inequality x has an ambiguous, probably inverted U
shaped,  effect on the measure of markets where a Southern firm is active, n, while an increase in
Northern inequality xN, raises n. In symbols: , and . (See the Appendix for theØn
Øx ó 0
Øn
ØxN > 0
proof).
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Proposition 2 concerns n, the measure of markets were it is a local Southern firm that
produces the second-best good. If one accepts the argument that it is only when such a firm
through imitation successfully masters the technology behind that good that a technology
transfer to the South does actually take place, then n can also be interpreted as a measure of the
magnitude of technology transfers to the South. In this light, this model cannot make an explicit
prediction on the impact of changes in Southern inequality on the rate of technology transfers to
the South. Innovation efforts in the North and imitation efforts in the South both rise because of
higher profit expectations in both segments of the Southern market. The net impact is a result of
whether the rise in innovation is greater or lower than that in imitation, and the net effect may
take an inverted U shape. 
Notice however that an increase in Northern inequality unequivocally raises n. Here the
only change is a drop in Northern research efforts which slows down the rate at which Southern
firms exit Southern markets thereby increasing n.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has developed an open economy model characterized by endogenous
technology-advancing activities along a quality ladder and by heterogeneity both within country
and between countries in the distribution of wealth across individuals. The objective was to
produce a theory capable of predicting a relationship between the wealth distribution and
technology-advancing activities that are widely believed to be growth-enhancing. To our
knowledge, this is the first attempt of its kind, as previous studies either fell short of considering
the open economy case or were not really concerned with the wealth distribution issues and their
links to innovation and other forms of technology transfers that have been the focus of the
present study.
This study can be extended in several ways; we have assumed that the two main sources
of income are wage income and income from other assets and we have introduced income
inequality through dispersion in the income from other assets, while assuming the same wage
income for all. Income inequality may instead be thought of as wage income inequality. It may
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be argued that labor income is a more widely accepted source of income differences than other
wealth income, mainly because of productivity differences among different regions. 
Another way to extend this study is by generalizing the income distribution to more
realistic cases and beyond the uniform assumption. Such an extension is admittedly challenging,
mainly because the integral that enters in the labor market clearing conditions would contain a
density function (the demand function for the good of the given quality) that is not a constant
and as such would make the calculation of the integral difficult. 
Yet another way to extend this model is by abandoning the original Schumpeterian
assumption that an outside firm that innovates can leapfrog the current incumbent, and espouse
instead the-neck-and-neck assumption introduced by the most recent work in this field, so that a
firm that innovates must first catch up with the incumbent and then, through further innovation,
it can get one step ahead in the race. Such settings would provide both a closer description of the
real world and a richer framework for further research.
Finally, we hope that this set of results will feed researchers with enough testable
predictions to enable them to extend to the empirical field the exploration of the relationships
between two heterogeneous blocs’ wealth distribution features and their technological and
ultimately economic progresses.
Appendix A.4.1
Preliminaries: first, let us sign the coefficients  of coefficient matrix A. We compute:aij
   (A.4.1.1)a11 = ØF1
Øv =
x + V
3x + b1
x − V
3x > 0
where  (a notation that we shall stick to throughout this appendix) and V = 13 v +
wL(1 − c)!
. The sign of b1 determines the sign of . Recalling that b1 = (1 − n)!(1 − n) +  + (1 − n)( − 1)
ØF1
Øv
 by assumption, and that   , we conclude that   always.n c (0, 1)  > 1 b1 > 0
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    (A.4.1.2)a31 = ØF3
Øv = −! n( − 1)
x − V
3x + 1 < 0
    (A.4.1.3)a12 = ØF1
Ø = −b2
(x − V)2
2x −

 − 1 aw! < 0
where   .b2 = n!(1 − n)[!(1 − n) + ]2 > 0
   (A.4.1.4)a22 = ØF2
Ø = −2awx < 0
   (A.4.1.5)a32 = ØF3
Ø = −anw < 0
   (A.4.1.6)a13 = ØF1
Øn = −b3
(x − V)2
2x < 0
where  ;b3 = (! + )[!(1 − n) + ]2 + ( − 1) > 0
  (A.4.1.7)a23 = ØF2
Øn = 0
   (A.4.1.8)a33 = ØF3
Øn = ( − 1)!
(x − V)2
2x − aw > 0
positive signing of the latter derivative stems from the equilibrium equation (3.5):
  (A.4.1.9)( − 1)! (x − V)
2
2x − aw = aw! > 0
In order to sign the determinant of A, we need to compute:
 (A.4.1.10)det A = a11a22a33 − a11a23a32 + a12a23a31 − a12a21a33 + a13a21a32 − a13a22a31
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Since , the above reduces to: . Ina23 = 0 det A = a11a22a33 − a12a21a33 + a13a21a32 − a13a22a31
the latter, because of the signs of the various coefficients, the first three elements weigh
negatively, while only the fourth element is positive. A sufficient condition for  is that det A < 0
 or, equivalently, that . When written in its explicita11a22a33 − a13a22a31 < 0 a11a33 − a13a31 > 0
form, this relation becomes:
(A.4.1.11)x + V3x + b1
x − V
3x aw! > −b3
(x − V)2
2x −! n( − 1)
x − V
3x + 1
Solving for aw and rearranging yields a sufficient condition for  which is:det A < 0
  . (A.4.1.12)aw > 3b3(x − V)
2 n( − 1) x−V3x + 1
2[x + V + b1(x − V)]
Proof of proposition 1: From system (4.8) in the main text, we know that:
  (A.4.1.13)Ø
Øx = − 1det A c12
ØF1
Øx + c22
ØF2
Øx + c32
ØF3
Øx
where  are the cofactors of the adjoint matrix of A. cij
We compute:  ;   is a quantity we have computed already,c12 = − ØF2
Øv
ØF3
Øn − 0 = −(−)(+) > 0 c22
in order to sign , and we have established then that  if   det A c22 > 0
.aw > 3b3(x − V)
2 n( − 1) x−V3x + 1
2[x + V + b1(x − V)]
 .   (A.4.1.14)c32 = − 0 − ØF1
Øn
ØF2
Øv = (−)(−) > 0
ØF1
Øx =
(x + V)(x − V)
2x2 (1 − b1 ) > 0
 (A.4.1.15) ØF2
Øx = 2( − 1)!(x − V) − 2aw(! + ) = 2( − 1)!(x − V) − 2( − 1)!
(x − V)2
2x > 0
by using once again equation (3.5). . Hence:ØF3
Øx = n( − 1)!
(x − V)(x + V)
2x2 > 0
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  (A.4.1.16)Ø
Øx = − 1det A c12
ØF1
Øx + c22
ØF2
Øx + c32
ØF3
Øx = − 1(−) (+)(+) + (+)(+) + (+)(+) > 0
We now compute: ; ;  ;ØF1
ØxN = −1
ØF2
ØxN = 0
ØF3
ØxN = 0
By the same reasoning as before, we have:
 (A.4.1.17)Ø
ØxN = −
1
det A c12
ØF1
ØxN + c22
ØF2
ØxN + c32
ØF3
ØxN = −
1
(−) (+)(−) < 0
Proof of proposition 2: along the same lines as proposition 1, from system (4.8) in the main
text, we know that:
(A.4.1.18) Øn
Øx = − 1det A c13
ØF1
Øx + c23
ØF2
Øx + c33
ØF3
Øx = − 1(−) (−)(+) + (+)(+) + (−)(+) ù 0
where  are the cofactors of the adjoint matrix of A which have been signed as follows: cij
 ; ; c13 = a21a32 − a22a31 = (−)(−) − (−)(−) < 0 c23 = −a11a32 + a12a31 = −(+)(−) + (−)(−) > 0
 (A.4.1.19)c33 = a11a22 − a12a21 = (+)(−) − (−)(−) < 0
It is now easy to calculate:
  (A.4.1.20)Øn
ØxN = −
1
det A c13
ØF1
ØxN + c23
ØF2
ØxN + c33
ØF3
ØxN = −
1
(−) (−)(−) > 0
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Appendix A.4.2 - List of Symbols for Chapter 4
In Chapter 4 the symbols employed were all those of Chapter 3 (see Appendix A.3.2) and the
following: 
Superscripts:
H = high quality
L = low quality
NL = Northern low quality
SL = Southern low quality
Subscripts:
NM = Northern monopoly
SD = Southern duopoly
N = North
S = South
g = location index, defined as {N, S}
 = innovation intensity
 = imitation intensity
n = measure of markets where the second-best producer is Southern
 = ratio of Northern to Southern wealth, defined as & vNvS
 = ratio of Northern to Southern spread, defined as ) xNxS
 = ratio of Northern to Southern labor, defined as  LNLS
 = ratio of Northern to Southern productivity in research, defined as  aNaS
A = coefficient matrix, where the coefficients are the partial derivatives with respect to the
endogenous variables
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Chapter 5 Testing Schumpeterian Growth Theory: The Role
of Income Inequality as a Determinant of Technological
Progress
5.1 Introduction
Technological progress has long been widely recognized as one of the main engines of economic
growth. The literature that brought about such awareness has been around for more than a decade
now and goes under the name “Schumpeterian”, because it is based on the ideas developed by
the famous economist Joseph Schumpeter in his landmark book “Capitalism, Socialism and
Democracy” of 1942. Exactly fifty years after Schumpeter published his work, his central
concept of creative destruction (his name for technological progress) was revived by Aghion and
Howitt (1992), in their article, “A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction”. Since then,
this concept of creative destruction has gone through many developments and refinements.
The refinement which interests us here is the one whereby creative destruction need not
be total, and the degree of creative destruction is modeled as a function of the distribution of
income in the economy (our Chapter 3, Li 2003, Zweimuller and Brunner 1998). In short, the
mechanism envisaged in this strand of the Schumpeterian growth literature is the following: the
distribution of income determines the structure of the market for quality goods, which may be a
pooled market of the best quality or a segmented market of two or more qualities, depending on
the magnitude of the average income and on the spread of the distribution around that average.
This literature predicts that when the market for quality goods is sufficiently segmented to allow
for the presence of two qualities at the same time, an increase in income inequality causes that
segmentation to become even more pronounced, so that competition between the two qualities
becomes weaker. As the incumbent duopolists become able to charge more for their products,
the resulting surge in future expected profits is predicted to act as an incentive that determines an
increase in technology advancing activities. By contrast, in those markets where there is a
monopoly of the top quality, an increase in income inequality raises the threat of entry of a lower
quality competitor that would weaken the monopolist position. In these markets, rising income
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inequality  is predicted to cause a drop in technology advancing activities. Therefore, the
cause-effect relationship goes from income inequality to the degree of competition in product
markets, and from the latter to technical change.
The idea that income inequality may have an impact on growth through influencing the
mode and the pace of technical progress is relatively novel. The more widely accepted idea has
been that income inequality affects growth through physical and human capital accumulation.
For instance, Galor and Moav (2004) in a very recent study, reckon that inequality has long been
an important determinant of growth. But they argue that over time the channel through which
inequality affected growth has changed. In the early stages of industrialization, inequality was
thought to be a positive determinant of growth, because physical capital accumulation, in its
growth-fostering role, needed a more concentrated, that is unequal, distribution of income to gain
sufficient momentum. Later on, as human capital accumulation replaced physical capital
accumulation as a prime engine of growth, its characteristic of being embodied in humans
implied that in order to display its full potential, human capital accumulation should be widely
spread across individuals in society. This time therefore, higher income inequality would be
harmful to growth because it would hinder, or at least slow down, such a spread. Galor and
Moav attempted to provide a unifying theoretical framework that could reconcile these two
effects. However it is interesting to notice that they made no mention of the possibility of
existence for a third channel through which inequality could affect growth: technical change.
A direct link between income inequality and technical progress is predicted in theory in a
strand of Schumpeterian literature that, given its relevance for the present study, will be
reviewed in some greater detail in Section 5.2.1 below. In that literature, the transmission effect
from income inequality to technical change is claimed to occur through the effect of income
inequality on the degree of competition in product markets and from the latter to technical
change. It is therefore important to acknowledge the literature that has studied this second
linkage between the degree of competition in products markets and technical progress both from
theoretical and empirical standpoints.
From a theoretical standpoint, Aghion et all (2002), predict an inverted U-shaped
relationship between product market competition and innovation, while De Nicolo and
Zanchettin (2002) predict a positive relationship between competition and innovation when
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innovations are large enough. Aghion et all also gather empirical evidence in support of their
inverted U-shaped hypothesis. 
Despite these efforts,  there has been no attempt yet, to the best of our knowledge, to
gather supportive empirical evidence for the direct link between income inequality and technical
progress. In order to fill this gap, we develop an empirical test whose design can best be
appreciated after a more detailed description of the theory that underpins it. That is done in
Section 5.2.1. Section 5.2.2 provides some descriptive statistics concerning the data set
employed. Section 5.3 contains the first of three levels of the empirical analysis, the analysis by
world region. Section 5.4 describes the analysis by sector of industry, while Section 5.5 contains
the analysis by country. Finally, Section 5.6 concludes. 
5.2.1 The Schumpeterian Theory Which Links Income Inequality to Technical Progress
The theoretical literature which predicts a causal relationship between income inequality and
technical progress includes the papers by Zweimuller and Brunner (1998), Li (1998 and 2003)
and Chapters 3 and 4 of this book. All these studies share two common features: first, there are
economic agents that seek the monopoly rents which accrue to an innovator because of his/her
technological advantage over rivals. Their effort to produce the latest innovation takes place over
vertically differentiated quality goods, so that the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction
can materialize. This point is the basis of mainstream endogenous growth theory. Second, and
here is the novelty of these models, the process of creative destruction is only partial, and the
income distribution plays a role because consumer preferences are assumed to be non homothetic
over indivisible goods. Consumers’ choice is not about how much to buy of the quality good, as
in standard Cobb-Douglas like specifications. Instead, it is assumed that consumers buy one unit
of the good (indivisibility assumption) and their choice concerns which quality to buy. 
All the four papers mentioned above share this common setup. However they differ in the
way they model consumers’ wealth distribution. In Zweimuller and Brunner 1998, the latter is
assumed discrete and consists of two groups, the rich and the poor. As a result, the competition
easing effect that takes place when the income distribution is continuous38, is lost and profit
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38 Such a competition-easing effect has been mentioned several times in this book. An example is in the
introduction of Chapter 4 (penultimate paragraph of Section 4.1).
expectations are lower with higher inequality. Hence Zweimuller and Brunner predict an inverse
relationship between inequality and technical progress. 
By contrast, the consumers’ wealth distribution is assumed continuous and uniform in Li
(1998 and 2003) and in our Chapter 3. That way, the predicted relationship between inequality
and innovation is no longer monotonic but it depends on the structure of the market for quality
goods. If such a market is a monopoly of the best quality, then more inequality hampers
technical progress through weaker incentives for innovators in the form of lower profit
expectations. If the market for quality goods is a duopoly, then more inequality provides stronger
incentives to innovate.
In Chapter 4, we went one step further and interpreted the different market structures in
terms of two big regional economic blocs. In the first bloc, the North, the distribution of income
is such that the market demands the good of the highest quality only and the market structure
there is a monopoly of the incumbent in possession of the latest innovation. As for the Southern
bloc, an assumption is made that enterpreneurs based there, can never completely catch up with
the state of the art, but, if they try, they might succeed in successfully imitating the quality that
sits second from top on the ladder. Because of the different income distribution in the South,
both the top quality and the second-from-top quality enjoy positive market share in this region.
Hence the structure of the market in the Southern bloc is a duopoly of two qualities. In such a
framework, the predictions of this model are as follows: rising inequality in the Southern bloc
raises innovative research efforts in the North, but has an ambiguous impact on the rate of
technology transfers to the South.
An increase in Northern inequality has a contrasting effect on the technological
advancements of the North and the South. It causes a drop in Northern research efforts, while at
the same time promoting an increase in the rate of technology transferred to the South.
5.2.2 Research Design and Some Descriptive Statistics
We pursue our objective by designing an empirical test that resembles the ideal world modeled
in the theory as closely as possible. In order to reproduce a setting with two big world regions,
one developed and one developing, we gather data from two groups of countries. A summary of
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descriptive demographic and income statistics for both groups of countries is provided in Tables
5.1 and 5.2. The first is a group of 15 OECD countries with a combined population of nearly 800
million, that is meant to represent the developed North. The second is a group of 11 developing
economies, with a combined population of 2.5 billion at the beginning of the time interval
considered (1988), which grows to almost 2.9 billion by the end of that interval (1998). This
second group is meant to represent the developing South. As it can be easily checked with a
glance at the table, the 15 OECD countries qualify to be labeled as the developed North, since
their income is on average 10 times higher than that of the 11 countries in the second group and
less dispersed around its mean, as shown by smaller Gini coefficients than those of the countries
in the second group. For specular reasons, those countries in the second group qualify to be
termed as the developing South. 
As it has been done in the theoretical work, we shall assume that technological progress
takes the form of advancement of the technological frontier (innovation) in the Northern region,
and of technology transfers in the Southern region. A central issue is how to measure
technological progress in the two regions. In order to measure innovation in the North, two of the
most common measures used in past literature have been research and development (henceforth
RnD) expenditures or patent counts.
We choose to use RnD expenditures, both because suitable time series of RnD
expenditure data across the relevant countries are readily available and because patent counts
may not be comparable across industries owing to the fact that their value can vary significantly.
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Table 5.1 - Summary Population and Income Statistics for 15 OECD Economies: Australia,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway,
Spain, Sweden, U.K., U.S.A.
35.0324,914790,4211998
34.9224,790785,5841997
34.6524,267780,3901996
34.4123,432775,1971995
34.5122,455769,9171994
34.3421,626764,6891993
34.1521,142759,1931992
34.2120,101753,6171991
34.2919,740749,2091990
33.9318,880743,9241989
33.9618,781721,3531988
Average Gini coeffs.GDP per capitaPopulation (thousands)Year
Table 5.2 - Summary Population and Income Statistics for 15 developing Economies: Brazil,
China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Rep. Korea, Singapore, Thailand,
Turkey
47.593,6782,891,7931998
47.643,6552,852,6701997
46.833,5022,813,6271996
46.63,2722,774,7791995
46.062,9912,736,0111994
462,7672,697,2251993
45.962,5532,657,7301992
45.592,3292,617,5051991
44.772,2132,574,4711990
44.542,1472,530,3901989
44.192,0862,486,1561988
Average Gini coeffs.GDP per capitaPopulation (thousands)Year
Notes for both tables: GDP per capita is expressed in PPP current international dollars. Data
Sources: World Bank World Development Indicators for GDP and population, United Nations
World Income Inequality Database (UNWIID) for Gini coefficients.
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In past empirical literature, the focus has mostly been on the alleged impact of RnD on
various productivity measures and/or their growth rates. Therefore, RnD has mostly served as an  
independent, right-hand-side (RHS) variable. There are also some recent studies that use
innovation intensity39, as the dependent variable. One such example is Aghion et al. (2002). One
difference between that study and ours is that they aim to investigate the effect of product market
competition on innovation, while our objective is to probe the effect of income inequality on
innovation. Other differences concern the way innovation is measured. That study does not use
RnD expenditures but patent counts and their data are at firm level, while our data are both at
country and industry level.  
Figure 5.1 below (Panel a) shows the behavior, over the 10-year interval 1988 - 1997, of
total RnD expenditures in the 15 OECD countries sampled (the upper line which unites the
circles in the graph). It is immediate to notice a non negligible upward trend in the absolute
amount of RnD expenditures in the North, which illustrates an increasing effort at innovating in
that part of the world. This figure also shows the behavior of high tech exports in the 11
developing countries sampled (the lower line which unites the triangles in the graph). High tech
exports is our chosen measure of successful technology transfers to the South. Developing
countries, which do not perform any significant RnD activity, achieve technological progress
when technology that was invented in the North is successfully transferred to them. We make the
assumption that if a country that does not carry out significant RnD activities of its own, is able
to export goods with high technological content, that technology must have been transferred into
the country from the outside at some point. Possible alternative measures of technology transfers
might be foreign direct investment (FDI) or high tech imports. But FDI is a much more
problematic quantity, which may include purely financial flows, and whose definition varies
across countries much more widely than high tech exports. As for high tech imports, it is almost
as good a measure as exports, except for the fact that exports may be a more accurate reflection
of a country’s effective technological capability, since their occurrence can be taken as proof that
high tech production has actually occurred. The fact that the high tech exports line in Figure 5.1
stays far below that of RnD expenditures is consistent with the widely held belief that only part
of the technology invented in the North finds its way to the South. The fact that the line is also
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39 In most studies, innovation intensity is the ratio of some measure of innovative activity, such as RnD
expenditures, to gdp.
characterized by an increasing trend speaks of an equal effort made by the South in trying to
keep pace with the North in the field of technological progress. A further feature that emerges
from the comparison is that the high tech exports line ever so gradually moves closer to the RnD
expenditure line, as shown by its being closer to it at the end of the interval in 1997 than it was at
the beginning in 1988. This catch-up story is illustrated even more clearly by Panels b and c of
Figures 5.1. In Panel b, where the scale of reporting is logarithmic, the upward trend in RnD
expenditures is still present, but to a lesser degree than in Panel a. Besides, the high tech export
line approaches the RnD line at a faster rate. Panel c depicts the 10-year trend in “RnD
expenditure to gdp” and “high tech exports to gdp” ratios. The RnD expenditure to gdp ratio
does not trend upwards, while the high tech exports to gdp ratio does, thereby approaching the
former. Notice however, that the latest three data points in all three graphs are characterized by
the two lines running parallel. This feature would seem to confirm the existence of a hard-core
advantage held by the North which the South cannot completely eliminate. Such advantage is
captured in the theory by the assumption that the South is never less than one step behind the
North on the quality ladder. Given these observed regularities both in the distribution of income
and the distribution of technology-advancing activities across time and across world regions, our
declared objective is to uncover any relationship that might exist between the pursuit of such
technology-advancing activities and specific features of the distribution of income, such as
varying degrees of income inequality.
We start from a setup that is as close as possible to the theoretical setup. However, as we
become aware of the existence of a trade-off between the level of detail in the analysis and the
strength of evidence uncovered, we steadily move away from that theoretical setup, by changing
the cross sectional unit of reference from world regions to industrial sectors and finally to
countries. the analysis at the regional level is carried out in Section 5.3, where the two world
regions are 15 OECD countries, to represent the developed North, and 11 developing countries,
to represent the South. In Section 5.4 more detail is added as the analysis is performed at the
industrial sector’s level. the analysis at the cross-country level is described in Section 5.5.
.
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Figure 5.1 - Time Series of RnD Expenditures and High Tech Exports (in U.S.$)
Panel a
Panel b
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RnD Exp. and High Tech Exports
year
 RnDN  HTexptsS
1988 1997
9.1e+09
2.7e+11
Logs of RnD Exp. and High Tech Exports
year
 logRnDN  logHTexptsS
1988 1997
22.9287
26.3134
Panel c
5.3 Analysis by World Region
In order to have a close correspondence with Schumpeterian growth theory, we start the analysis
at the broadest possible level of aggregation.
Two world regions are considered: a sample of 15 OECD countries, to represent the
developed world (at times also referred to as the “North” in the theory), and a sample of 11
developing countries (referred to as the “South” in the theory). The data on the relevant variables
are collected at this level of aggregation. Thus there will be region totals or region averages for
all variables selected. Before explaining the variables and the criteria used for their selection, we
illustrate the econometric model that we shall employ and its rationale. 
Since our aim is to test the effect of income inequality in the North and in the South on
technology-advancing activities of both regions, in accordance with Schumpeterian growth
theory, we posit the following structure:
(3.1)ln RnD15t = 0 + 1 ln HTEXPTS11t + 2NGt + 3SGt + 4opennesst + 5 ln gdp15 + 1
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RnD and High Tech Exports Intensities
year
 RnDintN  expgdpratioS
1988 1997
.001749
.013749
(3.2)ln HTEXPTS11t = 0 + 1NGt + 2SGt + 3 ln gdp15t + 4 ln pop11t + 2
The dependent variable in the first equation is RnD expenditures in the sample of 15
OECD countries. On the right hand side, beside the two measures of income inequality NG, the
average Gini coefficient for the sample of OECD 15, and SG, the average Gini coefficient for the
sample of the developing 11, we control for openness, measured as the average over the sample
of OECD 15 of the following ratio, computed for each country: (imports+exports)/gdp.
Openness is often claimed to be an important determinant of RnD expenditures. Its impact on
RnD expenditures is expected to be positive. We also control for the size of the economy, as
measured by total gdp. Again, we expect a positive effect here. In order to address the likelihood
of a simultaneity problem, high tech exports from the developing 11 enter equation (3.1) as an
independent variable. The reasoning behind this choice stems from the Schumpeterian growth
theory and is as follows: RnD expenditures are a measure of innovative activities in the
developed world and high tech exports from the developing countries are a measure, albeit a
crude one, of how much technology has successfully been transferred to that part of the world
from the developed economies. Schumpeterian growth theory predicts that the rate of successful
technology transfers to the South determines the pace at which Northern monopolists ultimately
exit the market for quality goods. The coefficient attached to high tech exports in the RnD15
equation is expected to be negative, through the following mechanism: the faster is technology
transferred to the South, the shorter the tenure of Northern monopolists, the smaller the profit
incentives for successful innovators.
In the second equation, high tech exports originating in the sample of 11 developing
nations depend on the income inequality of the North and the South, NG and SG, and on two
control variables, population of the developing 11, as a measure of the size of the labor force that
contributes to the production of those exports, and the gdp of the OECD 15, on the assumption
that the larger the destination market of the high tech exports (presumably the OECD 15) the
higher the demand for those exports and hence the higher their magnitude. In both equations
above, the variables characterized by very large magnitudes have been logged in order to put
them on a comparable scale to the other variables.
We carry out the estimation in two ways. If the endogenous variables are correlated
between each other, the OLS method yields consistent estimates of the reduced form
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coefficients, but since these are linear combinations of the structural coefficients, OLS estimates
of the latter are biased. In order to address this problem, we employ instrumental variable (IV)
estimation of equations (3.1) and (3.2), also known as two stages least squares (2SLS). The
second stage is exactly equation (3.1), while the first stage regression adds openness to the
independent variables of equation (3.2)40. Table 5.3 shows both 2SLS estimates as just described
and OLS estimates of the exogenous variables. The latter are retained in order to serve as a term
of comparison for the instrumental variable estimation and for completeness. We can see that in
the case of equation (3.1), the 2SLS estimation yields a negative coefficient for the variable
LogHTexpts11, as predicted by the theory, but it is not significant. Furthermore, income
inequality measures carry a positive coefficient in all cases but one (the exception being 2SLS
regression of NG on RnD), but they never approach any significance threshold, as indicated by
very low t-statistic values. Hence it is not possible to make any inference in this case. What does
have an effect on RnD expenditures is, in accordance with previous literature, the variable
openness. In the case of equation (3.2), the income inequality measures all carry a negative sign.
Although they too fail to make the significance thresholds, the higher values of the t-statistics
indicate that perhaps it might be possible to infer a negative effect of rising income inequality
everywhere on the high tech exports of the developing world. But, with only ten observations to
work with, we are clearly moving in very shallow waters and the level of aggregation is too
broad to make any evidence gathered here credible. In fact, the purpose of this section is to show
that an empirical study designed to match Schumpeterian growth theory closely, is seriously
constrained by data limitations, hence the necessity to move on and start introducing more detail,
in the form of analyses by sector of industry (in Section 5.4) and by country (in Section 5.5).
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40 This is because all the exogenous variables of equation (3.1) must be included as instruments in the first stage of
the 2SLS estimation, or the estimates will be biased (Baltagi, 1998).
Table 5.3 - OLS and 2SLS regression results of logged HTexpts11 and logged RnD15 on
selected independent variables, 1988-1997, 10 Observations:
35.38***61.20***66.98***58.16***F-test of joint
significance
0.950.960.970.98Adj. R-Square
--65.22 (3.20)**43.83 (2.23)*logpop11
0.386 (0.65)0.26 (0.456)-12.59 (-1.98)-6.26 (-1.00)loggdp15
0.02 (2.20)*0.02 (2.60)**0.10 (1.77)-Openness
0.04 (0.48)0.02 (0.65)-0.58 (-2.10)-0.28 (-1.08)SG
-0.02 (-0.28)0.05 (0.69)-0.88 (-1.99)-0.46 (-1.04)NG
-0.18 (-0.28)---LogHTexpts11
2SLS (second
stage)
OLS 2SLS (first
stage)
OLS Independent
Variable
LogRnD15LogHTexpts11
Dependent Variable
Note: * indicates significant at 10%; ** indicates significant at 5%; *** indicates significant at
1%; t statistics in parentheses.
5.4 Analysis by Sector
In this section, technological advancement is measured, as before, by RnD expenditures in a
sample of 15 OECD countries and by high tech exports in a sample of 10 developing countries,
the 11 sampled in Section 5.2 minus Turkey41. Furthermore, the data that concern technological
advancement, are broken down by sector of industry, following standard categorization of
sectors for these types of data.
There are minor differences in the classification of industrial sectors regarding RnD data
and export data. In order to facilitate comparisons, we patch up the differences and end up with
the following nine industrial sectors, both for the Northern and the Southern samples42:
aerospace, computing, electronics (communication equipment), electrical, non electrical,
chemical, pharmaceutical, armaments (other metal products), items not elsewhere specified.
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42 Sector names are those used for exports according to SITC 3. Whenever sector names for RnD expenditures
differ considerably, their names is also shown in parentheses; the last item - not elsewhere specified - contains
exports of scientific instruments and RnD expenditures in motor vehicles, other manufacturing and services sectors.
41 The selection of countries to represent the developing world for this section was made based on a claim in Mani
(2000) that the 10 countries selected here account for 90% of all high tech exports originating from the developing
world.
We denote RnD expenditures in the 15 OECD countries by tn (for “technology North”),
and high tech exports in the 10 developing countries by ts (for “technology South”). Since the
data are broken down by sector, we shall have tn1, tn2,..., to denote RnD in sector 1 (aerospace),
sector 2 (computing) and so on. Likewise, we shall also have ts1, ts2,.., to denote high tech
exports in aerospace, computing etc.
The model to be estimated consists of two equations, the first of which concerns the
sample of 15 OECD countries, as follows:
(4.1)ln tns t = a0 + a1NGt + a2SGt + a3 ln gdp15t + 4opennesst + u1
Where s = 1,2,...,9 indexes sectors,  is the natural log of the OECD 15 total figure of RnDln tns
expenditures in sector s,  NG and SG are simple averages of Gini coefficients in the OECD 15
and the developing 10 respectively, and the control variables are the logged gdp total of the
OECD 15 and openness, which enter equation (4.1) both individually and together. Openness
here is calculated as a weighted average of the openness measure specific to each one of the 15
OECD countries included in the sample, and the latter is computed as the ratio
(imports+exports)/gdp for each country. The weights are the ratio of each country’s gdp to the
total gdp for the sample of the OECD 15. Finally,  is an equation-specific error term. Inu1
contrast to the preceding Section 5.3, the variable “high tech exports from developing countries”
has not been included in the RnD equation (4.1), in order to simplify the analysis without
apparent loss of explanatory power, given the lack of evidence gathered in its favor in Section
5.3. Such an equation is estimated according to the random effects model, and the outcome of
this regression is reported in Table 5.4 below. In the table, there are four regressions, one for
each column. Column (i) shows the results when only Northern and Southern Gini coefficients
(respectively: NG and SG) are accounted for. Columns (ii) and (iii) show regression results when
we control for logged gdp of the OECD 15 and openness respectively. Finally column (iv) shows
the regression outcome when the two control variables both appear on the right hand side of
equation (4.1).
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Table 5.4 - Random Effects estimates of logged RnD expenditures in the OECD 15 (denoted
logtn) on selected independent variables - 90 observations
105.61***106.28***106.43***107.17***Chi2 test of joint
significance
0.580.580.580.58R-square
(within)
00--openness15
0.24-0.22-loggdp15
0.070.09**0.08*0.1***SG
0.080.110.110.13NG
(iv)(iii)(ii)(i)
logtnIndependent
Variable
Dependent Variable
Note: In random effects estimation, significance thresholds are calculated on the basis of the z
(standard normal statistic), and the test of joint significance is chi square. Values shown are
coefficient estimates; significance levels as in Table 5.3
In the table, there are four regressions, one for each column. Column (i) shows the results
when only Northern and Southern Gini coefficients (respectively: NG and SG) are accounted for.
Columns (ii) and (iii) show regression results when we control for logged gdp of the OECD 15
and openness respectively. Finally column (iv) shows the regression outcome when the two
control variables both appear on the right hand side of equation (4.1). 
Income inequality in the developing world, SG, is significant to highly significant and
positive in regressions (i) through (iii). This result would confirm the Schumpeterian conjecture
that when income inequality is higher in the South, RnD expenditures in the North rise as a
consequence of the fact that a more segmented market for quality goods in the South (due to
higher inequality) increases profit opportunities for firms that have a market share in that region. 
Likewise, the second equation to be estimated concerns the sample of 10 developing
countries, as follows:
(4.2)ln tss t = b0 + b1NGt + b2SGt + b3 ln gdp15t + b4 ln pop10t + u2
Where   is the natural log of the total figure for the developing 10 of high tech exports inln tss
sector s, the independent variables are as in equation (4.1), except that logged population of the
developing 10 is used as a second control variable in place of openness, and  is an equationu2
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specific error term. Each variable in both equation (4.1) and (4.2) is measured over the 10-year
time period 1988-1997.
Estimation results for this equation, based on the random effects model, are shown in
Table 5.5 below.
Table 5.5 - Random Effects estimates of logged high tech exports in the developing 10 (denoted
logts) on selected independent variables - 90 observations
457.28***447.68***396.12***264.01***Chi2 test of joint
significance
0.860.850.840.77R-square
(within)
42.97***24.12***--logpop10
-6.79-7.48***-loggdp15
-0.13-0.090.060.7***SG
-0.61*-0.68**-0.61*0.35NG
(iv)(iii)(ii)(i)
logtsIndependent
Variable
Dependent Variable
Note: see Table 5.4 for details.
The layout of Table 5.5 follows the same pattern as that of Table 5.4. Thus the first
column shows regression results with the income inequality measures alone, and columns (ii) to
(iv) show regression results when the controls are added, both individually and together. We see
that now, unlike the earlier case of Table 5.4, the control variables are highly significant, so that
any reversal of results caused by their addition has to be taken seriously. Indeed, a reversal of
results is exactly what this estimation exercise produces. Southern inequality goes from being
highly significant in clolumn (i) to not making the significance threshold in the other three
columns. By contrast, Northern income inequality, which is not significant in the first regression,
becomes significant and negative in the latter three regressions. The magnitude of the coefficient
remains also almost the same when different control variables are added, which adds credibility
to the result. This result says that a rise in income inequality in the rich world has a negative
effect on the level of high tech exports from the developing world to that region. This is not the
expected outcome, if one is to believe to the strand of Schumpeterian theory briefly outlined in
Section 5.2.1 above. That strand, we recall here, predicts that an increase in Northern inequality
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causes a drop in Northern research efforts, while at the same time promoting an increase in the
rate of technology transferred to the South, which, in this study, are proxied by the South’s high
tech exports. 
At this point we would like to check for the robustness of the above results, and at the
same time understand which sectors are responsible for the findings gathered thus far. In order to
achieve both objectives, we test each industrial sector separately. The model to be estimated now
consists of two sets of nine equations each, one for each industrial sector. The first set of
equations concerns the sample of 15 OECD countries, as follows:
(4.3)
ln tn1t = a10 + a11NGt + a12SGt + a13controlst + u1
ln tn2t = a20 + a21NGt + a22SGt + a23controlst + u2
..........................................................
ln tn9t = a90 + a91NGt + a92SGt + a93controlst + u9
where s = 1,2,...,9 indexes sectors,  is the natural log of the OECD 15 total figure of RnDln tns
expenditures in sector s,  NG and SG are simple averages of Gini coefficients in the OECD 15
and the developing 10 respectively, and the control variables are either the logged gdp total of
the OECD 15 or their degree of openness. Finally,  is an equation specific error term.us
Likewise, the second set of equations, concerning the sample of 10 developing countries,
is as follows:
(4.4)
ln ts1t = b10 + b11NGt + b12SGt + b13controlst + v1
ln ts2t = b20 + b21NGt + b22SGt + b23controlst + v2
..........................................................
ln ts9t = b90 + b91NGt + b92SGt + b93controlst + v9
Where   is the natural log of the total figure for the developing 10 of high tech exports inln tss
sector s, the independent variables NG and SG are as in equation (4.1), the control variables are
either the logged gdp total of the OECD 15 or the logged population total of the developing 10,
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and  is an equation-specific error term. Each variable in both systems (4.3) and (4.4) isvst
measured over the 10-year time period 1988-1997.
Both systems (4.3) and (4.4) may be estimated separately, by OLS, or jointly, by the
seemengly unrelated regression (SUR) technique. Since the independent variables are the same
in each equation, the coefficient estimates obtained by the two techniques will be the same. The
SUR technique additionally allows for the equation specific error terms  and  to beus vs
correlated across sectors, and makes it possible to test for the coefficients attached to each
regressor to be jointly zero across sectors. In order to be able to perform such a test, the SUR
technique is employed for the above sets of equations. Notice that such a technique is
characterized by a constraint due to the limited number of degrees of freedom. The latter is equal
to the number of years considered (10) minus one and minus the number of independent
variables included in the RHS of the regression. Therefore, in order to avoid a singular
covariance matrix, we have to restrict the analysis to six or seven sectors, depending on how
many independent variables are included on the right hand side of the equations. For this reason,
in order not to reduce too much the number of sectors studied, only one control variable at a time
is added. Estimation results are shown in a series of six tables; the caption above each table
provides detailed info on their specific content. In all tables, R-square and F statistics are
provided for all regressions. When reading the results shown in the tables, we seek confirmation
for the finding, from Table 5.4, that rising income inequality in the South has a positive effect on
RnD expenditures in the North. A glance at the relevant tables (5.6, 5.7 and 5.8) reveals that the
sectors which fed that result particularly strongly were computing and chemicals. There is some
evidence that the non electrical and pharmaceutical sectors may also have contributed.
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Table 5.6 - SUR regression of logtn (logged RnD expenditures) in the OECD 15 on selected
independent variables in computing and electronics sectors - 10 observations per sector
33.2***11.48***19.06***2.184.81***2.52*F-test of
joint
significance
0.940.850.840.520.710.42R-square
0.06***--0.06--openness
-0.42---2.79**-loggdp15
-0.010.040.08-0.060.27**0.03SG
0.060.190.240.060.6*0.24NG
(iii)(ii)(i)(iii)(ii)(i)
Logtn (electronics)Logtn (computing)Independent
variable
Dependent VariableDependent Variable
Note: values shown are coefficient estimates; significance levels as in Table 5.3
Table 5.7 - SUR regression of logtn (logged RnD expenditures) in the OECD 15 on selected
independent variables in electrical and non electrical sectors - 10 observations per sector
35.35***81.42***59.46***12.06***11.56***20.21***F-test of
joint
significance
0.950.980.940.860.850.85R-square
0.01---0.01--openness
-1.17***---0.06-loggdp15
0.14**0.060.16***0.110.090.09*SG
0.1100.140.230.20.19NG
(iii)(ii)(i)(iii)(ii)(i)
Logtn (non electrical)Logtn (electrical)Independent
variable
Dependent VariableDependent Variable
Note: values shown are coefficient estimates; significance levels as in Table 5.3
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Table 5.8 - SUR regression of logtn (logged RnD expenditures) in the OECD 15 on selected
independent variables in chemical and pharmaceutical sectors - 10 observations per sector
28.18***42.77***34.07***10.4***7.15***10.36***F-test of
joint
significance
0.930.960.910.840.780.75R-square
-0.04--0.03*--openness
-1.72**--0.49-loggdp15
0.27***0.050.2***0.1**0.020.06SG
0.27-0.090.130.14-0.020.05NG
(iii)(ii)(i)(iii)(ii)(i)
Logtn (pharmaceutical)Logtn (chemical)Independent
variable
Dependent VariableDependent Variable
Note: values shown are coefficient estimates; significance levels as in Table 5.3
Table 5.9 - SUR regression of logts (logged high tech exports) in the developing 10 on selected
independent variables in computing and electronics sectors - 10 observations per sector
337.02***341.9***45.02***74,027***137.94***105.51***F-test of
joint
significance
0.980.990.930.960.990.97R-square
22.22***---2.2***--logpop10
-6.06***--4.26**-loggdp15
-0.21***0.020.54***0.79***0.32*0.69***SG
-0.31-0.190.61.02**0.481.03**NG
(iii)(ii)(i)(iii)(ii)(i)
Logts (electronics)Logts (computing)Independen
t variable
Dependent VariableDependent Variable
Note: values shown are coefficient estimates; significance levels as in Table 5.3
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Table 5.10 - SUR regression of logts (logged high tech exports) in the developing 10 on selected
independent variables in electrical and non electrical sectors - 10 observations per sector
203.88***545.15***36.47***98.36***122.48***32.41***F-test of
joint
significance
0.9810.910.980.980.9R-square
26.57***--27.57***--logpop10
-7.2***--11.42***-loggdp15
-0.35***-0.070.55***0.10.031.01***SG
-0.39-0.240.69-0.57-0.840.64NG
(iii)(ii)(i)(iii)(ii)(i)
Logts (non electrical)Logts (electrical)Independen
t variable
Dependent VariableDependent Variable
Note: values shown are coefficient estimates; significance levels as in Table 5.3
Table 5.11 - SUR regression of logts (logged high tech exports) in the developing 10 on selected
independent variables in chemical and pharmaceutical sectors - 10 observations per sector
34,635***40.29***19.26***53.57***31.24***20.46***F-test of
joint
significance
0.840.950.850.670.940.85R-square
-1.03*---16.81***--logpop10
-10.97***--8.12***-loggdp15
1.05***00.95**1.38***0.050.75**SG
-0.15-1.35*0.070.59-0.860.19NG
(iii)(ii)(i)(iii)(ii)(i)
Logts (pharmaceutical)Logts (chemical)Independent
variable
Dependent VariableDependent Variable
Note: values shown are coefficient estimates; significance levels as in Table 5.3
As for the analysis of the regressions concerning the sample of 10 developing countries,
the situation is probably best understood if the relationship between the two measures of income
inequality in the two world regions, denoted NG and SG, and the dependent variable, logged
high tech exports from the developing 10 (denoted logts), are described separately. Starting with
the relationship between NG and logts, recall from Table 5.5 that NG has a positive but not
significant effect if regressed along with SG only on logts (column (i), while the effect becomes
negative and significant when control variables are added (columns (ii), (iii), and (iv)). This
reversal of results is broadly confirmed by Tables 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11, as far as the signs attached
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to the coefficients are concerned, but it is not confirmed when it comes to the significance levels.
Indeed, only in the computing and pharmaceutical sectors have the significance thresholds been
passed. The pharmaceutical sector seems to be responsible for the negative and significant sign
obtained in Table 5.5, column (ii), while it is not clear what determines the negative coefficient
of column (iii) in the same table. We can only presume that the positive and significant effect
obtained in computing is more than offset by the negative (but not significant) effect in the
remaining sectors.
In the case of the relationship between SG and logts, Tables 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11 show that
all sectors contribute to the positive and significant coefficient of Table 5.5, column (i), while
compensating effects between the various sectors are the most likely cause of non significant
coefficients of Table 5.5, column (ii) and especially column (iii). If compensating effects are
indeed at work, once total GDP or population are controlled for, one should not conclude that
Southern income inequality has no significant effects on high tech exports from the South, but
rather that income inequality in the South may have sector specific effects of opposite sign that
offset each other. 
As for the joint test that the coefficients attached to Northern Gini and Southern Gini be
zero across sectors, as expected, that hypothesis is strongly rejected in all cases.
To sum up, the sectoral analysis carried out here does produce some evidence that
income inequality may have some tangible effect on technology advancing activities. That
evidence points to a positive relationship between the level of income inequality in the
developing world and the intensity of research activities in the developed world, just as predicted
by Schumpeterian theory. The evidence also suggests a link between income inequality
everywhere and the level of high tech exports originating from the developing world. That link
might be of different sign, depending on the sector of industry, but the overall impact on
Southern high tech exports (logged) is probably negative in the case of Northern income
inequality and positive with respect to Southern income inequality. Such results, if confirmed,
would not confirm the predictions of the strand of Schumpeterian growth theory being discussed
in this study. Therefore, it should be easy to see what may well be the strongest finding of this
section: the need for further analysis, which we duly undertake in the next Section 5.5.
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5.5 Analysis by Country
5.5.1 The 15 OECD Developed Economies
Up to this point, one recurrent problem has been the fact that, both in the analysis by world
region and in the analysis by sector, income inequality measures and the other control variables
varied over time but did not vary with the dependent variables across sectors. This lack of
variability in the cross sectional dimension, may have been one reason why evidence has been
hard to find. In order to overcome such a problem, in this section the analysis is performed by
country. 
In Section 5.5.1 our focus is on the sample of 15 OECD economies. Income inequality is
measured by a domestic Gini coefficient (DG) for each country sampled, and a foreign Gini
(FG), also specific to each country sampled. This Foreign Gini is a trade-weighted average of the
Gini coefficients of the biggest trade partners of the country concerned. For each of them, we
compute the foreign Gini in four different ways. FG1 is computed across the five biggest trade
partners of each country in all commodities. FG2 is computed across the five biggest trade
partners in the relevant high tech commodities. FG3 is computed across the six biggest trade
partners in the relevant high tech commodities among the pool of 11 developing countries which
we call the South. Finally FG4 is computed across the six biggest trade partners in the relevant
high tech commodities among the pool of 15 OECD countries which we call the North. The
computation of the foreign Gini in four different ways should be seen as an attempt both to
perform a sensitivity analysis and to remain as loyal as possible to the theoretical setting of two
big world regions. In such a setting, the foreign Gini should be expressed by two variables, one
to measure income inequality in the developed world (outside the country concerned), and one to
reflect income inequality in the developing world. A simple Gini coefficient calculated across
each country’s biggest trade partners is not likely to represent those two regions. Our various
foreign Gini coefficients are designed to take these issues into account. Since FG1 and FG2 are
based on the main trading bloc of each country, these foreign income inequality measures are not
based on any particular geographical area. However, since the counterpart in most of the trade
done are a few developed economies, FG1 and FG2 tend to be measures which refer to the
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developed world.43 FG3 is a measure of income inequality in that part of the developing world
that engages in high tech trade with the country concerned. It is meant to resemble the Southern
Gini in the earlier analysis. Finally, FG4 is based on high tech developed trade partners of the
country concerned, in a bid to resemble the Northern Gini of the earlier analysis. 
Equipped with these measures of income inequality, we estimate the following equation:
 (5.1.1)lnRnDit = 0 + 1DGit + 2FG3it + 3FGMit + it
The subscript i indexes countries and t indexes time. The notation relative to the third regressor
is FGM, where M =1,2,4 to reflect the fact that FG1, FG2 and FG4 are alternatively used in the
equation. We also estimate the same equation with the addition of two control variables, as
follows:
(5.1.2)lnRnDit = 0 + 1DGit + 2FG3it + 3FGMit + 4 lnCV1it + 5Opennit + it
Where CV1 stands for “control variable 1”, which will be the log of gross domestic product
(gdp) total or gdp per capita, depending on the regression equation. The second control variable
used is openness, calculated as the ratio of total imports + total exports to gdp. Each variable is
now measured over the 11-year time period 1988-1998.
As a further robustness check, the selected independent variables have also been
regressed on RnD intensity (denoted  ), calculated as the ratio of RnD total to GDP (inRnDint
PPP terms), according to the following equations:
 (5.1.3)RnDintit = 0 + 1DGit + 2FG3it + 3FGMit + it
(5.1.4)RnDintit = 0 + 1DGit + 2FG3it + 3FGMit + 4 lnCV1it + 5Opennit + it
Regression results are presented in two tables, one for each dependent variable. 
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43 Graphs B3 to B17 of Appendix B visually illustrate the fact that FG1, FG2, and FG4 measure roughly the same
thing.
Table 5.12 - Random Effect model estimates of log RnD expenditures on selected independent
variables - 165 observations:
10.6910.7210.73111Hauss.
p-value
03.0402.8402.8200.010.03Haus.
stat.
0.060.90.050.90.040.910.030.030.03R-sq. ov
0.040.910.030.910.020.910.020.020.02R-sq. be
0.740.720.740.730.730.710.560.530.51R-sq. wi
0.004c0.005c0.005c 0.005c0.005c0.006a---openn
1.198c-1.210c-1.27c----loggdppr
c
-1.09c-1.1c-1.12c---loggdpto
t
0.05c0.06c----0.17c--FG4
0000000.04c0.04c0.04cFG3
--0.04c0.04c---0.11b-FG2
----0.03a0.0b--0.12cFG1
0.0b0.010.0100.0100.05c0.03c0.02bDG
(9)(8)(7)(6)(5)(4)(3)(2)(1)Ind var.
Regr. no.
Note: values shown are coefficient estimates; a = significant at 10%; b = significant at 5%;        
c = significant at 1%; DG = domestic Gini; FG1 = foreign Gini based on the five biggest trade
partners of each country in all commodities; FG2 = foreign Gini based on the five biggest trade
partners in the relevant high tech commodities; FG3 = foreign Gini based on  the six biggest
trade partners in the relevant high tech commodities among the pool of 11 developing countries;
FG4 = foreign Gini based on the six biggest trade partners in the relevant high tech
commodities among the pool of 15 OECD countries; loggdptot is the log of total gdp in PPP
current international dollars; loggdpprc is the log of per capita gdp computed as total gdp
divided by total population; openness is the ratio (imports+exports)/gdp. R-sq. wi = R-square
within, R-sq. be = R-square between, R-sq. ov = R-square overall.
The dependent variable is the log of research and development (RnD) expenditures total
in Table 5.12, and RnD intensity, in Table 5.13.  Each table is further characterized by 9
regressions. In the first three regressions, only the various Gini coefficients are in turn used as
independent variables, as in equations (5.1.1) and (5.1.3), while in regressions (4) to (9) the logs
of gdp and gdp per capita, and openness are also alternatively used as control variables, as in
equations (5.1.2) and (5.1.4).
A glance at Table 5.12 reveals that, when considered on their own, all the various Gini
coefficients have a positive and significant impact on the log of RnD expenditures. The main
problem with these regressions is that the positive sign of the coefficients attached to the
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independent variables might still be determined by some other variable that is not explicitly
considered in those first three regressions. This issue is addressed in Table 5.12 by introducing
two control variables that the previous literature on RnD considers to be important determinants
of RnD expenditures: gross domestic product (gdp) and the degree of openness of the relevant
economy. Thus in regressions (4), (6) and (8) the controls are gdp total and openness, while in
regressions (5), (7) and (9) we control for gdp per capita and openness. What we see is that, after
adding the controls, domestic Gini and FG3 lose their significance, whereas foreign Gini
measures calculated on partners from the developed region (FG1, FG2 and FG4) are still very
significant and positive.
Table 5.13 - Random Effect model estimates of RnD intensities on selected independent
variables - 165 observations:
0.50.450.520.330.170.360.860.940.99Hauss.
p-value
4.364.774.185.737.765.470.750.390.08Haus.
stat.
0.0100.01000.030.010.020.09R-sq. ov
0.0500.0500.020000.07R-sq. be
0.340.330.390.390.340.330.270.330.24R-sq. wi
0.005c0.005c0.005c0.005c0.006c0.006c---openn
0--0.04--0.01----lngdpprc
-0.07-0.05-0.08---lngdptot
0.063c0.059c----.089c--FG4
-0.01-0.013a-0.015b-0.018b-0.014a-0.017b0-0.013a-0.01FG3
--0.059c0.056c---0.073c-FG2
----0.05c0.045c--0.068cFG1
0.014a0.0100000.02c0.010DG
(9)(8)(7)(6)(5)(4)(3)(2)(1)Ind var.
Regr. no.
Note: values shown are coefficient estimates; significance levels, Gini measures, control
variables and R-square statistics as in Table 5.12.
Table 5.13 yields a less clear cut picture, with respect to DG and FG3, which sometimes
are not significant. Moreover, when controls are added, FG3 is characterized by a significant but
negative coefficient. Despite these complications, table 5a.2 confirms the evidence that FG1,
FG2 and FG4 all have a positive effect on the level of RnD expenditure. 
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Tables 5.12 and 5.13 also show R-square coefficients and Hausman test statistics for all
regressions. We start with a comment on the Hausman test and deal with the R-square
coefficients later. The Hausman test is used here to decide between employing the fixed effects
or the random effects estimation technique. The fixed effects model assumes that time-invariant
country-specific effects are correlated with the independent regressors, and treats them as fixed
components of the intercept. On the other hand, the random effects model assumes that there is
no correlation between these country specific effects and the regressors. Under the hypothesis of
no correlation, both OLS and GLS estimates are consistent. A low value of the Hausman test
statistic (and a high p value) indicates that any difference in estimated coefficients under OLS
and GLS is not systematic, and the random effects model should be preferred. High values of the
Hausman test statistic, along with low p-values (p < 0.05) imply rejection of the null hypothesis
that differences in OLS and GLS coefficients is not systematic. In that case, the fixed effects
model should be employed. By looking at the values in the three tables, the case for using
random effects estimates is overwhelming. As for R-square coefficients, we use them to assess
the goodness of fit of each regression, so to have some guiding criterion, for declaring a
preference of some regressions over others. We see that R-square coefficients are high for
regressions (4), (6) and (8) of Table 5.12, and, with the exception of the within R-square in some
cases, they are low, or very low, elsewhere. It is a well known feature of R-square coefficients
that they increase in magnitude as more independent variables are added to a regression, and that
this surge in magnitude does not necessarily reflect a better fit. Nevertheless, the striking
difference between R-square coefficients in this case should leave the analyst in no doubt that
this is indeed an instance where regressions (4), (6) and (8) of Table 5.12 do represent a better
fit. When we look at how plausible regression coefficients are and at the goodness of fit of the
various regressions, our preference goes to regressions (4), (6) and (8) of table 5.12. The
evidence from these regressions is that foreign income inequality in the main trade area of each
country sampled, however measured (by FG1, FG2 or FG4), has a significant and positive
impact on the level of RnD expenditures. Such result is certainly the strongest piece of evidence
that emerges with respect to the 15 developed countries sampled, and it appears robust to
whether we introduce control variables or not, and to several ways of measuring the dependent
variable and the independent variables concerned. On the contrary, domestic income inequality
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(DG), and income inequality in the developing 11 (FG3), do not appear to have any significant
influence on RnD expenditures of the developed 15.
How do these results fare when compared with Schumpeterian growth theory? The
regressors FG1, FG2 and FG4 which are meant to measure income inequality in the North,
matter as predicted by the theory, but they are wrongly signed. This discrepancy could be
explained by recalling the detail of the theoretical setup. In the latter, the crucial factor that
causes the distribution of income to have a negative or a positive effect on the level of innovative
activities in a given region, is whether the market for quality goods in that region is pooled or
segmented. Such a market structure, in turn, is supposed to depend on the regional distribution of
income. It might be that, in practice, the distribution of income in the countries used for
calculating FG1, FG2 and FG4 is such that the market for quality goods in those countries is
segmented, not pooled. If this were the case, those countries would actually have to be included
in the South, not the North. Nevertheless, the distribution of income in most of the 15 OECD
countries that comprise the North probably satisfies the condition for a pooled quality good
market. Therefore such an explanation is extremely unlikely to apply to FG4, which was
calculated entirely on the basis of countries located in the group of OECD 15.
An alternative explanation is that the relevant theory which is more successful at
explaining the real world is not the first strand of Schumpeterian growth literature, but the more
recent refinements that replace leapfrogging with neck-and-neck competition. In this more recent
literature, stiffer competition in the quality goods market pushes levels of innovation intensity
higher, due to an escape competition effect that more than offsets the original Schumpeterian
negative effect.
The non significance of the coefficient attached to FG3 is somewhat justified by the fact
that the trade in high tech goods occurring between the OECD 15 and the developing countries
sampled here is too small a fraction of the total for the distribution of income in the latter
countries to have any effect. 
More puzzling is the lack of evidence regarding the domestic Gini coefficient. At first
sight, it would seem that whatever mechanism is in force that makes changes in the distribution
of income in a country’s trade partners be felt in the level of innovative activity in that country,
should also be at work to make the domestic distribution of income a factor in the activities of
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innovators in that country. At present, we have no plausible explanation to offer for this apparent
discrepancy of results between the domestic and foreign Gini coefficients. 
5.5.2 The 11 Developing Economies
In this section, we stick to the assumption that high tech exports are a good proxy for successful
technology transfers to a developing country. The role of both domestic and foreign income
inequality as a determinant of those high tech exports is investigated for a cross section of 11
developing countries over the time interval 1988 - 1998. To this end, the following equation is
estimated:
(5.2.1)lnHTEXPTSit = 0 + 1DGit + 2FGit + it
where DG is domestic Gini and FG stands for foreign Gini, which is calculated, as before, as a
weighted average of the Gini coefficients of each country’s five biggest trade partners, the
weights being the volume of trade.
In this case, unlike Section 5.5.1, we did not feel it was necessary to compute the foreign
Gini in several ways. Insofar as the main trade partners of the 11 countries sampled here are
most frequently located in the developed world, the foreign Gini measure reflects fairly well
income inequality in the North. Results from estimation of equation (5.2.1) are reported in Table
5.14 sub column (1) below:
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Table 5.14 - Fixed Effect model estimates of log high tech exports on selected independent
variables:
0.0000***0.0000***0.0045***Haus. p-value
56.7323110.82Haus. stat.
0.30.050.04R-sq. ov
0.250.160R-sq. be
0.730.770.51R-sq. wi
00-rel.exch.rates
 2.569 ***--loggdpprc
-2.34***-loggdptot
0.065*0.020.205***FG
0.055*0.050.172***DG
(3)(2)(1)Indep. variable
Regression no
Note: values shown are coefficient estimates; significance levels as in table 3.1; DG = domestic
Gini; FG = foreign Gini; loggdptot and loggdpprc as in table 5a.1; real exch. rates = real
exchange rates; R-sq. wi = R-square within, R-sq. be = R-square between, R-sq. ov = R-square
overall.
In the same table, column (2) presents regression results when the log of total gdp and
real exchange rates are controlled for, while in regression sub column (3) the control variables
are log of gdp per capita and real exchange rates. 
Domestic Gini and foreign Gini are both highly significant and positive when considered
on their own, but not so when the log of gdp total is used as a control. Notice however that they
pass the 10% significance threshold when gdp per capita is controlled for. One reason to prefer
the regression of column (3) to that of column (2) is that, since gdp per capita is less likely to
display a time trend than total gdp (the former is stationary when the latter grows at the same rate
as the population), and  since trended variables are notoriously more prone to produce spurious
results, the output of column (3) is likely to be more accurate than that of column (2). As for real
exchange rates, the fact that they turn out not to have any impact on high tech exports may be
explained by the fact that high tech exports generally do not compete on price.
Table 5.14 presents R-square and Hausman test statistics for the same regressions. The
values of Hausman tests here are all highly significant and justify estimation by the fixed effect
model in this case. 
As for R-square statistics, values are very low in the case of regressions sub column (1)
and (2), but they rise non negligibly when gdp per capita is controlled for (regression sub column
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(3)).  Such a higher R-square coefficient provides one further reason for us to prefer the
regression sub column (3). Therefore, we tentatively conclude, based on this regression, that the
analysis carried out in this section yields some evidence that both domestic income inequality
and foreign (mainly developed world) income inequality have a positive effect on the level of
high tech exports in developing countries. Such results, although not as strong as we would like
it to be, is nonetheless completely novel. As far as we know, this is the first time that some link
is being established between the technological progress of a developing country, and both its
domestic income distribution and the income distribution of its main trade partners. Furthermore,
these findings, particularly the one concerning the foreign Gini, are in line with the strand of
Schumpeterian growth theory when it predicts an increase in Northern income inequality to have
a positive effect on the rate of technology that is successfully transferred to the South. 
5.6 Conclusion
This study has investigated the role played by income inequality as a determinant of
technology-advancing activities, both in the developed world (the “North”) in the shape of
innovation, and in the developing world (the “South”) in the shape of successful technology
transfers. Technology-advancing activities were measured by RnD expenditures in the North and
by high tech exports in the South. The analysis has been conducted at three different levels: by
world region, by industrial sector, and by country.
While the analysis by world region did not produce any clear cut evidence, the analysis
by sector yielded some evidence that income inequality in the South may have a positive effect
on RnD expenditures in some industrial sectors, such as non electricals and pharmaceuticals. The
evidence also suggested a link between income inequality in the North and the South and the
level of high tech exports originating from the developing world. That link might be of different
sign, depending on the sector of industry, but the overall impact on Southern high tech exports
(logged) is probably negative in the case of Northern income inequality and positive with respect
to Southern income inequality. 
However, the strongest evidence came from the cross-country analysis. We found that for
each of the 15 OECD countries, foreign income inequality in the countries that trade the most
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with them, had a positive effect on the research and development expenditure carried out in those
15 countries. Such evidence appeared robust to whether we introduced control variables or not,
and to several ways of measuring the dependent variable and the independent variables
concerned. We also found that both domestic income inequality and foreign (mainly developed
world) income inequality had a positive effect on the level of high tech exports in developing
countries.
The cross country findings concerning income inequality as a possible determinant of
RnD expenditures in developed countries, do not support the strand of Schumpeterian growth
theory which was briefly explained in Section 5.2.1, and which this study tried to appraise. That
theory predicts a negative effect of Northern income inequality on Northern innovative activities,
owing to the negative effect that a stiffer competition in the Northern product market (due to
higher inequality) has on the innovative activities of that region. Such findings may however be
in line with a more recent strand of Schumpeterian growth literature which predicts a positive
effect of increased competition on innovative activities in the North, through an escape
competition effect that kicks in if outsiders cannot leapfrog incumbents but have to race
neck-and-neck with them, and that more than offsets the standard negative Schumpeterian effect.
As for the cross country findings relative to the determinants of high tech exports in the
developing world, although not as strong as those relative to Northern RnD, they still represent a
novel element that should be taken into account by future work in this area. Suggestions for such
future work may include refinements in the econometric techniques used, for example by
relaxing the assumption that the relationship between variables is linear, and variations to the
ways innovation and technology transfers are measured.
Finally, given that the theory posits the effect of income inequality on
technology-advancing activities to occur through changes in product markets structure and
competition, it might be of great interest to bring this latter element explicitly into the empirical
analysis. This might be achieved for example by performing a 2 stages least squares estimation,
where in the first stage income inequality is regressed on the degree of product market
competition and in the second stage, the latter is regressed on some measure of innovative or
technology-transferring activity. 
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Appendix A.5.1 - Data sources and methods
A.5.1.1 Research and Development Expenditures
Data on Research and Development expenditures come from the OECD ANBERD Database.
The data, in PPP dollars, refer to the following 15 OECD countries: Australia, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United
Kingdom, United States.
The variable RnD15 of Section 5.2 is calculated as total  manufacturing RnD
expenditures in the 15 OECD countries sampled. 
The variables tn1, tn2,..., tn9 of Section 5.3 are RnD expenditures totals for the 15 OECD
countries in each of the following industrial (manufacturing) sectors: aircraft, computing,
communication equipment, electrical, non electrical, chemical, pharmaceutical, other metal
products, items not elsewhere specified. 
The variable RnDi of Section 5.4 is total RnD expenditures in manufacturing for country
i.
A.5.1.2 High Tech Exports
High tech exports figures were calculated on the basis of exports data from the U. N. Comtrade
database. Figures concern the following 11 developing countries: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Rep. Korea,  Singapore, Thailand, Turkey. Mani (2000)
calculates that 10 of the 11 countries listed here (Turkey is not included) contributed about 90
per cent of the total exports of manufactures from the developing world in the period 1991 -
1997. We added Turkey to the sample because we found that it was the country that contributed
the most of the remaining 10 per cent (notice however that Turkey is not included for the
sectoral analysis carried out in Section 5.3).
To decide whether exports should qualify as having high technological content, we rely
on a table provided by Mani (2000), who reports a classification based on OECD definitions of
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high technology by Hatzichronoglu (1997), made according to SITC (Standard Trade
Classification) Revision 3. That table is shown below:
Table A.5.1.1 - High Tech Products List by OECD (Based on SITC Rev. 3)
8911, 8912, 8913, 8919Armaments
5413, 5415, 5416, 5421, 5422Pharmaceutical
Sum (52222...52269), 5251, 5259, 5311,
5312, 57433, 5911, 5912, 5913, 5914
Chemical Products
Sum (7741...7742), 8713, 8714, 8719, 87211,
Sum (87412...8749), 88111,88121, 88411,
88419, 89961, 89963, 89966, 89967
Scientific Instruments
71489, 71499, 71871, 71877, 71878, 72847,
7311, 73131, 73135, 73142, 73144, 73151,
73153, 73161, 73163, 73165, 73312, 73314,
73316, 7359, 73733, 73735
Non Electrical Equipment
Sum (77862...77865), 7787, 77884Electrical Equipment
76381, 76383, Sum (7641...76492), 7722,
77261, 77318, 77625, 77627, 7763, 7764,
7768, 89879
Electronics and Telecommunications
75113, Sum (75131...75134), 
Sum (7521...7527), 75997
Computing and Office Equipment
Sum (7922....7925)
Sum (71441....71491)
Aerospace
SITC Revision 3 CodesProduct Description
Source: Hatzichronoglou (1997) as reported in Mani (2000)
The HTEXPTS11 variable of Section 5.2 is calculated as the total export figure for the
commodities listed in table A1 across the 11 developing countries sampled.
The ts1, ts2, ..., ts9 variables of Section 5.3 are export totals across 10 developing countries (the
11 of Section 5.2 minus Turkey) for the commodities listed in table A1 in each of the following
industrial (manufacturing) sectors: aerospace, computing, electronics, electrical, non electrical,
chemical, pharmaceutical, armaments, items not elsewhere specified.
The HTEXPTSi  variable of Section 5.4 is total exports for the commodities listed in table
A1 for country i.
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A.5.1.3 Gini Coefficients
Gini coefficients for both the 15 OECD countries and the 11 developing countries sampled have
been calculated on the basis of the United Nations World Income Inequality Database
(U.N.W.I.I.D.), for the period 1988 - 1998. This database is a comprehensive collection of all the
existing primary sources of data on income inequality. Two are the problems that any user of this
database faces: first, on the time dimension, many data points are missing. Secondly, magnitudes
of Gini coefficients vary a great deal, depending on factors such as the income definition upon
which the Gini coefficient is calculated (gross income, net income and so on), the reference unit
used (person, household and so on) and the source of the data. 
In order to achieve consistency over time and across countries, wherever possible the
following criteria were adopted: 
1) use Gini coefficients based on gross income as the income definition;
2) employ the same data source, mainly the Luxembourg Income Survey, as much as possible;
3) use Gini coefficients based on household as the reference unit.
Wherever data for a particular year or longer time interval are alltogether missing, we
interpolate by using the available extremes of the relevant time interval. If data are missing for
the preferred data source, income definition or reference unit but coefficients are available under
different criteria, we interpolate assuming that the missing coefficients change at the same rate as
those available under different criteria. If data based on gross income are not available
throughout the period, where possible we use coefficients based on net income and add a
constant c (generally    c = 5), in accordance with the guidelines of the U.N.W.I.I.D.
Finally, when no interpolation is possible, we assume that the coefficient remains
constant throughout the missing years (typically such an instance occurs towards the end of the
time interval).
The Northern Gini coefficient of Sections 5.2 and 5.3 is a simple average of the Gini
coefficients of the 15 OECD countries sampled. Likewise, the Southern Gini coefficient of
Section 5.2 is the simple average of the 11 developing countries sampled. In Section 5.3, the
simple average was calculated over 10 countries (Turkey was not included in the calculation).
The FG1, FG2, FG3 and FG4 are trade-weighted average Gini coefficients calculated as
follows: FG1 of country i is the trade-weighted average Gini coefficient of the 5 biggest trade
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partners of country i. In symbols:  where j indexes countries and the weights FG1 i = j=1
5
wijGj wij
are the ratio of value of trade of country j with country i in all commodities above total value of
trade of country i in all commodities. FG2 is like FG1, except that the weights are calculated for
the value of trade in the subset of high tech commodities as defined in table A1. FG3 of country i
is the trade-weighted average Gini coefficient of the 6 biggest trade partners of country i among
the developing 11 in the subset of high tech commodities. The calculation is as before, but j is
now an element of the set of 11 developing countries, and the weights are calculated as the ratio
of value of trade of country j with country i in high tech commodities  above total value of trade
of country i in high tech commodities. Finally, FG4 is like FG3, except that j now indexes the set
of 15 OECD countries.
A.5.1.4 Control Variables
Data sources for the control variables are as follows: gdp and population data, both for the 15
OECD countries and the 11 developing countries included in the study, come from the World
Development Indicators Database of the World Bank. The variables “openness” and “real
exchange rates” are from the Penn World Tables 6.0. 
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Appendix A.5.2 - Other Tables and Figures 
In this Appendix we present those figures and tables that did not find space in the main text, yet
are very useful for understanding the main features of the data.
Tables A.5.2.1 to A.5.2.4:
Table A.5.2.1 - Correlations and basic statistics for variables in Section 5.3
47.6434.9239.0421.7730.625.5126.31Max.
44.1933.9330.4221.6330.2422.9325.89Min.
1.080.32.640.050.130.820.13St.Dev.
45.8234.3433.521.7130.4224.4926.09Mean
10.90.910.980.970.950.96SG
10.90.920.920.880.94NG
10.890.90.870.97openn15
110.980.96logpop11
10.980.96loggdp15
10.94logHTexpts11
1logRnD15
SGNGopenn15logpop11loggdp15logHTexpts11logRnD15
Note: See main text for definitions of variables
Table A.5.2.2 - Correlations and basic statistics for variables in Section 5.4
21.7739.0430.647.534.9225.0425.43Max.
21.6330.4230.2444.2933.9316.7222.97Min.
0.042.520.120.940.291.790.58St.Dev.
21.7133.530.4245.734.3421.1423.84Mean
10.8910.960.920.440.23logpop10
10.90.930.90.380.22openn15
10.960.920.440.23loggdp15
10.90.420.23SG
10.390.22NG
10.43logts
1logtn
logpop10openn15loggdp15SGNGlogtslogtn
Note: See main text for definitions of variables
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Table A.5.2.3 - Correlations and basic statistics for variables in Section 5.5.1
10.7415729.7641.6648.9642.0941.8244.625.61Max.
9.316.3124.3832.1239.7231.4532.0325.118.65Min.
0.2528.551.41.581.891.942.184.351.65St.Dev.
9.9358.126.936.5544.6737.0336.0434.422.1Mean
1-0.210.490.140.270.140.150.080.5loggdpprc
1-0.700.23-0.040.050.02-0.65openness
10.11-0.010.120.080.150.95loggdptot
10.080.890.770.030.14FG4
10.110.15-0.180FG3
10.720.130.13FG2
1-0.060.15FG1
10.12DG
1logRnD
loggdpprcopenn
.
loggdptotFG4FG3FG2FG1DGlogRnD
Note: See main text for definitions of variables
Table A.5.2.4 - Correlations and basic statistics for variables in Section 5.5.2
261,0009.9329.0544.0760.1424.82Maximum
07.1724.2233.1433.6418.49Minimum
28,548.180.71.082.547.481.65St.Dev.
5,283.078.4926.7538.1545.9822.03Mean
10.050-0.10.06-0.25relexchrate
1-0.540.530.210.6loggdpprc
1-0.18-0.01-0.27loggdptot
10.130.71FG
1-0.09DG
1loghtexpts  
relexchrateloggdpprcloggdptotFGDGloghtexpts
Note: See main text for definitions of variables
These tables convey the following information: correlation coefficients between the independent
variables of Sections 5.3 and 5.4 are high and may hint at a multicollinearity problem. The
addition of control variables seems to make the problem worse. Notice however that there seems
to be no multicollinearity problem in Sections 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 which are characterized by much
lower correlation coefficients. This is good news for the main findings of this study, since they
are mainly based on Section 5.5. 
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From Section 5.3 the following figures are of some interest because they allow comparison of
RnD expenditures and high tech exports across sectors:
Figure A.5.2.1 (from Section 5.4):
Figure A.5.2.2 (from Section 5.4):
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RnD Expenditures by Industrial Sector
year
 1 logtn  2 logtn
 3 logtn  4 logtn
88 97
22.9662
25.4315
HighTech Exports by Industrial Sector
year
 1 logts  2 logts
 3 logts  4 logts
88 97
16.7208
25.042
Figures below display time series data, from 1988 to 1998, of logRnD expenditures (the
lowermost line in the graphs), FG1, FG2, FG3 (the uppermost line in the graphs) and FG4 for
each of the 15 OECD countries sampled (see Appendix A.5.1 for definitions).
Figures A.5.2.3 to A.5.2.17:
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Australia
year
 logRnD  FG1
 FG2  FG3
1988 1998
20.6133
44.99
Canada
year
 logRnD  FG1
 FG2  FG3
1988 1998
21.6112
47.92
Denmark
year
 logRnD  FG1
 FG2  FG3
1988 1998
19.9957
48.82
Finland
year
 logRnD  FG1
 FG2  FG3
1988 1998
20.2997
46.25
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France
year
 logRnD  FG1
 FG2  FG3
1988 1998
23.0845
45.84
Germany
year
 logRnD  FG1
 FG2  FG3
1988 1998
23.6861
46.84
Ireland
year
 logRnD  FG1
 FG2  FG3
1988 1998
18.6523
45.91
Italy
year
 logRnD  FG1
 FG2  FG3
1988 1998
22.3562
48.02
Japan
year
 logRnD  FG1
 FG2  FG3
1988 1998
24.2521
44.87
Netherlands
year
 logRnD  FG1
 FG2  FG3
1988 1998
21.5433
48.04
  
 
The above figures illustrate visually how different are the trade-weighted foreign Gini
coefficients. It is apparent from the graphs that, with the exception of Australia and possibly
France, the Netherlands for the first five years, and Spain for the last five years, in the remaining
cases FG1, FG2 and FG4 are very similar measures of income inequality.
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Norway
year
 logRnD  FG1
 FG2  FG3
1988 1998
19.9143
47.66
Spain
year
 logRnD  FG1
 FG2  FG3
1988 1998
20.9371
48.27
Sweden
year
 logRnD  FG1
 FG2  FG3
1988 1998
21.5231
48.96
United Kingdom
year
 logRnD  FG1
 FG2  FG3
1988 1998
22.9786
46.3
United States
year
 logRnD  FG1
 FG2  FG3
1988 1998
25.1834
46.3
Chapter 6 Conclusion
The goal of this book has been to analyze two important issues relative to technological progress
and economic development. The first issue is whether FDI is an effective carrier of technology
from developed countries to the group of developing countries that are referred to as "middle
income" in the World Bank classifications. The linked issue of whether FDI, as a vehicle for
technology transfers, is a positive factor in the process of economic development of middle
income countries, has also been investigated. 
The second object of this study has been to investigate whether and how differences in
income distributions across countries might affect their technological progress.
Both these topics have been studied by following the same scheme. First, a theoretical
framework has been laid down, in order to advance a reasoned argument for the topic in
question, and then the predictions stemming from that analysis have been tested empirically. In
this vein, Chapter 1 examined theories that predicted a relationship between FDI and economic
development. In this chapter, the point of departure was a strand of literature that in sociology is
known as capital dependency theory, which holds a pessimistic view of the role of FDI in
developing countries. Such an opinion maintains that FDI is carried out by multinational
enterprises which are economic agents that act in pursuit of their own self interest. Attracted by
local demand for their goods, these firms bring FDI into a developing country, thereby triggering
a short term positive effect for that country. In the long run however, once that demand becomes
saturated and fades, the multinational firms withdraw their investment and move it to a new
country, leaving behind a long term negative effect for the country that hosted the investment.
Chapter 1 contrasted this view with a far more positive argument, advanced by the core models
of new growth theory in economics, and their augmented versions which take open economies
and FDI into account. The basis of this argument was that a primary factor in fostering growth is
technological change. In this context, FDI is a positive determinant of economic development
insofar as it is a vehicle for technology transfers from the country where the investment
originates to the country of its destination. The two elements of this argument that were tested
empirically were whether the amount of technology embodied into FDI mattered for
development and whether this was a peculiar feature of developing countries. The logic of these
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tests was that FDI can best fulfill its role as a vehicle for technology transfers when the
technological intensity of FDI is higher, and when the receiving nation's main mode of achieving
technological progress is through the technology that it receives from overseas. With respect to
the first question, the evidence found was that, in the development regression, the share of high
tech FDI in total FDI was significant but total FDI was not. Moreover, such a significance was
maintained throughout a sensitivity analysis that considered different ways of constructing that
share. 
As for the second question, the regressor "share of high tech FDI in total FDI" was
significant across the sample of developing countries, but it was not across the sample of OECD
countries. We concluded that the evidence found pointed to a positive  answer to both questions.
Chapters 3 and 4 have suggested models which predicted a relationship between income
inequality and technological progress. These models adopted the conceptual framework of the
endogenous growth literature based on quality improvements, also known as quality ladders
literature. We saw, first in the literature survey of Chapter 1, and then in the description of the
models of Chapters 3 and 4, that the two core references of this literature are the works of
Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992). Without wishing here to repeat
its main features, we recall that this literature, as it stands, is unable to assign a part to income
inequality, chiefly because it is characterized by homothetic Cobb Douglas-like consumers who
are all characterized by the same trade-off between price and quality. The trick that made it
possible for income inequality to become a variable capable of explaining technological progress
and growth has been to model consumer preferences as a choice over the quality of an
indivisible, durable good. Such preferences are no longer homothetic because now the
distribution of consumers splits into wealthier individuals who are willing to pay more and
obtain a higher quality, and poorer individuals who are happy to pay less and get a lower quality.
Applying these ideas to a closed economy setup, the model of Chapter 3 predicted that if the
market for quality goods is characterized by a monopoly of the best quality, an increase in
income inequality is harmful for technological progress and growth. By contrast, in a market
with two qualities such an increase in inequality is good for technological progress and growth. 
Chapter 4 considered an extension of this model with quality ladders and non-homothetic
preferences to an open economy context, and presented an analysis of the interactions between
the degree of income inequality in two big world regions, a wealthier and more egalitarian North
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and a poorer and more unequal South, and their rate of technological progress. The main
contribution of this model was that changes in the distribution of income in one region have an
effect on the speed of technological change not only in that region but also in the rest of the
world. Such a prediction was explained by the way those changes in the income distribution of
each region feed back into the incentives that motivate those working in the research lab in both
regions to carry out technology-advancing activities. 
These theoretical setups have been followed by empirical tests whose objective was the
verification of the validity of the predictions churned out by these theories. Hence Chapter 5
tested for the role of income inequality as a determinant of technology-advancing activities, both
in developing and in developed countries. The analysis by sector of industry yielded some
evidence that income inequality, particularly that in the developing world, may have a positive
impact on the research activities of some industrial sectors in the developed world. In particular,
these sectors were computing and chemicals and, to a lesser extent, non electricals and
pharmaceuticals. Another result was a positive effect of developing world income inequality on
the high tech exports originating from the same region. However, the sign of this effect changed
with the sector of activity, making it difficult to gauge the sign and magnitude of the overall
impact. The most convincing evidence came from the analysis by country. It was found that for
the 15 OECD countries that were selected to represent the developed world, the research
activities therein performed were positively influenced by higher income inequality in the main
trading partners of these countries. Furthermore, domestic and foreign (mainly developed world)
income inequality had a positive effect on the level of high tech exports in developing countries.
Although the findings of this book cannot be defined as "conclusive", they should be
considered as a contribution whose aim is to raise awareness towards the.topics in question and
the variety of channels through which links between the variables of interest may be envisaged. 
We conclude this thesis by attempting (in Section 6.1) to provide some suggestions on
how future researchers who decide to occupy themselves with the issues that were studied herein
might investigate them further. 
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6.1 Directions for Future Research
With respect to the issue of FDI and development, the contribution of this book in the theoretical
field was simply to take stock (in Chapter 1) of some of the recent developments and use them as
a platform on which to base the empirical research of Chapter 2. The most immediate and
obvious way in which such a research can be enhanced, is by exploiting new data on FDI as they
become available, particularly with respect to the breakdown of these data by sector of industry.
New data may become available not only because of better collection methods, but also because
the group of developing, middle income countries that formed the object of our study may
become larger,  due to changing geo-political conditions. The empirical research of Chapter 2
was based on the idea that FDI may perform a peculiar function as a vehicle for technology
transfers in the context of developing countries. In order to test this idea, we mostly relied on
data relative to Latin America and East Asia, where the most complete data on FDI for middle
income countries could be found. However, with the fall of the Soviet Union, both in Eastern
Europe and Central Asia, a whole new geographical area, comprising all those countries that are
also known as "countries in transition", has opened up to the kind of empirical research carried
out in Chapter 2. Therefore, future studies that set out to test the same idea, can employ a
broader sample to include these new countries, as data concerning their FDI inflow, become
available. Advances in data collection will render it possible to take advantage of more
sophisticated econometric techniques, such as panel data analysis, so that many of the issues
raised by the cross-sectional nature of the study of Chapter 2 can be addressed in a more
effective way.
While it is widely accepted that a relationship between FDI, technological progress and
economic development may exist (although some controversies still persist, as explained in
Chapters 1 and 2), the role of income inequality as a determinant of technological progress and
economic development is a far more novel concept that has not been investigated as deeply in
the literature. Chapters 3 and 4 provided a theoretical framework for such a role, and should
therefore constitute a valuable contribution. There are several ways in which a theory that aims
to explain technological progress with income inequality can be taken further than it has been
done in Chapters 3 and 4. The way the process of technological change is conceived can be
modified. In Chapter 3, incumbents in the quality goods market are happy with their position as
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monopolists and have no incentive to innovate further. This assumption produces the well known
leapfrogging result, whereby research activities are undertaken by outsiders only. Since this
prediction is counterfactual, it could be changed by espousing the setting employed by Aghion et
al. (2001), in which outsiders cannot leapfrog incumbents, but must first catch up with them. The
open economy model of Chapter 4 could also be changed in a similar fashion, and a similar
process of innovation as such envisaged by Aghion et al. (2001) is certainly bound to change the
feedback mechanisms by which income inequality in each world region affects technological
change everywhere. The model of Chapter 4 could also be extended by taking into explicit
account the possibility for firms to bring goods to an overseas market not just through costless
trade, but also through FDI. All the cost and strategy considerations implied by the FDI decision
would then play a part in establishing the direction of influence of income inequality on
technological progress in each region.
In Chapter 5, the ideas developed in Chapters 3 and 4 have been tested empirically. The
final comment of this thesis is dedicated to the important topic of how future research should go
about improving and extending such a test. In order to do so, it is probably useful to attempt an
assessment of what has been achieved by the study of Chapter 5 and what still needs
investigation. The empirical tests of Chapter 5, as well as the theory of Chapters 3 and 4, have
tried to establish a further channel of transmission through which income inequality relates to
economic development, beyond the two accepted channels of physical and human capital
accumulation, most recently mentioned by Galor and Moav (2004). This channel has been
thought to be technological progress. In the theory, the transmission from income inequality to
technological progress and then to economic development is thought to occur via the product
market, due to the fact that competition in that market has an effect on expected profits and the
incentives to innovate. As was noted in Chapter 5, per se the link between product market
competition and technological progress has been studied in recent work by Aghion et al. (2002).
An interesting extension to our work would be to bring such a role for product market
competition explicitly into the design of our empirical test. Needless to say, all the caveats that
apply to a more complex econometric analysis as that which would take place with the addition
of yet another step in the chain of transmission between inequality and development, would
apply to such an extension. 
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A further point is that whether the chain income inequality  technological progress t t
economic development becomes an established and broadly accepted fact depends on the
strength of the evidence supplied by tests such as that of Chapter 5. Notice however that such a
test concerns income inequality at one end and economic development at the other. These are
two features most typical of developing countries. Therefore, a test involving such features
would ideally be considered more satisfactory if the evidence thereby found were strongest
across the sample of developing countries. However, as noted a little earlier, the evidence found
was strongest across the sample of developed countries. This may depend on the way income
inequality has been measured, at a macro level and by using Gini coefficients. Although a widely
accepted and employed measure, Gini coefficients may miss some subtler mechanisms that
might be at work when technological progress and economic development take place in the
specific context of developing countries. The difficulty for cross-country analysis to uncover all
the possible factors that may be at work in regressions which include inequality and the need for
the employment of alternative measures of inequality based on microeconometric techniques has
also been noted in the literature that studies inequality as a left hand side variable and growth as
one of its possible determinants (see Bourgignon, 2002). Some other, perhaps micro-founded,
perhaps qualitative, measurement of income inequality is therefore called for. Such an alternative
measurement should be more capable at capturing developing country features which may
influence the composition of the demand for technological goods, such as the emergence of a
middle class44. It is therefore a task for future research to envisage such an alternative measure of
inequality and produce the kind of evidence that would place the relationship which goes from
inequality to development through technological progress, firmly in the realm of accepted
knowledge.
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44 I would like to thank Philippe Aghion for this suggestion on how to extend my empirical work in a way that
could yield stronger evidence towards the existence of a link between inequality and technological progress in the
context of developing countries.
Nederlandse Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
Dit boek behandelt twee belangrijke onderwerpen met betrekking tot technologische vooruitgang
en economische ontwikkeling. Het eerste onderwerp betreft de vraag of buitenlandse directe
investeringen een effectieve manier zijn om technologie van ontwikkelde landen naar
ontwikkelingslanden over te dragen, waarbij de laatste groep landen bestaat uit middeninkomens
landen. Ook wordt de verwante vraag bestudeerd, namelijk of buitenlandse directe investeringen
als drager van technologische kennis een positieve invloed hebben op het ontwikkelingsproces
van middeninkomens landen. Het tweede onderwerp dat in deze dissertatie wordt behandeld, is
de vraag of en hoe verschillen in inkomensverdeling tussen landen invloed kunnen hebben op
technologische vooruitgang. 
Beide onderwerpen worden bestudeerd aan de hand van een vergelijkbaar schema. In de
eerste plaats wordt een theoretisch raamwerk geconstrueerd, om daarmee een beredeneerd
argument voor het onderwerp in kwestie te kunnen formuleren. Vervolgens worden de
voorspellingen die uit deze analyse voortvloeien empirisch getoetst. Volgens dit patroon geeft
Hoofdstuk 1 een overzicht van de theorieën die een verband voorspellen tussen buitenlandse
investeringen en economische ontwikkeling. Het vertrekpunt in dit hoofdstuk is een deel van de
literatuur die binnen de sociologie bekend staat als de capital dependancy theorie. Deze theorie
heeft een pessimistische kijk op de  rol van buitenlandse directe investeringen in
ontwikkelingslanden. De mening van deze theorie is dat buitenlandse directe investeringen
worden verricht door multinationale ondernemingen die alleen vanuit hun eigenbelang handelen.
Aangetrokken door de lokale vraag naar goederen, gaan de buitenlandse directe investeringen
naar het land toe waarbij ze alleen op korte termijn een positief effect hebben voor het betrokken
land. Op lange termijn echter, als de vraag is voldaan en verdwijnt, trekt de multinationale
onderneming haar investeringen terug en gaat naar een nieuw land. De multinational veroorzaakt
hierdoor op de lange termijn een negatief effect op de economische groei van het land waarin het
geïnvesteerd heeft. Hoofdstuk 1 stelt tegenover deze mening een optimistischer visie. Hierbij
maakt ze gebruik van de modellen van de nieuwe economische groeitheorie en dan met name
van de uitgebreidere versies die een open economie en buitenlandse investeringen in de
beschouwing betrekken. Het basisargument is dat technologische verandering een belangrijker
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factor vormt in het bevorderen van economische groei. In dit verband zijn buitenlandse directe
investeringen een positief verklarende factor van economisch groei, voor zover deze
investeringen technologische kennis overbrengen van het land waar de investeringen vandaan
komen naar het land waar de investeringen naar toe gaan. De twee elementen van dit argument
werden empirisch getoetst door na te gaan of de hoeveelheid technologie die in de buitenlandse
investering besloten zit van belang is voor economische ontwikkeling en of dit verband typisch
is voor de ontwikkelingslanden. Deze toets is in overeenstemming met de theoretische literatuur
over dit onderwerp, die beargumenteert dat meer aandacht geschonken moet worden aan de
verschillende soorten buitenlandse directe investeringen. Buitenlandse directe investeringen met
hoogwaardige technologie spelen een belangrijke rol. 
Hoofdstuk 2 gaat na of dit effect bestaat en hoe groot of dit is. Dit hoofdstuk is een
cross-sectie studie van 29 ontwikkelingslanden, waarvoor we twee vergelijkingen schatten. In de
eerste vergelijking is de onafhankelijke variabele het aandeel van buitenlandse directe
investeringen met een hoog technologisch gehalte als aandeel van de totale directe buitenlandse
investeringen. Dit aandeel wordt verklaard uit de omvang van de bevolking en het gemiddelde
aantal jaren scholing als benadering voor de factorbeschikbaarheid van het gastland, en uit de
hoogte van de inflatie als benadering van de mate van macro-economische onzekerheid in het
desbetreffende land. In de tweede vergelijking regresseren we het aandeel technologisch
hoogwaardige buitenlandse directe investeringen op het inkomen per hoofd van de bevolking.
We vinden dat landen met een hoge mate van factorbeschikbaarheid, benaderd door
bevolkingsomvang en de voorraad menselijk kapitaal, en landen met een lage onzekerheid in
staat zijn buitenlandse investeringen met hoogwaardige technologie naar zich toe te trekken. We
vinden ook enkele aanwijzingen voor een positieve relatie tussen het aandeel van buitenlandse
investeringen met een hoge technologische kennis en de hoogte van het inkomen per hoofd van
de bevolking in het gastland. We voeren twee toetsen uit om na te gaan of de gevonden
resultaten afhankelijk zijn van het aandeel van hoogwaardige technologische buitenlandse
directe investeringen en de data van de desbetreffende ontwikkelingslanden. Ten eerste
vervangen we het aandeel van buitenlandse directe investeringen door de totale voorraad van
buitenlandse directe investeringen. Ten tweede wordt de regressie niet uitgevoerd voor de
ontwikkelingslanden maar voor een groep OESO-landen. Beide veranderingen leiden niet tot
significant andere resultaten.
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Hoofdstuk 3 is het eerste van drie hoofdstukken waarin nagegaan wordt of en hoe
verschillen in inkomensverdeling tussen landen invloed kunnen hebben op de technologische
vooruitgang in deze landen. Hiertoe ontwikkelt Hoofdstuk 3 een endogene groei model voor een
gesloten economie waarbij technologische vooruitgang door middel van quality ladders wordt
gemodelleerd en de consumenten heterogeen zijn met betrekking tot hun inkomen en
niet-homothetische preferenties bezitten. We laten zien dat in dit model, in tegenstelling tot de
gebruikelijke quality ladders modellen het steady state evenwicht wordt gekarakteriseerd door
een duopoly waarin de meest geavanceerde technologie en de technologie vlak daarachter beide
kunnen blijven bestaan. Dit geldt onder bepaalde voorwaarden met betrekking tot de
inkomensverdeling. In de woorden van Schumpeter levert dit model alleen gedeeltelijke
creatieve destructie op. Verder laten we zien dat onder duopoly een toename van de mate van
inkomensongelijkheid leidt tot een hogere intensiteit van onderzoeksactiviteiten en een hogere
groeivoet van de economie. 
Hoofdstuk 4 modelleert de wisselwerking tussen inkomensongelijkheid en
technologische vooruitgang in een open economie. Het laat zien dat in een wereld met twee
blokken (Noord en Zuid) een toename van de ongelijkheid in het Zuiden leidt tot een toename
van innovatief onderzoek in het Noorden maar een onbepaalde invloed heeft op de mate van
technologische overdracht naar het Zuiden. Een toename van de ongelijkheid in het Noorden
heeft een tegenovergesteld effect op de technologische vooruitgang in het Zuiden. Het leidt tot
een afname van onderzoeksactiviteiten in het Noorden maar tot een toename in de mate van
technologische overdracht naar het Zuiden. De reden die wij voor dit resultaat geven, is dat de
dreiging van de toegang van een producent van lagere kwaliteit in het Noorden leidt tot een
afname van de verwachte winsten daar, terwijl een afname van onderzoeksactiviteiten leidt tot
een vermindering van de mate waarin Zuidelijke bedrijven de markten verlaten waarin ze actief
zijn.
Hoofdstuk 5 toetst de theorie zoals die is ontwikkeld in de hoofdstukken 3 en 4 voor wat
betreft de voorspelling van deze theorie met betrekking tot de rol van inkomensongelijkheid als
een bepalende factor voor de mate van innovatie in het Noorden en technologische overdrachten
naar het Zuiden. De analyse wordt op drie niveaus uitgevoerd: de wereld, de bedrijfstakken en de
landen. De analyse op het niveau van de wereld levert geen enkel duidelijk resultaat op. De
analyse op het niveau van de sectoren levert een indicatie dat inkomensongelijkheid in het
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Zuiden een positief effect kan hebben op uitgaven voor onderzoek en ontwikkeling in sommige
industriële sectoren die in het Noorden gelegen zijn, zoals de computerindustrie en de chemische
industrie en in mindere mate de niet-elektrische en farmaceutische industrie. Een ander resultaat
bestaat uit een positief effect van de ongelijkheid van inkomen in ontwikkelingslanden op de
export van technologisch hoogwaardige goederen vanuit deze landen. Echter, het teken van dit
effect verandert per sector, waardoor het moeilijk wordt het teken en de omvang van het effect
voor het geheel te bepalen. De duidelijkste resultaten vinden we met behulp van de analyse op
het niveau van de landen. We vinden dat voor de OESO-landen de ongelijkheid van het inkomen
in de landen waar elk land de meeste handel mee drijft, een positieve invloed heeft op de
uitgaven aan onderzoek en ontwikkeling in deze 15 landen. Dit resultaat blijkt robuust met
betrekking tot de invoering van controle variabelen en met betrekking tot verschillende manieren
om de afhankelijke variabele en de onafhankelijke variabelen te meten. Deze analyse levert ook
aanwijzingen op voor een positief effect van zowel binnenlandse als buitenlandse (voornamelijk
ontwikkelde wereld) inkomensongelijkheid op het niveau van technologische overdrachten naar
ontwikkelingslanden. 
Ten slotte vat Hoofdstuk 6 de resultaten van de vorige hoofdstukken samen en suggereert
enkele richtingen voor toekomstig onderzoek. In het kort, Hoofdstuk 2 zou kunnen worden
uitgebreid door gebruik te maken van nieuwe econometrische technieken en nieuwe gegevens
over buitenlandse directe investeringen, zoals deze recentelijk beschikbaar zijn gekomen.
Hoofdstukken 3 en 4 kunnen aangepast worden door het proces van technologische verandering
anders te behandelen en Hoofdstuk 5 kan worden uitgebreid door gebruik te maken van andere
maatstaven voor inkomensongelijkheid.
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